

BRONZS


BRITISH REVIEW

OF

NEW ZEALAND

STUDIES

Number 1 July 1988



Non – nuclear defence policy

1987 General Election

First nuclear ship 'ban'

Maori self – government 1945
– 1981

Early days of electricity

generation and supply

The British Review of New Zealand Studies is edited by Ged Martin and Guy M. Robinson and published once a year. It aims to encourage the study of all aspects of New Zealand in Britain.

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Submission of articles (of between 3,000 and 10,000 words) is welcomed, especially from the United Kingdom. Two copies of a typescript should be submitted, double-spaced. A style sheet is available on request. Submission of an article will be taken as an assurance that it has not already been published, is not under consideration for publication elsewhere, and that, if accepted, the author(s) will undertake to provide camera-ready copy in a form requested by the editors. Every effort will be made to keep typescripts safe and to respond within reasonable time, but the editors cannot accept responsibility for any loss, damage or delay which may occur. The editors aim to develop the review section as a forum for British debate on New Zealand publications, but regret that they cannot undertake to cover all works submitted.

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BRITISH REVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND STUDIES

The British Review of New Zealand Studies is intended to encourage the study of New Zealand in Britain. The past two decades have seen a dramatic slackening, almost a violent breach, in the traditional close ties between New Zealand and the UK. We do not challenge the necessity for those changes, and we neither would nor could reverse them. Rather we feel that the time has come when we in the United Kingdom should rediscover and redefine an interest in New Zealand, and when New Zealand scholarship has reached a stage of maturity where it can benefit from discussion in a parallel if distant country.

We did not wish to launch yet another expensive academic publication, nor did we wish to burden New Zealand libraries with even a small subscription at a time when funds are in short supply. BRONZS was accordingly launched on two principles: that it would use low-cost production methods, placing the onus on its contributors to supply camera-ready copy, and that it would be given to libraries of record, including 22 in New Zealand itself. The latter principle obviously costs a shoe-string venture valuable revenue. We hope to maintain the principle of deposit, and appeal for sponsorship to make its continuation possible.

The idea of interdisciplinary area studies is well-established within British higher education. African, Asian and Latin American Studies have at various times been generously funded by the British government. Canadian Studies and European Studies receive generous support from Ottawa and Brussels. American, Australian, Middle Eastern and Japanese Studies have each received external support from foundations and governments. We believe that it is important that New Zealand concerns should be articulated by British academics and taught to the students who will form the next generation of opinion formers in this province of the EEC, but we fully recognise that economic constraints limit the support which any government in Wellington can currently give to cultural and educational diplomacy overseas. BRONZS, then, is an exercise in academic self-help, and we hope its shortcomings may be forgiven.

One practical difficulty which has delayed the appearance of this first issue has been the lack of any academic network in Britain to bring into contact scholars interested in New Zealand. BRONZS

emerges into the daylight almost like an underground publication: word has been passed around and, bit by bit, we have been made contact with exiled Kiwis, with British academics who retain grateful memories of their a lectureship overseas, and with scholars interested to read, and to comment on, New Zealand work in fields parallel to their own. That is one reason why we have encouraged reviewers to write at length; another was our feeling that New Zealand writing deserves but rarely finds an overseas forum.

The publication of this first issue of BRONZS enables us to claim that we are now in contact with the nucleus of a British scholarly community interested in the study of New Zealand. We have a long way to go before we might claim the coherence of those who style themselves 'Americanists' or 'Africanists' - nor dare we guess what label might be chosen! The important thing is that BRONZS is now in being.

Whether it will survive and flourish depends on the support it receives - from academics who write for BRONZS, from publishers who send BRONZS books to review, from those who contribute advertisements and sponsorship to BRONZS but - above all - to those who buy the copies. We have no commercial publisher to fall back on, no inflated library subscriptions to cushion us - nothing, in short, but the hope that there is enough interest, one side of the world in far-off New Zealand, on the other in what the one-time metropolitan society, no longer 'Home', makes of its half-lost South Pacific cousins.


We already owe thanks to many people: contributors, reviewers, subscribers, advertisers and well-wishers. We are grateful to record the financial support of NZI Corporation, of Westpac and of one other company whose policy is to decline acknowledgement. The New Zealand High Commission in London and the British High Commission in Wellington have both offered valued encouragement.


The second issue of BRONZS is planned for July 1989. Contributions, books for review, offers and suggestions for reviewers - especially in the UK - are all warmly invited.

Ged Martin

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BRITISH REVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND STUDIES

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
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THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING A NON-NUCLEAR DEFENCE
POLICY: NEW ZEALAND IN AN ELECTION YEAR

New Zealand's general election, held on 15 August 1987, saw the Labour Party returned for a further period in office for the first time in nearly half a century. Despite regaining both of the Democrats' seats in the House of Representatives, the National Party failed to dent Prime Minister David Lange's fifteen-seat majority. However, ministers' euphoria was checked by evidence that extensive abstaining had ensured a swing against them nearly twice that felt by colleagues in more marginal constituencies. Nevertheless, Labour clearly broadened the base of its electoral support by attracting many of Auckland's middle-class voters away from their traditional National Party allegiance. The transformation of Labour's parliamentary party, initiated early in the decade, and consolidated by the unexpected victory of July 1984, appears now to be permanent. The consequences, not simply for the Labour movement, but for New Zealand as a whole, have already proved profound. The Lange government's confidence in fighting for re-election on its economic record, promising further hardship as the price of ultimate prosperity, confirmed the present leadership's unqualified break with Labour's longstanding 'welfare statist' tradition.(1)

With inflation around eighteen per cent, and the unemployment level at six per cent, the visibly widening gap between rich and poor should have provoked an extensive debate over the condition of the economy. Yet the opposition did little more than lament the remarkable speed with which Labour has shifted resources from the public to the private sector; and articulate the complaints of those hardest hit by Finance Minister Roger Douglas's rapid refocusing of economic priorities away from subsidised farming and protected manufacturing, and towards a burgeoning service sector centred heavily upon Auckland. Further south, especially across Cook Strait, National's traditional support had been strengthened by the bankruptcies and redundancies that have plagued the small towns and rural communities. Focusing on the newly unemployed, opponents strove with only modest success to erode Labour's urban power bases in Christchurch, Dunedin and the smaller South Island towns.

All parties concentrated upon key social issues, such as the rising crime rate, Maori rights, and above all, education. The National Party actually preferred such a campaign, tacitly conceding that once in office the prevailing economic strategy would change only in name. In three years 'Rogernomics' had become synonymous with the promotion of an unfettered economy, checked only by minimum income guarantees and a creaking welfare system purporting to represent more than just a gesture of social justice. The National leadership, under Jim Bolger, offered no viable alternative, while at the same time dissociating itself

entirely from the heavily interventionist policies still so closely associated with the former prime minister, Sir Robert Muldoon. Bolger himself proved a more than competent campaigner, but his efforts to exploit the law-and-order issue ultimately backfired. In addition, his promise of a tougher line on welfare benefits merely encouraged voters in low-income families, often Maori or South Pacific islanders, to place self-interest before their general disillusion with Labour.

Thus, the National Party often chose to ignore government charges of economic mismanagement whenever in office. Yet opposition leaders rarely focused their efforts upon the area in which they had most consistently and most vehemently condemned the Labour government for much of the previous three years, namely its conduct of foreign policy, and in particular the effective suspension of New Zealand's alliance with the United States of America. This article sets out to examine the deterioration in relations between Washington and Wellington, in the context of the present government's continued adherence to a strictly non-nuclear defence posture; also seeking to suggest why, surprisingly, defence did not become one of the most salient issues in the 1987 general election campaign.

The NZ Labour Party and the French presence in the Pacific

Since Labour first came to power in 1936, successive administrations have not felt afraid to seek out the higher moral ground when establishing the foreign policy interests of an admittedly small and securely isolated nation. Rejecting accusations of naivety or even of disloyalty to old allies, the present government claims not only to have enhanced New Zealand's global standing as a nation of principle, but also instigated a genuine enhancement of territorial and regional security. The relative size and effectiveness of New Zealand's support for Great Britain, and subsequently also the United States, through a succession of armed conflicts since 1899, is invariably quoted in rebutting any outside claim that the country no longer acknowledges an obligation to protect Western interests in the South Pacific. Many of the government's more vociferous critics at home would not hesitate to endorse this form of rebuttal should such a view be voiced by a non-New Zealander. Sensitive to the nation's general wariness of Americans, unashamed antipathy towards the French, and outright indignation if lectured to by the British, National Party leaders checked their initial enthusiasm and increasingly distanced themselves from the harsh criticism expressed by Sir Geoffrey Howe during his controversial visit to Canberra and Wellington in late April 1987.(2)

The aftermath of the Foreign Secretary's stormy meeting with David Lange and his advisers - Conservative backbenchers in rural seats calling for cuts in NZ lamb imports, and the prime minister in Wellington publicly attacking Sir Geoffrey on television - marked a nadir in Anglo-New Zealand relations. Labour's critics argued that such a development

was the sad consequence of approaching the nuclear issue emotionally rather than dispassionately. Defenders of government policy suggested that the British position further eroded the close ties between the two countries, drawing parallels with the 1972 decision to enter the European Community. The Foreign Office, with the full approval of Mrs Thatcher, was seen to be the unquestioning supporter of an American administration which, since February 1985, had drastically reduced the flow of raw intelligence passed on to Wellington, either directly or via Canberra; withdrawn from joint ANZUS exercises involving New Zealand forces; and scaled down the level of scientific or military exchange appointments. In addition, the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a highpoint of military cooperation in the 36-year-history of the ANZUS Treaty, had been effectively negated by New Zealand's loss of preferential status in equipment procurement. (3)

New Zealand was - and still is - uniquely isolated from two of its three closest allies. Yet arguably, the origins of this sad state of affairs involve the Western Alliance's other nuclear partner, France. (4) Since the nuclear testing began on Moruroa and Fangatafu atolls in July 1966, France has carried out at least 130 explosions, of which the first 41 were atmospheric. In the summer of 1973, two years before world opinion forced the French to adopt underground testing, Norman Kirk's Labour government actually despatched two frigates to support the Greenpeace protest off Moruroa. A combination of this dramatic act, and the initiation of legal proceedings against the Pompidou government, caught the imagination of many New Zealanders. The initial government-inspired campaign against the French nuclear presence in the South Pacific gave official endorsement to a widespread (bipartisan) conviction that nuclear energy, whether in military or civilian form, remains the greatest threat to New Zealand's unique and still relatively unspoilt environment. Government-sponsored opinion polls, conducted in the spring of 1986, found that not only did 92 percent oppose the stationing of nuclear weapons on New Zealand soil, but 89 percent of those questioned were against any nation testing warheads outside their own overseas territories. Needless to say, many of the respondents would have shared a common objection to France's legitimate presence in Polynesia. (5)

The most tangible result of the first official active protest (as opposed to campaigning initiated by Greenpeace and other pressure groups) was New Zealand's proposal that the South Pacific Forum (SPF) declare the entire region a nuclear-free zone. Although unsuccessful, the government's 1975 proposal initiated the process that culminated in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Treaty (SPNFT) a decade later. The SPNFT, otherwise known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, calls on the Forum's thirteen members not to acquire, test, permanently station, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or to dump nuclear waste in the treaty zone. (6) Because the terms of the treaty left a wide range of nuclear activities still theoretically possible, Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) and three other Forum members refused to sign. The Australian prime minister, Bob Hawke, felt able to take a prominent role in securing common agreement with the rest of

the SPFT, given that the proposed legislation offered no serious impediment to Australia's regular military relations with the United States. The electoral success of Hawke's New Zealand counterpart in July 1984 gave a vital boost to the final negotiations. The credibility of the SPFT had depended on New Zealand's ratifying the final agreement.

David Lange increasingly took the initiative, his party having made clear at its 1984 conference that a genuine nuclear-free zone would exclude the transit of nuclear-armed or -powered ships or aircraft. Conference had gone far beyond what the parliamentary leadership was prepared to accept as binding, many members arguing that a future Labour government should preempt an American decision to terminate tripartite ANZUS exercises. Lange did, however, endorse the view of Vanuatu's leader, Father Lini, that if the principle of a nuclear-free zone could not be comprehensively enforced throughout the South Pacific, then it could at least apply within territorial waters - given the appropriate domestic legislation. (7)

The SPFT called on all nuclear powers to sign the attached protocols, especially the three with possessions in the Pacific. All three have so far refused, Britain supporting the American view that nuclear-free zones undermine the basis of an effective deterrence, and France adding that such a treaty impinges upon sovereign rights over its overseas territories. If the State Department was quietly relieved that the SPFT was a milder document than anticipated, the Quai d'Orsay was determined to respond with a dramatic reassertion of France's claim to a major strategic presence in the Pacific. By the time the treaty was signed, on 6 August 1985, it was becoming increasingly clear that agents of the French government had been responsible for the sinking of the Greenpeace ship, *Rainbow Warrior*, in Auckland harbour a month earlier. Domestic and foreign pressure forced the announcement of an internal enquiry by Bernard Tricot, a former aide of de Gaulle. The Tricot enquiry was a holding operation, but the response to the SPFT was uncompromising. Within a month President Mitterand himself was at Moruroa to declare that anyone opposing French interests would be considered an adversary. David Lange's combative reply, the continuing revelations in Paris and Auckland about the sinking, and the Labour Party's adherence in office to its insistence on genuine self-determination for French Polynesia and New Caledonia, together ensured that the New Zealand government was - and still is - unwilling to compromise its position vis-a-vis France's presence in the Pacific. Labour, both in and out of power, have always been conscious of popular support, not only for its opposition to nuclear testing, but also for its rejection of France's claim to be a stabilising influence in a vital strategic area. Paris interpreted the coup in Fiji in May 1987 as simply reinforcing this claim, at the same time echoing American fears of a Libyan presence in Vanuatu or in an independent Kanaky (New Caledonia). In sharp contrast, one of Russell Marshall's first acts as Labour's new Foreign Minister, was to dismiss the result of the referendum held on 13 September 1987 to decide whether New Caledonia should remain French.

Marshall pointed out that, in accordance with the instructions of the separatist FLNKS, almost the entire indigenous Melanesian population had abstained.(8)

The *Rainbow Warrior* controversy notwithstanding, arguably the attention focused on relations between Washington and Wellington over the past four years has obscured international perception of how seriously New Zealand governments - of both major parties - approach the question of France's continuing presence in the Pacific. The present government's case for a genuinely nuclear-free zone within its own sovereign territory, and ideally throughout the South Pacific and beyond, is as firmly rooted in popular antipathy towards French hegemony as in grassroots Labour suspicion of past ANZUS obligations. Contrary to French self-perception, the Chirac government's refusal to accommodate Kanak grievances, and the political as well as ecological consequences of further nuclear testing in French Polynesia, were seen as the most potentially destabilising forces in the region. The 1987 Defence Review reiterates this point, while also making clear that 'New Zealand will respond to any serious threat to our Pacific Island neighbours', on the basis of the 1984 Defence Mutual Assistance Programme. Diplomats and staff planners anguish over the response to a request for support from the Vanuatu government in the event of a semi-covert French retaliatory raid; destroying an FLNKS radio station, for example.(9) Any such request would be far harder to turn down than that made by the deposed prime minister of Fiji, Dr Timoci Bavadra, in May 1987. On that occasion New Zealand quickly acknowledged the governor-general as still the 'lawful authority' by virtue of his having assumed executive power.(10) In the Vanuatu scenario, however, the request for military support would presumably be made by a legitimate, popularly supported government whose sovereign territory had been attacked by an external power, albeit one primarily concerned with seeking reprisals against - theoretically - its own citizens.(11)

However obdurate in public, over routine bilateral matters the Lange government has proved surprisingly accommodating in its relations with Paris. Even in the aftermath of the *Rainbow Warrior* affair, the handover of Alain Mafort and Dominique Prieur to French 'custody' suggested a willingness on Wellington's behalf to rebuild bridges; albeit at the cost of domestic objections. The French have unashamedly exploited such goodwill, by repatriating Mafort in December 1987 for 'necessary medical treatment', and then posting him to staff college three months later. Lange could do little other than protest at such flagrant abuse of the United Nations settlement. By March 1988 he must already have been aware that France had persuaded the new regime in Fiji to accept £4.4 million in aid. The South Pacific Forum could anticipate further French attempts at destabilisation, whatever the outcome of the presidential election.

Labour's leaders, if not the membership as a whole, appreciate only too well the danger of becoming too bereft of friends in an era when old ties and loyalties are dead, or dying. Thus, Mrs Thatcher's government would display little more than token resistance should France ever seek retaliation through a redefinition of New Zealand's trading

relationship with the European Community. Both the British prime minister and foreign secretary have, when pressed, repeatedly refused to condemn France outright for the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior*. (12) The refusal to bend under joint Anglo-American pressure over the non-nuclear policy, even if it means a de facto ban on Royal Navy vessels visiting New Zealand ports; the public admonition of Britain for not supporting harsher sanctions against South Africa; and not least of all, the sharply contrasting personalities of David Lange and Margaret Thatcher, when taken together must influence the latter far more than any sentimental attachment to a distant and unvisited nation, however Anglophile that nation still visibly remains. Hence, one might feel uncomfortable with the prospect of Britain supporting France at the expense of a leading Commonwealth member, but one should not be unduly surprised. (13)

The NZ Labour Party and the breakup of ANZUS 1984 - 1987

The 1951 ANZUS Treaty was deliberately drafted, and subsequently projected, as an expression of a 'strategic community of interest', and not as a binding contract laying down precise obligations. With circumstances changing so rapidly, the emphasis was on flexibility rather than the creation of an unambivalent but dangerously rigid security pact. Thus, the treaty itself offered a political framework for what theoretically might be a relatively low level of defence cooperation. Should a major response to aggression arise, then New Zealand could quickly integrate its modest forces into a much larger trinational command structure. However, American strategic planning came to envisage each member's armed forces as fulfilling far more than a contingency role, hence the growing importance placed on regular ANZUS exercises since the Vietnam years. New Zealand was increasingly seen as vital to US forward deployment and collective security strategy. Highlighting such assumptions, leading peace campaigners such as Owen Wilkes have over the past two decades insisted that the provision of intelligence facilities at Tangimoana and elsewhere (under the secret 1946 UKUSA Treaty) entails a far greater level of integration into US 'war fighting strategies' than was ever envisaged by the ANZUS Treaty. From a New Zealand military standpoint, the practical benefits of ANZUS membership were the maintenance of operational effectiveness and the confirmation of professional competence secured through close cooperation with two larger partners. The consolidation and extension of the ANZAC/US ties, whether military, diplomatic or commercial, further encouraged this high level of cooperation, 'alongside the treaty as much as because of the treaty'. (14)

Defenders of ANZUS argue that the more obvious military benefits are complemented by direct access to US raw intelligence and, via The Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) and other channels of scientific exchange, state of the art technology. (15) In addition, the previously mentioned Memorandum of Understanding ensured preferential terms when

buying American weapons. ANZUS is further justified on grounds of underpinning New Zealand's trading relationship with the United States, and most important of all, providing a direct channel of influence to key decision-makers in Washington. (Both arguments apply equally to Australia, of course.) Being on good terms with the American, and by implication the British, governments is seen by ANZUS supporters as a partial guarantee of sound relations with other, in some cases non-aligned nations. Prior to 1985, successive New Zealand governments did on occasions profoundly disagree with policy decisions, or express positive criticism, and on the whole were listened to sympathetically by the State Department and the White House. In order to avoid embarrassing publicity, New Zealand diplomacy was assertive but essentially discreet. (16) Finally, the pro-ANZUS lobby take a very different view from those who insist that geographical isolation renders the alliance and its accompanying risks superfluous. Instead, ANZUS is seen as actually enhancing New Zealand's isolation from any potential aggression, by placing its strategic perimeter far beyond the South Pacific. (17)

In summarising the arguments levelled against ANZUS one must be careful not to confuse the views of those in favour of total withdrawal, for example the majority of delegates at Labour's 1984 conference, and of those who believe that a nuclear-free New Zealand need not withdraw from the ANZUS Council. The latter was still, of course, the government's position when it faced re-election. First, consider the ANZUS critics' answers to the points made above.

Since 1978 New Zealand has continued to run down her interests and obligations in the Far East in order to focus on an admittedly large area of direct strategic concern (South Pacific, Australia, Antarctica). Given Australia's continued commitment to ANZAC cooperation, most recently in the procurement field, and the operational requirements of the NZ armed forces, is there a need for hi-tech American weapons systems? Expertise in sonar research and development notwithstanding, what are the tangible benefits of costly involvement in TTCP? Is it not possible to purchase second-hand or even new military equipment on the world market at prices comparable to those quoted under the Memorandum of Understanding? (18) Quoting the figure of only fifteen percent, critics claim New Zealand exporters are not dependent on American markets, and that the policy of trade diversification has thwarted threats of retaliation. Discreet lobbying via ANZUS not only denies the New Zealand public access to important information, but also prevents Wellington from moulding public opinion in both the United States and other friendly nations. Anyway, forthright but private diplomacy assumes sensitive and responsible holders of high office in Washington. Recent administrations have manifestly lacked members in any way sympathetic to the New Zealand viewpoint. Since 1984 few nations have upheld such an uncompromising moral position, and in consequence New Zealand's standing in the Commonwealth and beyond has never been higher; witness David Lange's success at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva on 5 March 1985. Thus, there are more fruitful channels of international influence than

via Washington and London.

In his 1983 essay, 'ANZUS and the alternatives for New Zealand', Richard Kennaway noted several of the above arguments in analysing the growing dissatisfaction with the alliance, and the assumptions upon which it rested. Like Frank Corner (see endnote 14), Kennaway noted the strong current of anti-Americanism among ANZUS's harshest critics, many of whom trace their opposition to alleged US militarism back to the Vietnam era.

Even in Auckland, New Zealanders have never become substantially immersed in American popular culture in the way so many Australians have over the past twenty-five years. They are not antagonistic towards the United States, but they are careful to preserve the national image of independence and single-mindedness. The harshest critics of American foreign policy, while a minority, can thus address a not entirely unsympathetic audience - if only because Washington has unconsciously given them so much ammunition.

Advocates of withdrawal were by the late 1970s convinced that national interests and foreign policy objectives had become subordinate to much more narrow strategic interests, namely Washington's perception of the alliance. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, most notably sharp policy conflicts over the Middle East and south-east Asia, they had little difficulty in concluding that key decisions were really being made by the Americans. (19)

Such a conclusion suggested but one solution - notice of withdrawal from the ANZUS Council. Although such a course of action became increasingly attractive to grassroots Labour Party activists, particularly the many middle-class public sector employees whose recent recruitment had considerably diluted trade union influence, non-alignment was anathema to the old leadership. Neither was it seriously considered after David Lange succeeded Bill (now Sir Wallace) Rowling in 1982. To this extent there was bipartisan agreement between the two main parliamentary parties, acknowledging all New Zealand's obligations and retaining a much wider role for the armed forces than simply disaster relief, UN peacekeeping, and surveillance of the huge Exclusive Economic Zone (3.1 million square kilometres). Such a consensus did not prevent any future Labour Government from reviewing the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) linking New Zealand, Australia and Britain with Malaysia and Singapore, or, should the United States prove hostile to change, the ANZUS alliance itself. (20) After 14 July 1984 this indeed proved the case.

Since 1972 Labour's commitment to a regional nuclear-free zone, and its opposition to French testing at Moruroa, have remained - as has been seen - clear and unequivocal. The present government's refusal to participate, albeit indirectly within ANZUS, in any nuclear strategy for the defence of the South Pacific region is a logical consequence of such an uncompromising position. Support for the SPNFZ, reinforced by the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill (finally enacted in June 1987 after a prolonged and stormy passage through parliament), thus predates Labour's assumption of office. Taking positive steps to refuse the entry of nuclear weapons into New Zealand, and

to request even friendly powers to withdraw them from the whole region, was defended as 'the only practical step available' to reduce a 'real, and potentially catastrophic threat'. Determining what type of weapons should be banned was described in a 1985 discussion paper as, not only the exercise of a 'sovereign right', but an assertion of national identity and public opinion (defence and security issues 'reflect our sense of nationhood and our common interests as a community'). For thirty years an 'alliance mentality' had suppressed serious consideration of what New Zealanders could do to halt nuclear proliferation, and of 'a necessary assumption of the responsibilities of our own independence' - striking a balance between self-reliance and alignment. (21) Two years later the same author, in concluding the process of 'consultation', restated these two principles as the basis of New Zealand's future defence strategy: maintaining 'the ability to meet or deter credible threats to our security or interests using our own resources', and maintaining an adherence to collective security as 'part of an international community, which presents both opportunities and responsibilities'. Such a policy, however, would focus upon 'our area of direct strategic concern, namely Australia and the South Pacific'. (22)

The arguments advanced in both documents - The Defence Question: A Discussion Paper, and the 1987 Defence White Paper - drew heavily upon assumptions and interpretations shared by Labour Party policy-makers for well over a decade. American nuclear deterrence was seen to have under-mined ANZUS, and in particular New Zealand security. The United States could not guarantee protection from a nuclear attack, and if anything ensured New Zealand's identification as a potential target. Undue dependence on so dangerous a 'shield' had encouraged complacency, the avoidance of difficult decisions, and a consequential chronic deterioration in the armed forces' fighting efficiency. The National Party was depicted in both the 1984 and 1987 campaigns as having sheltered for too long under the American nuclear umbrella, at the expense of a costly but vital procurement programme to re-equip the three armed services. This ironic and unashamed attempt to play the patriotic card was, of course, consistent with Labour's overall charge that the Muldoon government had engaged in ceaseless crisis management at the expense of facing New Zealand's most fundamental problems head on. A reluctance to see the defence budget rise above two percent of GDP, and a failure to match the material requirements of a coherent and more self-reliant defence policy after 1978, had indeed undermined service efficiency and morale. The latter, however, was unlikely to improve if New Zealand was in effect frozen out of ANZUS, and in fact it deteriorated even more.

Labour argued that most New Zealanders shared a common frustration and concern that scant progress had been made during the 1970s to secure a mutually verifiable, balanced reduction in the nuclear arsenal. Physical isolation was no guarantee of safety, and, in the words of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee, 'a non-nuclear nation has a duty to speak out'. Opinion polls such as the government-sponsored survey in early 1986 have consistently shown majority support for a genuinely comprehensive test ban, on

the basis of which Labour argues that maintaining the ANZUS status quo would have meant inhibiting New Zealand attempts to stem nuclear proliferation. The former relationship with the Americans undermined the credibility of any request that they stop their arms build-up, and rendered any appeal to the Soviet Union open to charges of hypocrisy.(23) Labour's hardening attitude towards the first Reagan administration's perception of ANZUS reflected a heightened awareness of strategic and above all environmental dangers created by active cooperation with a nuclear power.

As elsewhere in the Pacific, the most obvious focus of concern was the potential health hazard from visiting US warships' nuclear reactors and weapons, mostly on attack submarines, while 'cross-decking' nuclear weapons between ships had become an increasingly common - and very risky - phenomenon. Further concern was expressed that in the event of war such vessels were potential nuclear targets, possibly moored in New Zealand waters.(24) In July 1984 the newly-elected government announced that port access would henceforth be available to those vessels which it could satisfy for itself were neither nuclear-powered nor nuclear-armed. The British and American 'neither confirm-nor-deny' stance was no longer deemed acceptable, although both nations' vessels were still welcome if clearly powered and armed by conventional means. Acknowledging the impact of such a decision on American strategic interests, Labour claimed - with some justification - that it gave practical expression to the majority view in favour of an absolute exclusion policy.(25)

The United States viewed New Zealand's action as a major default by a treaty partner. Theatre and field commanders complained that effective military cooperation was no longer possible, while the State Department interpreted the 'Kiwi disease' as a potential unravelling of the whole Far East and Pacific alliance system. Early in 1985 the conventionally powered, guided missile destroyer, USS *Buchanan*, became the first vessel to be denied entry. The US Navy had refused to confirm whether or not nuclear weapons were on board. Considerable speculation still persists regarding rumoured policy differences and personality clashes on whether or not cabinet should take a hard line over the *Buchanan*. The prime minister was absent from Wellington at a key moment, but both he and the other potentially more accommodating ministers were forcefully reminded that the price of grassroots and trade union acquiescence to 'Rogernomics' at home is the maintenance of Labour's anti-nuclear posture abroad. Needless to say, this proved even more the case in spring 1987, with an election looming, than in January 1985. Given the pressure on him from his own party, and faced at the time with a Secretary for Defence as resolute as Caspar Weinberger, Lange had and continues to have very little room for manoeuvre. The immediate price of party unity was Washington's announcement on 27 February 1985 of United States withdrawal from all ANZUS exercises and exchanges involving New Zealand, and the suspension of intelligence cooperation.

Labour could happily resist the opposition's predictable attacks, but more serious was the private pressure on the

Prime Minister's Department by former, and more important, by current Chiefs of Staff. To try and satisfy the very genuine concern being expressed by the military, Geoffrey Palmer, the deputy prime minister, was sent to Washington in September 1985 in search of a compromise. Palmer extended a public invitation to the US Navy to visit New Zealand, albeit at the prime minister's discretion. The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill, then in its earliest stages of being drafted, was to give the prime minister sole power of approval for the entry of foreign vessels into territorial waters. Pressure groups such as the Coalition Against Nuclear Warships feared Lange or his successors might be tempted to turn a blind eye if either the US Navy or even the Royal Navy requested a visit. In fact, the legislation is categorical that the prime minister *must* be satisfied no nuclear weapons are aboard vessels seeking admittance, and that nuclear propulsion is totally unacceptable.(26) Arguably, the visible hardening of positions by both New Zealand and the United States in late 1985 ensured that the forthcoming bill would leave scant opportunity for discretion and compromise. Two years later, opposition efforts in the final committee stage to inject a degree of ambivalence into the relevant clauses were thwarted.(27)

In its final, amended form the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act does, however, exclude the need for a formal inquiry into details of cargo borne by intending military visitors who request prime ministerial approval. Ostensibly, this leaves the Americans free neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of nuclear weapons, whatever the prime minister decides. It has been argued, therefore, that in the absence of accurate intelligence 'such a prime ministerial ban or sanction scarcely undermines American policy by betraying a vessel's weaponry'. This interpretation has seemingly been applied to 'Operation Deep Freeze' (see endnote 27). In other words, the government did subsequently leave a potential loophole in the act out of deference to the United States. It was on the basis of this interpretation that, while still bitterly attacking the act, Jim Bolger began the 1987 election campaign with an apparent reversal of policy. Still accusing ministers of drafting legislation to satisfy Labour Party members intent on destroying ANZUS, and pledging that a future National government would quickly restore harmonious relations with Washington, he nevertheless accepted that most New Zealanders had no wish to see nuclear weapons in their country's ports. Once in power, of course, Bolger would have been free to exercise his prime ministerial discretion. It would not be unduly cynical also to point out that for David Lange and his colleagues the act does still offer some scope for compromise in any further negotiations with a future, preferably Democrat, administration.(28)

Two years after the Palmer mission to Washington, New Zealand's relations with the current administration were further jolted by moves to strip it formally of ally status. On 8 July 1986 a joint American-Australian communique had announced New Zealand's formal exclusion from the ANZUS shield, and on 21 June 1987 the Memorandum of Understanding on Logistical Support had lapsed. Now finally, in September

1987 the White House announced its support for legislation promoted by senior Republicans in both houses of Congress which would redesignate the former 'ally' as a 'friendly' country, thus depriving it of preferential terms under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Control Act. Whereas twelve months earlier, the State Department was issuing surprisingly positive statements, in the wake of the 1987 election a senior official was telling Congressman that it could 'neither forget nor ignore the damage done by New Zealand to western security interests and the network of alliances crucial to preserving freedom'. The administration's endorsement of legislation which had already been on the floor of the House for nine months was an explicitly retaliatory measure following the June enactment of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms control Bill. An earlier announcement would, of course, have damaged the National Party's election chances by stirring up anti-American sentiment. (29)

The present state of impasse is perhaps best summarised by the report of the Defence Committee of Inquiry, the independent panel commissioned by the government in October 1985 to: hear evidence on the forthcoming defence discussion paper, conduct a nationwide survey of popular views on defence and security issues, and after ten months submit recommendations for the final stage of what was proving an unduly prolonged defence review, the White Paper. (30) Committee chairman and author of the final report, ex-diplomat Frank Corner, concluded that:

... when one member <of Anzus> seeks to place conditions over membership in relation to its nuclear dimension, and because the United States feels that New Zealand is not performing its minimal obligations under Article 2 of the Treaty, an apparently intractable dilemma emerges. Domestic pressures in New Zealand prompt the Government to promote its anti-nuclear stance, while the United States perception of its alliance interests requires that New Zealand revert to accepting unfettered port access if ANZUS is to operate. (31)

Corner's comments focused on the sharply differing interpretations of the ANZUS Treaty by the two governments. The 1987 Defence White Paper interprets the treaty to the letter, insisting that no 'far-reaching obligation' to accept nuclear weapons is even implicit in the text. In expanding upon this interpretation, David Lange has described ANZUS as being in no way analagous to NATO, being 'as much the reflection and assertion of common interests as the framework of a formal military alliance'. Both treaties reflect very difference strategic circumstances, hence the absence of designated ANZUS standing forces, and of a formal military integration under a standing unified command structure. In other words, ANZUS can serve as 'both catalyst and umbrella for a whole range of defence cooperation activities', but no more than that. (32)

To reduce an extremely dense legal argument to absolute

basics, the United States would point out that Article Two requires all three partners' armed forces to engage in 'continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid', and that Article Four states all three signators would 'act to meet the common danger'. The assumption is that any such action would be commensurate to the level of aggression, which might easily constitute a nuclear threat. Thus any contingency planning must acknowledge the continuing utility of strategic, intermediate, and short-range nuclear weapons in the Pacific theatre. For any one partner not to do so would run counter to the requirements of Article Two. In addition, the Americans would also claim that in September 1951 all three signators regarded the undertakings as being very much along the same lines as those recognised by NATO members. (33)

Although the Defence Committee of Inquiry was critical of the United States for its lack of sound 'alliance management skills', the New Zealand government was judged equally guilty. Not only had Labour 'misrepresented' ANZUS to the general public, but its leaders had made 'negotiating mistakes' in failing to clarify at the outset their policy objective of nuclear-free membership of an operative, trilateral alliance. The prime minister accused the committee of commenting from a position of ignorance, while also rejecting the suggestion that any major policy changes should only have followed the inquiry's conclusion. The government had done no more than fulfill an election pledge, and the committee's proceedings had taken place within the context of Labour's manifesto commitments. (34)

Despite these quite serious differences, Lange hailed the report as an endorsement of Labour's post-ANZUS framework for collective security. New Zealand armed forces should become more self-reliant, and be capable of operating independently (vital given the distances involved); domestic expertise, most notably in science and technology, should be more effectively exploited in enhancing the overall defence capability; independent intelligence and assessment facilities should be greatly extended; and above all, defence spending should be sufficient to enable all three services 'play a part in the region, to obtain the respect and cooperation of Australia and to reassure New Zealanders'. The report stressed the vital contribution that Australia had to make on forging a new and even closer bilateral relationship. ANZAC cooperation was the key to a credible defence policy, and it also left open the long-term possibility of reactivating the full alliance. (35)

The committee's enthusiasm for an enhanced relationship with Australia was based primarily upon strategic considerations, but also upon its opinion poll findings. Seventy-two percent of those questioned still supported membership of ANZUS, but seventy-three percent also supported a nuclear-free New Zealand. By adroit use of statistics, dubious methodology, and a carefully constructed flow chart, the committee suggested that up to eighty percent of New Zealanders would support the government's ideal but unfulfilled objective of active but nuclear-free membership of ANZUS. But for the duration of the Reagan administration at least, such findings remain of only academic interest.

Attention focused more on the fifty-two percent who preferred a return to an operational ANZUS even if it meant unrestricted visits. Lange questioned this finding, while drawing strength from the forty-four percent endorsing ANZUS withdrawal as the ultimate price of a nuclear-free zone. The prime minister drew attention to a separate finding that sixty-six percent opposed visits of nuclear-armed or -powered warships.

By now it must be clear that there was no consistency in these findings with regard to future ANZUS membership, nor was there any consensus on an alternative defence policy. The only conclusion that the committee, the prime minister, and the leader of the opposition all agreed upon was that the vast majority of New Zealanders have no wish to be non-aligned, semi-aligned, or neutral. Interestingly, Bolger interpreted this as a vigorous reassertion of popular faith in the Western alliance, and Lange as a rejection of 'subverting our social policies' to maintain an unrealistic level of self-reliance. The committee saw closer relations with Canberra as the only credible means of reconciling those desiring collective security, and a majority of those favouring a nuclear-free defence policy. (36)

Six months later, in February 1987, the Defence White Paper finally appeared (see endnote 22). Announcing 'the most fundamental change in defence policies' since 1945, the review fleshed out many of the proposals contained in the Defence Committee of Inquiry's report. Thus, the most critical section - on 'Defence Cooperation with Australia' - was, at thirteen paragraphs, by far the longest. John Henderson, with the approval of the prime minister, concluded that:

For the first time we have adopted in formal policy terms the concept that the New Zealand armed forces will have a capability to operate independently, although more probably with Australia, to counter low level contingencies in our region of direct strategic concern. This represents a major change from the past where the concept of operations for our armed forces was for each service to be individually a component of a larger allied force operating in a wider sphere. (37)

The White Paper went on to state that the government accepted the need to provide resources to meet the logistical requirements of a battalion-strong Rapid Reaction Force operating far from home; let alone all the other demands generated by New Zealand's more 'independent and self-reliant role' in the South Pacific. (38) To be fair, Labour ministers have always been frank about the cost of such a policy - a sizeable increase in the 1986-87 figure of \$NZ1.04 billion, taking net spending beyond two percent of GDP. Even in the wake of the general election, many party members were still failing to appreciate the full implications of such a commitment. By contrast, their leader was only too aware of the need for urgent savings wherever possible, having initiated a thorough-going management review of the Defence Ministry in April 1987. The Treasury commissioned an independent consultant to 'investigate and review the methods

and systems used to allocate resources, the management of these resources, and to recommend any changes necessary'. (39)

The review was an extension of a study of land assets already taking place, and in line with the application of systems analysis to all spending departments. The objective was quite categorically to maintain the operational efficiency of the armed forces by the most cost-effective methods. Presumably, such an attempt to apply private sector management techniques to public sector administration would be along similar lines to the review and reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence carried out in Britain by Michael Heseltine between 1983 and 1985.

The result of Heseltine's initiative had been, among other things, a greater degree of individual responsibility given to line management, a more clearly defined chain of accountability, stricter budgetary control, increased use of civilian labour on contract, more military personnel transferred from a support to a front-line role, and a much needed injection of competition and cost-cutting into the process of procurement. In other words,, precisely the principles most admired by Roger Douglas and his more ardent supporters. Government spokesmen and former defence officials indicated that Britain did indeed offer a role model. (40) Once again the irony was obvious. Here were two governments, seemingly irreconcilably divided over two key issues (defence, and South Africa), and yet so often thinking as one on the future directions of their respective economies.

Conclusion

There are reasonable grounds for assuming that in the long term relations between New Zealand and the United States will improve, if only because it is hard to envisage them deteriorating further than at present. The next president will only be halfway through his term of office when the possibility again arises of a change of government in Wellington. For Labour to secure a further three years in office would be a remarkable achievement, although the present party can not be judged by any past criteria. Although hopes were pinned on a Gary Hart administration, there is no reason why a Democrat such as Michael Dukakis - always assuming he can beat George Bush - should not prove sympathetic to any future New Zealand attempt at rapprochement. But even if there are changes of government, whether in Wellington or Washington, and in consequence a revival of ANZUS, the Americans will have to come to terms with a more assertive, self-confident and genuinely independent partner in the South Pacific. New Zealand will seek to counterbalance older ties and obligations with a new diplomatic and military role, as the de facto leader of the South Pacific Forum (Australia's presence notwithstanding), and as an increasingly significant check upon French power in a region with a disturbing potential for instability. (41)

The controversy over ANZUS can not be separated from the question of France's continued presence in the Pacific, and most especially the nuclear testing programme. The resumption of tests in mid-October 1987 reinforced support for the Lange

government's view of France as a potentially destabilising force. The bitter divisions in New Caledonia, highlighted by the September 1987 referendum, subsequently inspired Polynesian autonomist riots in the Tahitian capital of Papeete.

The Defence Committee of Inquiry criticised Labour for moving too fast in 1984-85, but the government could justifiably argue that many of its external policies were an extension of a long-held position, predating even 1972. Indeed, the claim that New Zealand need feel no embarrassment internationally in seeking the high moral ground can be traced as far back as the aftermath of Gallipoli. The government claimed, and still claims, to reflect a widespread rejection of France's claim to a major strategic presence so far from home. This popular antipathy towards French hegemony, fuelled by an unusually well-informed public's concern over the environmental impact of continued testing, has in no way abated. Thus, France is perceived not as a guarantor of stability, but rather, as the fatal catalyst of Libyan infiltration and the growing Soviet interest south of the Equator. (In the spring of 1987 the United States, Britain, and the National Party highlighted very real evidence of Libyan and Soviet involvement in the South Pacific in order to embarrass the government. David Lange's expulsion of a Soviet diplomat, and aggressive remarks regarding Libya, were clearly intended to take the heat out of the controversy, while at the same time not alienating key South Pacific Forum members such as Vanuatu.)

Events in New Caledonia and Vanuatu, and most especially in Fiji, have of course raised serious questions about New Zealand's capacity to launch and sustain low strategy operations. However, the 1987 White Paper makes clear that any demonstration of regional 'self-reliance' would almost certainly be a bilateral ANZAC intervention; and thus a further illustration of Australia's key role in its neighbour's current strategic thinking. Relations between the two countries' governments have clearly been strained for alarmingly long periods over the past six years, notably during 1985 when Bob Hawke put considerable pressure on his New Zealand counterpart to compromise over warship visits. However, Hawke's re-election in July 1987, and his well-publicised visit four months later, indirectly enhanced the credibility of Labour's medium-term defence plans.

David Lange's most immediate rebuttal of the Defence Committee's complaint of pre-emptive action was to claim a mandate. He pointed out that Labour had fought the 1984 election on a policy of excluding nuclear-armed or -powered vessels from New Zealand waters (possibly the only unambivalent policy in the whole manifesto), and that voters had been fully aware of the implications. Concern over the environment extended to risks of nuclear contamination brought into the country, most visibly in the form of US warships. That specific concern was underpinned by a relative indifference to the United States, or in the case of a minority, an outright hostility dating back to the Vietnam period. As has already been suggested, New Zealand attitudes towards the Americans differ sharply from those to be found throughout much of Australia, and as such constitute an often

over-looked factor in explaining the effective breakup of ANZUS. The vast majority of New Zealanders still prefer active membership of a trilateral alliance, but many of those same people remain opposed to a nuclear presence. The only safe conclusion arising out of the 1986 government-initiated opinion poll was that respondents demonstrated a laudable confusion at the expense of coherence and consistency.

There can only be two consistent and unambivalent positions: active membership of ANZUS as pre-July 1984, thereby facilitating US Navy and Royal Navy visits with no constraints, or alternatively, total withdrawal from the ANZUS Council with all that such a course of action implies for New Zealand's continued membership of the Western alliance. Since reassessing its position in the wake of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill's pre-election enactment, not even the National Party publicly espouses a return to the status quo, whatever members' private feelings. Likewise, the parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party pursues a defence policy at variance with the majority of its grassroots membership, particularly the more recent and middle-class recruits who in the early 1980s eroded traditional trade union influence. Lange and his colleagues made clear at the 1984 conference that were in no way bound to follow popularly-supported resolutions in favour of total withdrawal from all alliances and external commitments. The cabinet has never wavered from that position, although the USS *Buchanan* episode confirmed that adherence to a seemingly uncompromising non-nuclear policy was the price of a grudging party's reconciliation to unprecedented structural change at home - the by now famous 'Rogernomics'.

Jim Bolger was forced to acknowledge in July 1987 that the legislation so relentlessly attacked for nearly two years was finally on the statute book, and that in reality no solid body of opposition remained. It was possible for a future National government to live with the act, and anyway it could always be revoked at some future date. Thus, a formal acknowledgement of the widespread concern over contamination risks would gain votes but lose scarcely any. After all, the National Party had always opposed French nuclear testing. It was clear right up until the end of the 1987 campaign that the combative and often very witty prime minister was still more than capable of seeing off ex-service chiefs and any other hostile voices from the 'defence establishment'. Such critics had a stuffed-shirt image in the public's eyes anyway, and were potentially embarrassing to the increasingly sophisticated successors of Sir Robert Muldoon. Many of the latter's remarks were damaging to Bolger, but the spring 1987 visit of Sir Geoffrey Howe had illustrated how National had most to lose from the hostility so manifestly displayed by Britain and the United States. If anything influenced National Party leaders in their campaign decision to tone down the attacks on the government's defence and overseas record, thereby focusing upon domestic issues, it was the potential effect on the New Zealand electorate of their being too closely identified with Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan.

Most important of all, the opposition came to terms with a policy, or more accurately, a set of policies, rooted in a clear perception of both a redefined national identity and a complementary regional identity; a widely-accepted acknowledgement that, personal and cultural links notwithstanding, post-1945 and post-imperial ties with the United States and a 'pro-Washington' United Kingdom respectively, had to be reassessed and redefined via an almost painful process. There is of course the danger of this process going too far, and New Zealand finding itself unduly isolated, for example, if Mrs Thatcher's government should ever tacitly support French-initiated retaliatory measures to amend current European Community trade agreements.

Within the South Pacific region, and arguably even beyond, the relationship with Australia will become even more important. Current bilateral links will ultimately be underpinned by a proposed free trade agreement. Given the Labour government's commitment to a very real and widely recognised regional identity, relations with the other members of the South Pacific Forum must remain fluent, flexible and dynamic (the principal reason why events in Fiji - home of the SPF and the University of the South Pacific - are so worrying to Wellington). The 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Freeze Treaty was a manifest assertion of common interests, and a shared identity among the region's independent nations - large and small. Since 1984 the present New Zealand government has been the fulcrum of Forum efforts to forge and consolidate this shared identity. If circumstances have demanded the sacrifice of old but arguably obsolete ties and loyalties, then the at times very costly reverberations have been judged necessary - if no doubt regrettable. Such is the price of securing realignment, while avoiding non-alignment.

ENDNOTES

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1. Austin Mitchell, 'Labour transformed from down under', New Statesman, 3 July 1987, p. 10.
Adrian Smith, 'Letter from Auckland', Contemporary Review, December 1987, pp. 318 - 321.
Fundamental changes in New Zealand society over the past fifteen years, and most especially since July 1984, are analysed in detail in Colin James, The Quiet Revolution (Allen & Unwin NZ/Port Nicholson Press, 1987).
2. New Zealand contributed ten percent of its total population (forty percent of adult males) to the Allied war effort in the First World war, and suffered the second highest Allied casualty rate per head of

population in the Second; in Korea only the United States surpassed its per capita contribution to the United Nations Command. Figures quoted by the government in defending its ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels entering NZ sovereign territory in the official publication, New Zealand Review, April 1987, pp. 13 - 14. The argument that, because of its history - and 'individualism and independent self-reliance' - New Zealand is in a unique position to promote 'common security' as a successor to global strategic deterrence, is lucidly advanced by Ken Graham, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official writing in a personal capacity, in 'Common security - a link to the global age', NZ International Review, July/August 1986, vol. XI no. 4, pp. 12-16.

3. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty marked 'a significant adjustment by the two European outposts in the South Seas to their Pacific environment', surviving intact until 8 July 1986 when a joint communique from Washington and Canberra formally announced New Zealand's exclusion from active involvement in the alliance - a state of affairs which had already been in effect since the cancellation of 22 tripartite exercises planned for 1985. The 1982 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on American logistic support for New Zealand formed the basis of extensive sales and continued support, via US Foreign Military Sales (FMS). American supplies ranged from battle communications equipment through to the RNZAF's 22 A4 Skyhawks (recently refurbished with advance avionics) and 6 P3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft.
Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of New Zealand Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age, Pamphlet No. 46 (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1984), p. 43.
Malcolm McKinnon, 'The Richest Prize?', NZ International Review, May/June 1986, vol. XI no. 3, pp. 10 - 13, reviews the collection of government papers covering New Zealand's signature of the ANZUS Treaty.
NZ Government, Defence of New Zealand Review of Defence Policy 1987 (Wellington, 1987), pp. 18 - 19.
4. The third, and now the most vital, ally is of course Australia.
5. New Zealand and Australia ultimately secured a condemnation of French atmospheric testing at the Court of International Testing in the Hague. In total 41 atmospheric tests were carried out, 1966 - 1975.
Defence Committee of Inquiry, Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want (Wellington, 1986), p. 42.
6. South Pacific Forum, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and Draft Protocols (Wellington, 1985), Articles 1 - 16.
Malcolm McIntosh, 'A Nuclear-Free Pacific?', ADIU Report,

7. Ibid., p. 6.
David Lange, 'New Zealand's Security Policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 63 no. 5, summer 1985, pp. 1009 - 1019.
NZ Labour Party, Policy Document, July 1984 (Wellington, 1984), p. 50.
Thakur, op. cit., p. 46.
8. The two best studies of the Rainbow Warrior sinking are David Robie, Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior (Lindon Publishing, Auckland, 1986), and Michael King, Death of the Rainbow Warrior (Penguin NZ, Auckland, 1986). King claims that one result of the ban on US Navy vessels with nuclear weapons entering New Zealand ports was an American refusal to locate the Ouvéa, with its crew of DGSE agents en route to New Caledonia, via a KH11 military satellite:

There were strong suspicions among members of the NZ government, intelligence agencies and police, that cooperation with American and British authorities was being limited because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.

Ibid., p. 193.

The FLNKS - Front de libération nationale kanak socialiste - was constituted in September 1984 as a majority replacement for the Front indépendantiste, itself an electoral union of constituent autonomist parties founded in September 1979.

Alan Clark, 'New Caledonia 1984 - 1987: the electoral dimension', NZ International Review, July/August 1986, vol. XI no. 4, pp. 2 - 6.

The FLNKS claimed 83.2 percent of the indigenous population boycotted the referendum, and official returns revealed an abstention rate of 90 percent or more in the Melanesian constituencies outside Noumea.

Patrick Marnham, 'Separatist issue remains hot in New Caledonia', Independent, 15 September 1987.

'Kanakas hint at new campaign of violence', Guardian, 15 September 1987.

9. 'C'est sans doute la poursuite des essais nucléaires français qui nous a le plus aidé à prendre conscience de la course aux armements et du caractère illogique d'une option de défense nucléaire pour la Nouvelle-Zélande. Nous nous dissocions consciemment de toute stratégie nucléaire.'

David Lange, July 1987, quoted in Jacques Renard, 'La France dans l'oeil du cyclone', L'Express, 18 September 1987, p. 54.

Defence of New Zealand, pp. 12 - 13.

Private information, Auckland and Wellington, May 1987.

10. 'Coalition likely says Mr Lange', New Zealand Herald, 16 May 1987.

11. For a French view of relations between Vanuatu and France since the former Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides gained independence, see Renard, L'Express, pp. 58 - 59. Father Walter Lini was the most active of the SPF leaders in securing international condemnation of the Chirac government's decision to reverse the Socialists' plans for 'independence-with-association'. In September and December 1986, Vanuatu (quietly supported by the Hawke government) successfully proposed motions at the Summit of Nonaligned Nations in Harare, and at the General Assembly in New York, that the UN Committee of Decolonisation readopt New Caledonia; as formally recommended by the XVI SPF in August 1986.
12. King, op. cit., p. 194.
'Terrorism by France claim disputed', New Zealand Herald, 28 April 1987.
An incentive to improved relations with New Zealand was France's acceptance of the International Arbitration Tribunal's judgement on the Rainbow Warrior affair. On 2 October 1987 a Swiss judge, heading a panel of nominees from Greenpeace and the French government, awarded a total of £3 million to cover the ship's loss and £700,000 for 'aggravated damages'.
13. One of the more accessible English-language accounts of postwar France's colonial presence in Polynesia, focusing upon the nuclear issue, is Bengt and Marie-Therese Danielsson, Poisoned Reign: French Nuclear Colonialism in the Pacific (Penguin, London, 1986).
David Lange's views on the situation in the South Pacific by the end of 1987 are revealed in an interview with Simon Winchester following the second coup in Fiji and Jacques Chirac's visit to New Caledonia ('... the sleeper. The French have this monolithic, near-messianic commitment to things French. We don't want then to pull out of the region totally ... to pull the plug. But if they don't settle with the Melanesians ... I just don't know.').
Simon Winchester, 'In search of calm waters', Guardian, 1 October 1987.
14. Thakur, op. cit., p. 44.
Peter Hayes, Lyuba Varskey and Walter Bello, American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Penguin, London, 1987), pp. 267 - 288.
Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Frank Corner, in introducing the 1986 report of the government-initiated Defence Committee of Inquiry, pointed out that New Zealand's close military cooperation with the United States was not widely acknowledged until the 1970s when Britain finally withdrew east of Suez and joined the European Community, thus prompting a radical readjustment of national priorities in Wellington. He suggested that, because the close association with Britain survived for so long, an equivalent affection for the Americans - and

a 'popular understanding of the United States' military and political systems' - never had the chance to develop. Thus a gap developed between government and public opinion over the importance of the United States in guaranteeing New Zealand's interests. Although New Zealand's military contribution in Vietnam was little more than token support for the Australians through SEATO, the ensuing debate focused upon relations with the United States, and in the words of another former Secretary, '... brought to the surface deep philosophical divisions which have not yet been resolved ... in debates about nuclear free zones and our relations with ANZUS'.

Defence Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 11.

15. TTCP is a multilateral programme of weapons research involving the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. NZ Defence HQ seconds members of its twenty-strong scientific staff, their main contribution being in the field of sonar testing. In the spring of 1987 the terms of New Zealand's involvement in TTCP had not changed, but the Americans were gradually raising the threshold of information withheld. Longer term constraints upon the exchange of personnel and data were at that time no more than speculative.
Private information, Wellington, May 1987.
16. Those who argue that open lobbying is healthier, and just as likely to succeed, often quote David Lange's appeal to Washington in 1984 not to move the base for the US Antarctic survey 'Operation Deep Freeze' from near Christchurch to Tasmania. Government critics, noting subsequent negotiations with the Americans, quote it as the exception that proves the rule.
17. Thakur, op. cit., pp. 74 - 75.
18. Such a question is academic given that, '... New Zealand will, when feasible and acceptable cost arrangements can be negotiated, purchase from Australian sources', with orders amounting to \$NZ60 million by the time this statement was published in spring 1987. Given the Hawke government's attempt to sell ten A4G Skyhawks at twice the market price in 1984, and the cost and delay caused by having to buy Steyr AUG A1 SLRs made under licence in Australia and not Austria, the omens for ANZAC joint procurement are not good.
Defence of New Zealand, pp. 15 - 16.
'Australia expensive as defence buddy', New Zealand Herald, 28 April 1987.
19. Richard Kennaway, 'ANZUS and the Alternatives for New Zealand' in T.J. Hearn (ed.), Arms, Disarmament and New Zealand (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1983), pp. 113 - 117.
20. Under the 1971 FDA members will 'consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken' in the

event of a threat to Malaysia and/or Singapore. Having forestalled a final decision in 1978 and 1983, the 1987 Defence Review confirmed the withdrawal of 740 military personnel from Singapore within two years, but the maintenance of Mutual Assistance Programmes (MAPs) with all ASEAN members. The NZ Force had remained for so long for essentially 'political rather than military reasons', and henceforth would provide a second Regular Force battalion at home. The latter would 'facilitate the development of the Rapid Reaction Force and provide an immediate reserve to reinforce and sustain the RRF on deployment'. The RRF is a vital element in current strategic planning, constituting a 'self-contained all-arms group' of battalion size (approximately 1500) 'which can be committed to independent low level operations at short notice'. The problem facing staff planners is how quickly such a force can be deployed across so large an area of direct strategic concern, and by what means it can receive effective logistic support. Plans have been announced to convert a merchant vessel, and a \$NZ30 million Korean-built tanker comes into service during 1988.

Defence of New Zealand, pp. 22 - 23, 35.

Address of Major-General John Mace, Chief of the General Staff, to Auckland Rotary Club, 5 May 1987.

21. New Zealand Government, The Defence Question: A Discussion Paper (Wellington, 1985), pp. 10 - 12.

22. Defence of New Zealand

The author was Lange's closest policy adviser, and the head of the Prime Minister's Department, Dr John Henderson. Formerly a university lecturer in international affairs, Henderson is in the unusual position of being both a permanent civil servant and a political adviser. As a demonstration of his influence, and of the poor relations between Labour ministers and the 'defence establishment' in Wellington, the team preparing the 1987 defence review was headed by Henderson and not the Secretary of defence. The team reported directly to the Cabinet Committee on External Relations and Security, chaired by the then minister of defence, Frank O'Flynn, but on which also sat the prime minister. The stormy relations between past and present civilian or military members of the defence staffs, and the Labour government have been such a marked feature of New Zealand politics since July 1984 that they warrant a separate study of recent civil-military relations.

Russell Hill, 'Secretary of defence under fire from political boss', New Zealand Herald, 28 February 1987. Private information, Wellington, May 1987.

23. Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee, Disarmament and Arms Control, 1985, quoted in Defence Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 12.

Fifty-two percent of those questioned in 1986 stated that individual nations should refrain from testing within

their own boundaries.

Ibid., p. 42.

Lange, op. cit., pp. 1010, 1015 - 1016.

24. Kennaway, op. cit., pp. 113 - 117.

Hayes, Zarsky and Bello, op. cit., pp. 282 - 287. The authors make the point that American efforts to undercut Labour's support by staging high-profile exercises and visits backfired, partly because they were based upon the assumption that the New Zealand electorate is as pro-American as that of Australia. Perhaps Washington should have noted a 1984 survey showing that only 14 percent of those polled perceived the United States as the country with which most readily identified (in Australia the figure was 62 percent).

Ibid., p. 277, and the Defence Committee of Inquiry, p. 41.

25. Ibid., p. 12.

Lange, op. cit., p. 1011.

26. NZ Government, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Bill (Wellington, 1986), clauses 9 and 11.

'PM's amendment clears US Antarctic flights', New Zealand Herald, 8 May 1987.

27. Ibid.

On 7 May 1987 the House of Representatives passed a government amendment to the bill's clause 10, which covers prime ministerial approval for the landing of foreign military aircraft. The prime minister was in effect given specific authority to provide clearance for all US aircraft providing logistic support for 'Operation Deep-Freeze' in the Antarctic. A defeated opposition amendment sought to secure the same blanket coverage for visiting warships. The debate, in the course of which Lange offered to initiate a judicial review, marked the climax of a lengthy campaign by the National leadership to convince the public that Labour were applying double standards by not taking a hard line on checking US aircraft flying in and out of Harewood airport, near Christchurch. The government insisted that a blanket clearance on freight aircraft movements made practical sense, and that any suggestion of Starlighters ferrying nuclear weapons to an Antarctic base was mischief-making by the opposition and evidence of naivety in the case of the 'peace movement'.

'Ice base "Put in jeopardy by National Party"', New Zealand Herald, 14 April 1987.

28. 'Nuclear sophistry', *ibid.*, 16 April 1987.

Ian Templeton, 'Opposition in nuclear about-turn', Guardian, 10 July 1987.

Private information, Wellington, May 1987.

29. Statement by Dr Gaston J. Sigur, Assistant Secretary of

State, Washington, 29 September 1986. Another State Department representative, Paul Wolfowitz, expressed even more conciliatory sentiments at a press conference on 5 March 1986, thereby reinforcing the commonly held assumption that for two years a dialogue was maintained between assistant secretaries and the NZ Ambassador, Sir Wallace Rowling. By the spring of 1987 the latter's holding operation had collapsed. The reservoir of goodwill in Washington had been drained, and the former Labour leader's influence in Wellington had long since waned.

Remarks of Karl Jackson, State Department official, to the House foreign affairs sub-committee for Asia and the Pacific quoted in David Barber, 'NZ unmoved by loss of US ally status', Independent, 26 September 1987. As the headline suggests, Russell Marshall, who, as well as being made foreign minister in the post-election cabinet reshuffle had been given the new portfolio of disarmament, feigned relative indifference.

30. Defence Committee of Inquiry, 18 October 1985 - 31 July 1986:

Frank Corner (chairman, and former Secretary of Foreign Affairs)

Diane Hunt (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research - the country's major publicly-funded institution of research and development)

Major-General Brian Poananga (former Chief of the General Staff)

Kevin Clements (sociology department, University of Canterbury - a Quaker and pacifist)

The composition and balance of the panel suggests considerable care was taken over selection, although criticism was expressed by the pressure group NZ Security and Defence Association over the exclusion of experts on political violence and counter-insurgency. Such carping totally missed the point of the exercise, which was primarily consultative rather than prescriptive. After Defence: A Discussion Paper was published on 21 December 1985, the panel received around four hundred written submissions, their authors subsequently being invited to give oral evidence between February and April 1986. (Serving officers were free to comment publicly or privately.) There then followed a poll of 1,600 New Zealanders by the National research Bureau, requiring answers to over seventy questions on defence and security issues. (one reason for the delay of the final report was that the prime minister questioned certain methods employed by the NRB.)

Annexe to Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want, written submissions, oral evidence, and National research Bureau public opinion poll, op. cit.

31. Defence Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 12.

32. Defence of New Zealand, p. 18.
Lange, op. cit., p. 1013.

33. Treaty Between the Governments of New Zealand, Australia, and the United States of America Concerning Security (The ANZUS Treaty), (San Francisco, 1 September 1951), Articles II and IV.
Defence Committee of Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 10 - 11.
34. Ibid., p. 12.
The prime minister to the chairman, Defence Committee of Inquiry, 21 August 1986, quoted in 'Defence report call endorsed', New Zealand Herald, 22 August 1986.
35. Ibid.
Defence Committee of Inquiry, op. cit.
36. Ibid., pp. 39 - 44, 63 - 64.
'Defence report call endorsed', op. cit.
37. Defence of New Zealand, p. 38.
38. Ibid.
39. 'Govt aims to streamline Ministry of Defence', New Zealand Herald, 28 April 1987.
40. Ibid.
41. Perhaps the most notable feature of the legislation before Congress is the level of bipartisan support it has attracted. Given the endorsement of so many senior Democrats, and the encouragement of the White House, it will almost certainly be passed. In other words, any future rapprochement will have to overcome a succession of firmly-established, but by no means unsurmountable, obstacles. At the Wellington end, despite the *seemingly* unambivalent terms of the non-nuclear act, a tiny chink of accommodation is still visible.

THE 1987 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION:
CHANGING POLICIES = CHANGING GEOGRAPHIES?

At first sight, the New Zealand general election of 15 August 1987 was a relatively unremarkable event. The incumbent government was returned to power with a substantially increased share of the votes cast and with an increased parliamentary majority of two. This suggests a considerable vote of confidence by the electorate in the incumbent party's running of the country over the previous three years. But that apparent unremarkability hides some substantial changes in the nature of New Zealand politics over the period 1984-1987 and their reflection in the pattern of voting. The nature of those changes is explored here in a brief introductory ecological analysis of the changing geography of voting between 1984 and 1987.

The Political Background

In 1984, the New Zealand Labour Party regained power from the National Party after nine years in opposition, during which time it lost three general elections (in 1975, 1978, and 1981: at the last two, Labour won more votes than National but fewer seats, because of the effects of the electoral system).¹ Two factors led to the declining popularity of the National government. The first was growing disapproval of the combative style of the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon. The second was increased opposition to the policies of the National Party (many of which were supported in general by Labour too), particularly with regard to control of many aspects of society and regulation of the economy.² This opposition was crystallised by the formation in 1983 of the New Zealand Party, whose leader was a charismatic millionaire property developer, Bob Jones; the new party argued for deregulation of the economy. It won 12.3 per cent of the votes cast in 1984, but no seats; its success ensured the Labour victory.³

Labour did not campaign in 1984 on a radical programme, certainly not on economic issues, although its Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, had earlier published a book suggesting, as the title put it, There's Got to be a Better Way. But from the moment they achieved electoral success, and insisted on a devaluation of the New Zealand dollar

before Muldoon handed over power, they set about a series of radical economic reforms, removing many of the constraints to the operation of market forces and corporatising many parts of the state apparatus.⁶ So successful were they that in 1985 Bob Jones stated that the New Zealand Party was going into recess; he resigned as leader, and although other members refused to dissolve it, the party's influence waned rapidly - it won only 0.3 per cent of the votes cast in 1987. Jones enthusiastically embraced Labour, claiming that 'the 1984-87 Lange government was the best this country had enjoyed in my life-time'.⁶

The Labour Party's policies had major impacts on many aspects of New Zealand life, and all sectors of the economy: the success of what soon became known as Rogernomics was a focus of much debate.⁷ The removal of protection exposed many industries to outside competition, requiring them to respond by increasing their efficiency: if they remained uncompetitive, they were forced to close. Unemployment did not increase above the 1984 figure, however, as decline in some sectors was matched by growth in others - notably financial and other services. (In 1986, according to the Census, unemployment averaged 4.4 per cent per parliamentary constituency, with a standard deviation across the 93 non-Maori electorates of 2.4 per cent.) The farmers, long protected as the backbone of the New Zealand economy, claimed to be especially hard-hit;⁸ inflation was high, interest rates high, and the balance of payments deficit substantial.⁸ The farming sector was never very supportive of Labour: the trades unions were, however, but the policies of state withdrawal meant that incomes policies and centralised wage-fixing were avoided, leading to wage-increase-led inflation followed by labour unrest.¹⁰

The policies adopted by Labour were much closer to the free market ideology of Conservatism in the UK under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan's brand of Republicanism in the USA than they were to the traditional stance of a social democratic party with similar roots to those of Labour in Great Britain. In social policy, however, Labour remained true to its roots, and promised to advance social reforms if re-elected in 1987. Its foreign and defence policies were unique, in particular its anti-nuclear stance,¹¹ and they, plus its promotion of individual rights (and the interests of formerly depressed groups - notably women and the Maori) retained support of its traditional left wing.

How would the electorate react to these changes, to policies enacted by Labour which were very different from those with which it was traditionally associated? In

economic policy, Labour outflanked National - in the terms of the traditional 'left-right continuum' of political ideology it shifted to the right of National. Many of National's traditional voters - especially those in the finance and related industries in the large cities - benefited substantially from Labour's new stance. Could National retain their loyalty, and win back that of those who voted for the New Zealand Party in 1984 in protest against Muldoon and controls? And having moved to the right, could Labour retain the support of its traditional, left-leaning urban-industrial voters? If not, where could they go to? The only third party of any size - the Democratic Party (Social Credit until 1986) - lacked credibility, and Labour voters may have been reluctant to switch to National: for them, perhaps, abstention was the only alternative to remaining loyal to Labour.

There are two ways in which these questions can be answered - the direct and the indirect. The direct involves detailed social surveys, of a type not conducted in New Zealand.¹² Local surveys have been conducted in increasing number,¹³ but these can provide only a partial picture.¹⁴ The indirect method involves ecological analysis whereby aggregate data, usually at a constituency level and combining census with electoral material, are used to suggest likely behavioural changes. The latter is chosen here.

Cleavages and Continuity in Voting Behaviour

Political parties structure political debate, and in doing so strongly influence the political agenda; their influence as major organising agents is crucial for, as Schattschneider argues, all organisation is bias.¹⁵ Their goal is to win power, to serve particular interests, and that goal can be substantially advanced if they have a reliable core of support within the electorate. They seek to obtain that core of support by mobilising particular sectors of society; winning their loyalty by the development of a political ideology which people in those sectors are socialised to favour. Those sectors may be defined in terms of certain characteristics of the electorate - religious adherence, perhaps, or social class - or they may be defined territorially - the residents of a particular section of the country. The former are group/individual strategies, with a party seeking the loyalty of people because it serves the interests of members of the category they belong to; the latter are community strategies, mobilising the people of particular places.¹⁶ Most parties employ a combination of the two - because people learn the meaning of class in a local milieu, for example, which may be different from that used elsewhere. Increasingly, it is argued, the community

strategy is obsolescent, as mass media allow people to be socialised into membership of particular categories wherever they are within a country.

The outcome of successful mobilisation strategies is a series of one or more electoral cleavages within a society, which is divided between the groups appealed to by different parties. In the classic study of West European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan identified four basic cleavages, although not all were present in every country;¹⁷ recent analyses have suggested others, consequent upon changes in the nature of those societies.¹⁸

One of the problems with the cleavage model is that it suggests a fixed division of society into supporters for the varied parties, with the consequence that the allocation of parliamentary power is frozen.¹⁹ This is particularly problematic in countries with single-member constituency plurality electoral systems, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, where two parties tend to predominate, so that one is likely to have a monopoly of power over several elections. In these situations, parties are usually more pragmatic than ideological in their political programmes, so that enough voters are prepared to vote for either in certain situations, and give each a chance of success in winning a parliamentary majority. Such pragmatic politics are well-represented by Downs' classic economic model of democracy, which suggests that the two parties will differ very little on many issues.²⁰ Switches in support from one to the other are then feasible for voters who are not deeply committed to one of them ideologically, if they believe that such a switch is a sensible short-term action. Fiorina's theory of retrospective voting suggests that in most cases governments lose elections rather than oppositions win them.²¹ Voters reward governments whose policies have pleased them; if they are dissatisfied with the government's performance, and at the same time believe that the opposition could do better, then some at least will be prepared to vote the former out of office and the latter in.

One conclusion to draw from this is that, given the cyclical nature of the capitalist world-economy, sooner or later all governments will fail to satisfy some of the electorate who formerly voted for them, so that as long as the opposition presents a credible alternative government it will eventually win power. But most oppositions are not prepared to wait: they want to win at the next election. And governments will want to counter opposition activities, so that both are constantly seeking to remobilise the electorate. For much of the time, they may be seeking to remobilise support among groups that have always voted for

them. On occasions, however, they may seek to mobilise different groups, either because they know that they have failed their traditional supporters and cannot rely on their votes in the future,²² or because they feel that they need to widen their electoral base in order to win power.²³ If this mobilisation activity leads to a new cleavage structure, it produces what electoral analysts term a realignment.

The identification of realignments was advanced in a classic paper by the American political scientist, V.O. Key.²⁴ He identified six types of election:

- 1) Maintaining, in which the pattern of cleavages prior to the election remains in place, and the normal majority party wins;
- 2) Deviating, in which the pattern of cleavages remains the same, but there is sufficient vote-switching for the normal minority party to win most seats;
- 3) Converting, in which a new set of cleavages emerges but the usual majority party wins;
- 4) Realigning or Critical, with a new set of cleavages and the usual minority party (or a new party) victorious;
- 5) Reinstating, in which a previous cleavage pattern reappears, perhaps after one or more deviating or converting elections; and
- 6) Dealigning, in which the old cleavages disappear (or are radically weakened) but no new set appears.

The implication, then, is that continuity - as exemplified by a sequence of maintaining and deviating elections - may be broken by a converting/critical sequence, through which a new set of cleavages is instituted and a new continuity created.

Key argued that elections can be classified using aggregate data analyses, particularly cross-temporal correlations. Using constituencies as the observation units, if the pattern of voting for a party was strongly correlated between two pairs of elections, this implies that its support has remained constant: it won votes in similar relative proportions in each constituency. Thus high correlations indicate maintaining/deviating elections.²⁵ Low correlations, on the other hand, indicate changed geographies of support, and thus probably one of the other types of election. Only study of a sequence of elections

can indicate what type - and Archer and Taylor have developed a methodology for this;²⁶ any low correlation between two elections indicates the possibility that the second is a critical election, however.

1987: A Critical Election in New Zealand?

Was the 1987 general election in New Zealand just one in a sequence of maintaining/deviating elections, with the swing to Labour consistent across the country, or was it possibly a critical election, heralding the onset of either dealignment or a realignment? Initial analyses suggest that it was sufficiently different from its predecessor in the geography of support that it bears closer examination.

Those initial analyses simply regressed the percentage of the electorate (not of the votes cast, since abstentions are of interest in this situation) who voted for Labour and for National, and also of abstentions, in 1987 against the similar percentage for 1984. To do this, it was necessary to use the estimates of the voting in 1984 derived from polling booth data provided by McRobie,²⁷ since a new set of constituencies was introduced for the 1987 election. Given the quality of data, these estimates are very reliable, especially as there is little evidence of differences in voting between adjacent constituencies because of particular local characteristics (i.e. few candidates have large individual followings: most people vote for party, not for the candidate). The regressions used the 93 European roll constituencies only.

Table 1 shows the results of those regressions. If 1987 were either a maintaining or a deviating election, the R^2 values would be very high. That for National is; that for Labour is not, with almost one-quarter of the geography of voting Labour in 1987 unrelated to the geography of voting Labour in 1984; that for Abstentions certainly is not, and there is only a small correlation between the two geographies of non-voting.

Most studies of elections show that in a maintaining/deviating sequence, when one party does well - i.e. there is a swing towards it - it tends to do better in the constituencies where it is already strong than in those where it is relatively weak. Similarly, when it does badly - i.e. there is a swing against it - it tends to lose more votes in the constituencies where it is relatively weak than in those where it is relatively strong.²⁸ When this happens the regression coefficient (the b value) is greater than 1.0. Table 1 shows that this was the case in 1984-1987 for National but not for Labour or Abstentions. National's

share of the vote increased between 1984 and 1987 (because of the decline of the Democratic and New Zealand Party votes). The constant term (a) indicates that on average it increased its share of the electorate by 4.94 percentage points. The larger its share in 1984 in a constituency, the larger its increase, however: in a constituency where 20 per cent of the electorate voted for it in 1984, 25.34 per cent did so in 1987; where the 1984 figure was 40 per cent, that for 1987 was 45.74; and where its 1984 support was 60 per cent, in 1987 it was 66.14.

Between 1984 and 1987, then, National's performance was best in the constituencies where it was already strong, as indicated by its 1984 vote; the stronger its support at the former date, the more converts it won. For Labour, however, a b value of less than 1.0 shows that its increase in support was not directly related to its pre-existing strength: where it got 20 per cent support in 1984 it got 27.05 per cent in 1987; where it got 60 per cent at the former date, it got 56.65 at the latter. This suggests that, for Labour at least, 1987 was a critical election, when it mobilised support from groups and in places where traditionally it has not performed well. Exactly the same was the case with Abstentions, with the 1987 geography of non-voting in no way linked to the pattern three years earlier: people in different places, and probably from different social groups, chose not to vote in 1987.

Exploring the New Geographies

The regression results reported in Table 1 suggest that the traditional cleavage pattern in New Zealand was cracked, if not broken, in 1987. (This assumes that 1984 was part of a long sequence of maintaining/deviating elections. That assumption remains untested here: there is little reason to believe that it is not valid.)

The traditional view of New Zealand electoral behaviour is that there are two salient cleavages: the major one is between socio-economic classes, and the less important is between cities and rural areas. Chapman describes it thus for the period 1935-1975:²⁸

each major party has been firmly grounded upon its hinterland - Labour in the poorer city and National in the richer city and purely rural sections of the population - and has competed for the support of the socially mixed constituencies that lie between.

This suggests a clear geography of voting in the country, with National dominant in the small towns and rural areas, as well as the higher status sections of the large cities, and Labour having majority support in the lower status suburbs and industrial towns; the marginal seats, of which there tended to be relatively few, were concentrated in the smaller provincial towns (places such as Napier and New Plymouth, Wanganui and Whangarei), plus those city constituencies which incorporated both higher and lower status residential areas.³⁰ This was confirmed by the first ecological analysis, using 1981 Census data.³¹

Was that traditional geography changed in 1987 or was it merely accentuated? Both trends might have been anticipated, given the performance of the 1984-1987 Labour government. For example, the effect of the removal of protection from the farming industry should have enhanced National's ability to win votes in the rural areas and the small towns dependent on them, and it could have won back former New Zealand Party voters there too. In the cities, on the other hand, and especially in Auckland and Wellington where the major benefits for the financial services sector were reaped, Bob Jones's former supporters may have switched to Labour, in a clear expression of retrospective voting - supporting the incumbent government that had brought them increased prosperity. The New Zealand Party may have acted as a bridge for ex-National voters who were unable to cross the cleavage and vote Labour in 1984; some 1984 National voters who also benefited from the new economic regime may have switched to Labour in 1987, enhancing its vote-winning capacity in the high status constituencies where it was traditionally weak electorally and breaking the continuity in the geography of voting that is statistically indicated by Table 1.

In its traditional heartlands, however, Labour may have had difficulty retaining support, as the less-well-to-do had not benefited substantially, and directly, from its policies. To some extent, Labour could afford to lose votes in those constituencies that were safe because their traditional supporters were unlikely to vote National and there was no other alternative except abstaining. In its marginal seats, however, it needed to retain support, which required more than promises that social policies would be to the fore if Labour were returned. Thus the party ran a long and very well-organised campaign focusing on the marginals, aiming to retain support in the places where it mattered.³²

To explore the possible shifts, especially those in Labour voting and in Abstentions not linked to the continuity hypotheses (Table 1), ecological analyses have been

conducted, using 1986 Census data.³³ Eight variables were selected as representing the basic cleavages and aspects of New Zealand society linked to the general hypotheses outlined above. They were:

PCAG - percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing;

PCBLOO - percentage of the workforce employed in blue-collar (manual) occupations;

PCFIN - percentage of the workforce employed in finance, insurance and property;

PCHIINC - percentage of the population earning more than \$30,000 per annum;

PCPROF - percentage of the workforce employed in professional occupations;

PCUN - percentage of the workforce unemployed;

PCSE - percentage of the workforce self-employed; and

PCDB - percentage of the population receiving domestic purposes benefit.

In addition, two variables reflecting the electoral context were used:

PCNZP84 - percentage of the electorate who voted for the New Zealand Party in 1984;

LABMAT84 - difference (in percentage points) between the Labour and National share of the electorate in 1984, irrespective of winner;

Each of these nine independent variables was correlated with the residuals from the three regressions reported in Table 1: in the study of Labour voting, for example, the dependent variable was the unstandardised residual from the regression reported there, representing that part of the Labour vote in 1987 not related to the 1984 pattern. (The three are thus termed LABRES, NATRES, and ABSRES.) The r^2 values (with signs) are given in Table 2.

Although none of the correlations in Table 2 is large, the general trends that they portray indicate some significant changes to the electoral geography of New Zealand. Salient is the shift towards Labour and away from National in the constituencies that can be categorised as high status

(i.e. housing relatively large percentages of people employed in finance and in the professions, and of high income earners). Labour clearly picked up many votes in 1987 in areas, and hence among social groups, where its support has traditionally been weak. National did extend its hold in one of its heartlands, however - the agricultural areas, where Labour's position was further weakened. Labour's hold in its own heartland was slightly weakened, as shown by the negative correlation with PCDB but there was a zero correlation with unemployment levels (PCUN); National picked up votes among the welfare beneficiaries (PCDB), it seems, but not among the unemployed, for in constituencies with high unemployment the main shift was into abstentions (as it was also in those with high percentages of domestic beneficiaries).

With regard to the two variables representing the electoral context, Labour's success in winning over those who voted for the New Zealand Party in 1984 is clearly suggested: it did much better in the constituencies where Bob Jones's party polled well in 1984 than was predicted by the continuity equation (Table 1), whereas National did slightly worse. And with marginality, the safer the seat the poorer the Labour performance and the greater the percentage of voters, relative to expected, who either voted National or Abstained.

Overall, therefore, the correlations suggest that, relative to its performance in 1984, Labour did best in the marginal seats, in those where the New Zealand Party did well in 1984, and in the higher status constituencies, with high-income, white-collar workers. National picked up votes in the agricultural areas and in the safe seats, but lost them in the higher status areas.

The bivariate relationships shown in Table 2 undoubtedly overlap to some extent - constituencies with large percentages employed in finance were likely to have high percentages who were high income earners also. Thus multiple regressions were run, using a stepwise design, including in the final equation only those variables that made a significant contribution (at the 0.05 level) to accounting for the geography of the residuals from the continuity regressions. The results are given in Table 3.

With regard to the Labour residuals, only two independent variables made significant contributions to accounting for the variation unaccounted for by the continuity effect: together they account for 24 per cent of the residual variation, so that, with the 78 per cent of the total variation accounted for by the continuity effect, this

leaves 17 per cent ($100 - 78 - (22 \times 0.24)$) of the variation in Labour voting in 1987 still unaccounted for. Of the two significant relationships, one - PCPROF - reflects Labour's successes in the high status constituencies: compared with 1984, Labour picked up votes in the seats with large percentages of people employed in professional occupations (and also, given the collinearity between the three variables, in those with large percentages of high income earners and of people employed in the financial sector). The other indicates its success in winning over those who voted for the New Zealand Party in 1984; the greater their number, the better the Labour performance in 1987, clearly sustaining the hypothesis that the New Zealand Party acted as a bridge for former National voters towards support for Labour.

The continuity regression (Table 1) left only 12 per cent of the variation in the pattern of National voting in 1987 unaccounted for: four other variables accounted for one-third of that residual variation. National lost support, relatively, in the high status areas - as indexed by the PCPIN variable - as an obvious corollary of Labour's successes there. It also lost support in the areas of higher unemployment, indicating its inability to counter the loss of votes to Labour in its own heartland by invading Labour's traditional heartland. It picked up votes where the New Zealand Party was relatively successful in 1984, though only at one-third the rate that Labour was able to (compare the regression coefficients of 0.14 and 0.46), and also in the safer seats, where presumably they were of little import - either National held the seat securely or Labour did.

Finally, two-fifths of the large amount of residual variation in the pattern of Abstentions was accounted for. Relatively, the volume of abstentions increased, the safer the seat, and the larger the proportion of blue-collar workers living there.

Between 1984 and 1987, therefore, the Labour Party gained support in the higher status constituencies, where the bulk of voters has not traditionally provided much support for Labour in recent decades. National, as a consequence, lost votes there, in what were traditionally its electoral strongholds. Labour also benefited much more than National from the virtual demise of the New Zealand Party, which achieved a pattern of votes in 1984 closely correlated with the distribution of people in professional occupations.³⁴ In addition, National's share of the electorate held up best in the safest seats, an indicator of the success of Labour's campaign policy of targetting the marginals.

Unpacking the Changing Geography

The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicate clear shifts in the geography of voting over New Zealand as a whole between 1984 and 1987. But were those shifts consistent across all types of constituencies? Levine and Roberts suggest not, on one major shift at least: among the seven constituencies that they surveyed, they found that in those classified as urban 63 per cent shifted to Labour and 37 per cent to National, whereas in the rural areas the respective percentages were 40 and 60.³⁶ This suggests the need to look at different sections of the country, to see whether the changing fortunes of the parties varied according to the local milieu. For this, and following McRobie's fourfold classification,³⁶ the following groups of constituencies were separately examined (with the number of constituencies indicated in brackets):

All North Island (68)

All South Island (25)

All Metropolitan (Auckland, Christchurch, Wellington) (40);

North Island Metropolitan (Auckland, Wellington) (32);

Auckland (22);

All Provincial Cities (20);

South Island Urban (15);

All Rural (21);

All Mixed Urban-Rural (12);

North Island Rural and Mixed (23);

South Island Rural and Mixed (10);

All Rural and Mixed (33).

The first part of this sectional analysis focuses on the 1987:1984 correlations, to see if there was any variability between the sections in the strength of the continuity effect. Table 4 shows that there was. For the National Party, all of the r^2 values exceeded 0.70, with the majority greater than 0.85: the topography of the voting surface for National varied little between the two elections. It was weakest in three sections: the mixed urban

and rural constituencies (such as Awarua, Clevedon and East Cape); the provincial cities; and the South Island urban areas (i.e. Christchurch, Dunedin, Invercargill, Nelson and Timaru). This suggests that it was in those areas that the ability of National to retain support equally across all constituencies was most at threat; elsewhere, it picked up votes relative to its 1984 performance in about equal quantities in all constituencies.

For Labour, the variation in the strength of the continuity effect varied from 25 per cent in the provincial cities to 69 per cent in Auckland. As with National, its 1987 performance was not very accurately predicted from its 1984 share of the electorate in the provincial cities and in the South Island other than in Christchurch (i.e. the relatively low correlations for South Island Urban, and South Island Rural/Mixed, relative to Metropolitan). Continuity was greatest in the North Island, and especially in Auckland.

For the pattern of Abstentions, the results of some of the correlations show less continuity in those sections (especially in the South Island, in the Provincial Cities, and in the Rural areas) than was the case for the analyses of the country as a whole (Table 1). In only one analysis was half of the 1987 pattern accounted for by the 1984 pattern.

These correlations suggest that the trends identified for the country as a whole - and analysed in Tables 1-3 - were not necessarily reproduced in all sections of New Zealand. Certain type areas - notably the Provincial Cities and the South Island Urban Areas - showed much less evidence of continuity than others, suggesting that it was there that the major shifts in voting behaviour occurred between 1984 and 1987.

Table 5 reports, in summary form, on the stepwise multiple regression analyses of the residuals from the continuity effect for each section. It shows, following Table 4, that in general the 1987 voting pattern for Labour was less predictable from the 1984 pattern in the South Island and the Provincial Cities than it was elsewhere: in these sections, it seems, the changes in voting between the two elections were the consequence of particular features of each constituency rather than any general trend. In the North Island, the residual patterns were more predictable. In the Metropolitan Areas of Auckland and Wellington Labour gained support in the high status areas (index by PCPROP),

whereas outside those cities and the provincial cities its main gains were in the constituencies where the New Zealand Party polled well in 1984.

For National, its growing dependence on support from the farming sector, and those intimately related to it, is shown by the presence of PCAG in several of the regressions for the Rural and Mixed constituencies. Overall, there was much greater continuity to the geography of its support than there was to Labour's; the main shift was its growing strength in the agricultural areas. There were no significant relationships in the Metropolitan regression for National, however. For Abstentions, two trends stand out: in the metropolitan North Island, non-voting declined relatively in the higher status areas (PCPROP); in the Rural areas, the rate of non-voting increased in the safe seats.

Discussion

The ecological analyses reported here provide no foundation for extravagant claims that 1987 was a critical election in New Zealand; the strength of the continuity effect for the geography of voting National is sufficient to dispel that hypothesis. Indeed, for National 1987 has to be interpreted very much as a maintaining election: the only substantial shift was its growing relative strength in the agricultural areas, where it has always been strong.

Two other aspects of the results presented here indicate that the 1987 election as a whole cannot be interpreted as maintaining. The first is the relatively weak continuity in the pattern of votes for Labour, and that party's growing strength in the high status constituencies of the North Island's metropolitan areas. Labour's new economic policies clearly won it votes where it had traditionally obtained few; only further elections will indicate whether this has resulted in a permanent realignment. Secondly, in some sections of New Zealand the geography of voting in 1987 was relatively weakly linked to that in 1984, especially for Labour but to some extent for National too, and the residuals were not related to constituency characteristics across the section. In these areas - basically the entire South Island plus the Provincial Cities in the North - very local circumstances appear to have prevailed, related presumably to local issues. This may indicate the onset of dealignment; it may be a deviation that will have disappeared by 1990.

Writing of the 1978 general election, at the end of his discussion of four decades of New Zealand's political history that began with election of the first Labour government in 1935, Chapman argued that ³⁷

The pattern as Labour designed and shaped it has disintegrated and the replacement is yet to be found.

Only time will tell whether the governments of David Lange have discovered the replacement and whether it will result in a permanent, significant reshaping of New Zealand's electoral geography.

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Table 1 1987-1984 Regressions

	Dependent Variables		
	Labour	National	Abstentions
<u>a</u>	11.93	4.94	8.24
<u>b</u>	0.76	1.02	0.54
<u>r²</u>	0.78	0.88	0.28

Table 2. Correlations (\underline{r}^2) between Residuals from Continuity and Independent Variables*

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable		
	LABRES	NATRES	ABSRES
PCAG	-0.10	0.18	-0.01
PCBLCO	-0.03	0.01	0.19
PCFIN	0.25	-0.20	0.00
PCHINC	0.22	-0.05	-0.02
PCPROF	0.27	-0.19	-0.04
PCUN	0.00	-0.01	0.03
PCSE	0.00	0.01	-0.01
PCDB	-0.05	0.08	0.12
PCNZP84	0.22	-0.01	0.08
LABNAT84	-0.04	0.02	0.32

Table 3. Results of the Stepwise Regression Analyses

	Dependent Variable		
	LABRES	NATRES	ABSRES
<u>a</u>	-10.32	3.35	-3.77
Significant <u>b</u> for			
PCPROF	0.40	-	-
PCNZP84	0.39	0.14	-
PCFIN	-	-1.14	-
PCUN	-	-0.84	-
LABNAT	-	0.08	0.10
PCBLCO	-	-	0.16
<u>R²</u>	0.24	0.32	0.40

Table 4. 1987-1984 Correlations (r^2): Sectional Analysis

Section	Dependent Variables		
	Labour	National	Abstentions

North Island	0.59	0.79	0.15
South Island	0.67	0.76	0.05
Metropolitan	0.40	0.74	0.18
N.I. Metropolitan	0.36	0.74	0.12
Auckland	0.69	0.74	0.03
Provincial Cities	0.25	0.56	0.01
S.I. Urban	0.37	0.56	0.12
Rural	0.46	0.83	0.06
Mixed Urban/Rural	0.52	0.52	0.18
N.I. Rural/Mixed	0.45	0.71	0.22
S.I. Rural/Mixed	0.38	0.81	0.01
All Rural/Mixed	0.61	0.86	0.28

Table 5. Stepwise Regression Analyses for Sections

Section	Dependent Variable		
	LABRES	NATRES	ABSRES
North Island	PCPROF (+) PCNZP84 (+) LABNAT84 (-) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.47)	PCPROF (-) PCNZP84 (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.34)	PCBLCO (+) LABNAT84 (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.29)
South Island	None	PCSE (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.18)	LABNAT84 (+) PCDB (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.78)
Metropolitan	PCPROF(+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.38)	None	PCPROF (-) PCDB (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.45)
N.I. Metropolitan	PCAPROF (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.28)	None	PCPROF (-) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.34)
Auckland	PCPROF (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.33)	None	PCPROF (-) PCDB (+) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.52)
Provincial Cities	None	PCUN (-) (\underline{R}^2 , 0.39)	None
S.I. Urban	None	PCSE (+) PCNZP84 (-)	PCFIN (-) PCNZP84 (+) LABNAT84 (+)

(contd.)

Table 5 (contd.)

Section	Dependent Variable		
	LABRES	NATRES	ABSRES
		(\underline{R}^2 , 0.55)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.92)
Rural	None	PCNZP84 (+)	LABNAT84 (+)
		(\underline{R}^2 , 0.21)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.42)
Mixed Urban/ Rural	PCDB (+)	PCAG (+)	None
	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.43)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.54)	
N.I. Rural/ Mixed	PCNZP84 (+)	PCAG (+) PCUN (+)	PCDB (-)
	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.25)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.37)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.16)
S.I. Rural/ Mixed	None	None	LABNAT84 (+)
			(\underline{R}^2 , 0.49)
All Rural/ Mixed	PCUN (+)	PCAG (+) PCDB (-) PCUN (+) PCNZP84 (+)	LABNAT84 (+) PCFIN (+)
	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.20)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.46)	(\underline{R}^2 , 0.37)

NEW ZEALAND'S FIRST NUCLEAR SHIP 'BAN'

Michael Pugh

There is a popular belief that a ban on visits to New Zealand by nuclear propelled warships existed between 1972 and 1975 as part of the Labour government's anti-nuclear stance. Evidence suggests, however, that the situation was rather more complex than that. Indeed in the longer history of New Zealand ship visit policy several paradoxes stand out. For example, the right wing government of Sidney Holland had reservations about clearance for US Navy visits, and it had been the Labour government of Walter Nash which, in 1960, welcomed the first nuclear powered visitor. This article addresses four aspects in relation to visit policy in the 1960s and 1970s: why the issue arose; the US response; why the 'ban' was lifted; and the significance of the 'ban' for the evolution of anti-nuclear politics in New Zealand.

The issue arose in the mid-1960s largely because visiting by nuclear powered vessels had become the subject of international dispute over liability and financial indemnity for reactor accidents. Within the United States provision had existed since 1957 for strict liability in regard to civilian reactors under the Price-Anderson Act which set the maximum indemnity at \$US 560 million for payment of claims. Liability for civil reactors abroad was incorporated into the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, extended to allow for operations outside the United States of the nuclear powered merchant ship Savannah. This government-subsidized vessel made its maiden voyage in 1962 but before putting into Southampton in 1964 the US and British governments had to reach a bilateral agreement about liability for damage. Also, ports in Turkey and Japan had denied entry on liability grounds. President Nixon deactivated the ship in 1971, and the US 'atomic establishment' claimed that nuclear powered civilian vessels had not proved commercially viable. In truth nuclear powered merchant ships, like the Savannah, the German vessel Otto Hahn and the ill-fated Japanese Mutsu, could not trade like

other ships because, as the editor of the Guardian Weekly (10 May 1975) remarked, 'they frighten the life out of people.'

European states had drawn up international agreements, such as the 1962 Brussels Convention, to deal with liability for civil nuclear reactors. But the US Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the Department of Defense were adamant that warships should not be bound by international treaties. In the view of Admiral Hyman Rickover (Deputy Commander for Nuclear Propulsion and 'father' of the nuclear navy): 'we simply cannot afford to subject what is now nearly a third of our major naval combatants to the dictates of international regulation under this convention... surely maintaining the sovereign status of these ships is more important to our national interests than solving the liability question for nuclear merchant ships.'²

The liability question, however, had become a pressing matter for the United States. Ambassador-at-Large, Robert J. McCloskey, indicated that he had been involved in negotiations with a number of foreign governments which had been reluctant to accept warships without liability assurances. And it had become a sticking point in renegotiating the Spanish base agreement.³ No doubt governments around the world were impressed by a spate of accidents in the 1960s involving nuclear submarines, though not necessarily caused by reactor failure, as well as B-52 bombers. The USS Thresher had been lost off New England in 1963; the USS Scorpion off the Azores in 1968. In 1970 a Soviet submarine sank near Spain, and perhaps with a reactor meltdown.

Many nations cited liability as the reason for restricting access. New Zealand and Australia were among them, and by the early 1970s there was hardly a port in the Pacific which would accept nuclear ships. The US government's standard 'Statement of Assurance', a single page document, was not considered a sufficient guarantee. It merely promises that claims arising out of a nuclear incident will be dealt with through diplomatic channels in accordance with customary procedures for the settlement of international claims under generally accepted principles of law and equity.⁴ There are no customary procedures for nuclear accidents.

In 1971 William McMahon's government in Australia requested Britain and the United States to refrain from proposing visits by nuclear powered ships until environmental assessments had been made. McMahon had made inquiries and been told that Sydney was unsuitable for nuclear powered visitors. He withheld permission for visits in view of uncertainty over environmental safety.⁶ It has been conceded, however, that the Holyoake government in New Zealand had already suspended visits in view of the reluctance of insurance companies to accept risks. After the US carrier task group led by the USS Enterprise visited Wellington in 1964 there were no nuclear powered visitors until 1976, and the Radiation Laboratory conducted no environmental tests between 1965 and 1977.

The Kirk government thus inherited National's 'ban', directed against nuclear propulsion rather than nuclear weapons. It was in the form of executive policy rather than a regulatory régime.⁶ The existing New Zealand Radiation Protection Act (1965) required the Minister of Health's written consent before radioactive material could enter the country, but the Act could not come into force until detailed regulations were promulgated. The Kirk government laid down the detailed Radiation Protection Regulations in 1973 but they specifically exempted foreign warships from the legal provisions.⁷ The 'ban' thus continued as an executive suspension.

But the Rowling government, and Whitlam's government in Australia, may have had additional reasons for persisting with restrictions into 1975. They were exploring proposals for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Pacific which involved the question of nuclear armed ship transit as well as nuclear tests by France; French tests, of course, also being subject to cases brought before the International Court of Justice. A delegation of American senators to the South Pacific certainly gained the impression that the Australian and New Zealand ship bans had been a way of highlighting their objection to nuclear testing in what they regarded as a zone of peace.⁸ It is also clear that by 1975 Whitlam had got cold feet and refused to co-sponsor the New Zealand-Fiji nuclear free zone resolution at the UN. At the 1974 ANZUS council meeting the United States had pointed out that a zone could pose problems for transit, port visits and use of facilities for its increasingly

nuclear powered navy. Subsequently Washington 'made clear its objections to the nuclear-free zone proposal and its dissatisfaction that an Anzus ally should persist in a course which the US has declared harmful to its interests.' Indeed Whitlam wrote to Prime Minister Bill Rowling in October 1975 arguing that it 'could stir up controversy with the United States and raise questions about the ANZUS relationship'.⁸

How did the United States, the country most directly affected, respond to the nuclear power suspension? Response occurred at two levels, legislative and diplomatic. Absolute liability for accidents involving US warship reactors abroad derives from US Public Law 93-513, passed on 21 November 1974 and signed by President Ford on 6 December 1974. The need for such provision was made clear during hearings of the US Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which began in June 1972. Testimony, much of which is still classified, was given by senior officials in the State Department and Pentagon. Admiral Rickover and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (Chief of Naval Operations), supported legislation, and Secretary for Defense James R. Schlesinger gave it his blessing. Described as 'long overdue, necessary and urgent', Public Law 93-513 was designed to recover access to foreign ports by the US Navy for 'efficient ship utilization and to provide a place for members of the crew to rest from their demanding duty'.⁹ In view of the dénouement in Vietnam and the pending closure of bases in Thailand the United States was doubly anxious to secure port visits. An increasingly nuclear powered navy might obviate reliance on overseas land bases, the availability of which had decreased since the end of the Korean War. But as Admiral Zumwalt argued, in the era of Nixon doctrine it was increasingly important to maintain and display naval strength to control sea lanes.¹⁰

The law stated in part:

That it is the policy of the United States that it will pay claims or judgments for bodily injury, death, or damage to or loss of real or personal property proven to have resulted from a nuclear incident involving the nuclear reactor of a United States warship: *Provided*, That the injury, death, damage, or loss was not caused by the act of an armed force engaged in combat or as a result of civil insurrection. The President

may authorize, under such terms and conditions as he may direct, the payment of such claims or judgments from any contingency funds available to the government or may certify such claims or judgments to the Congress for appropriation of the necessary funds.

In reply to a parliamentary question in New Zealand on 14 July 1976, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Muldoon government, Brian Talboys, pointed out that the law had no territorial limitations, that individuals as well as governments could present claims, and that American administrative and judicial procedures would apply. But prospective claimants should note that Congress expressly avoided any dollar ceiling on the amount of liability, fearing that this would act as a target. Nor, given an 'unparalleled safety record', did Congress establish special funds. It merely authorized the President to sanction, through the Secretary of the Navy, the use of contingency funds already set aside in the Department of Defense budget for meritorious claims. Congressional approval would be required to exceed the contingency budget.¹²

As critics also indicated at the time, thyroid cases would not necessarily reveal themselves for 30 years; it would be necessary to prove that it had been radiation which caused harm. There remain doubts about whether psychological damage would be covered, who would do the medical monitoring and over what period, and by what means compensation would be assessed. Moreover, the law had limited international value because it was a unilateral declaration which could be repealed unilaterally.¹³

Public Law 93-513 did not, of course, cover nuclear weapons accidents. In fact Secretary Schlesinger requested textual amendments to the congressional resolution to underline the point that indemnity related to reactors only. Obviously this was a consequence of the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board vessels.¹⁴

In the case of Australia and New Zealand vigorous diplomatic activity followed up the legislation because of the complicating issue of the proposal for a nuclear free zone. It seems that the United States spelt out to states in the South Pacific that without nuclear ships there could be no protection. In New Zealand, the US ambassador,

Armistead Selden Jr, also pressed for visits on the grounds that continued stoppage after liability had been 'solved' was inconsistent with ANZUS.¹⁵

On 14 April 1975 Rowling revealed that the US had 'put out feelers' and as a consequence of the Public Law the government would wish to look at the situation. In mid-1975 the Australian Minister for Defence visited New Zealand to confer about approaches by the United States for restitution of nuclear powered visits. Rowling announced on 10 July 1975 that the cabinet was 're-examining its policy of not permitting nuclear-powered ships to call at New Zealand ports' but that for the moment 'there are no plans for change'.¹⁶ Doubts have been expressed about the intention of the Rowling government to persist in this line if re-elected. CND and members of the Labour party were alerted by Rowling's announcements, and the Labour conference of May voted overwhelmingly for a prohibition on nuclear armed as well as nuclear powered vessels.¹⁷ But Labour's manifesto for the 1975 election stated that the defence alliance with Australia and the United States would be maintained without mentioning port visits. Clearly American and Australian pressure for a change in policy would have been difficult for a Labour government to resist without widespread public support.

After the changes of government in Canberra and Wellington in November-December 1975, eight members of the US House Armed Services Committee and four senators visited the South Pacific. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon left his talks with them on 14 January 1976 to announce to waiting journalists that the ban on nuclear powered ships was being lifted because the prohibition was inconsistent with New Zealand's obligations as a signatory to ANZUS. A few hours later the newly elected Fraser government in Australia announced that it also intended to review the policy, having been advised by the senators that the suspension was incompatible with ANZUS.¹⁸ The US Commander in Chief Pacific, Admiral Noel Gayler, arrived in New Zealand in March 1976 to arrange for the nuclear powered cruisers USS Truxtun and USS Long Beach to visit in August and October. New Zealand ports became available in June 1976, after the Atomic Energy Committee had revised its 1971 Code for Nuclear Powered Shipping and made new berthing assessments.¹⁹

In part, then, reinstatement of visits resulted from a coincidence of United States diplomatic and congressional pressure with a new mood in Canberra and Wellington. According to the Australian Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs who met the congressmen, the incoming Fraser government would not merely support ANZUS, but further develop the alliance with the intention of using it as a vehicle for the solution of more 'global' problems, starting with unequivocal support for the expansion of Diego Garcia to maintain a 'naval balance' in the Indian Ocean. Muldoon told the delegates that there was 'only one country in the world which will be in a position to exert positive leadership in the world for the next twenty-five years, and that is the United States. We believe that the alternative, if the United States does not exhibit that leadership, will be world chaos.' He was clearly concerned about Carter's strategic policies. The congressmen came away from the discussions in the belief that they had experienced a 'unique opportunity to literally be present at the rebirth of ANZUS.'²⁰

However, provision of accident cover had been a major preoccupation and Public Law 93-513 was a significant factor in lifting the 'ban'. Liability, in fact, continued to give concern. New Zealand was anxious to secure assurances about nuclear weapons indemnity. An approach to Ambassador Selden produced an aide-memoire on 13 August 1976, similar to an agreement reached with Canada in 1968-69, covering liability for warheads as well as reactors. In the view of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs this addition was 'as satisfactory as could be expected.' Australia took up the question, too, but was precluded from qualifying on account of its Status of Forces Agreement (1963) with the United States.²¹

What, then, was the political effect of the ending of the 'ban'? In response to Rowling's indication of American overtures, anti-nuclear campaigners, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the United Nations Association held a meeting in Auckland on 4 May 1975 attended by 70 people. They organized a petition calling for the 'ban' on nuclear powered vessels to be extended to vessels and aircraft which normally carry nuclear weapons. On 8 June 1975, an Auckland delegation presented Rowling with a paper querying the adequacy of Public Law 93-513,

asking whether the US ambassador's approach for visits was based on the legal provision, and what the nature of the 'ban' was. The organizers received no reply but obtained confirmation from the United States that the law was the basis for the approach.²²

In addition to this immediate reaction, several lasting repercussions can be identified.

First, the question of liability for reactor accidents became insuperably linked to the problem of carriage of nuclear weapons and thus to disquiet about the neither confirm nor deny policy. The Labour government had assumed that anything propelled by nuclear energy would be carrying nuclear weapons.²³ But a controversy had arisen in 1974 when Retired Admiral Gene La Rocque testified before a US congressional committee that he had never known a nuclear capable vessel not to carry nuclear weapons: 'They do not off-load them when they go into foreign ports such as Japan or other countries. If they are capable of carrying them, they normally keep them aboard ship at all times except when the ship is in overhaul or in for major repair.'²⁴ This had caused a storm of protest in Japan and was noted by anti-nuclear campaigners in New Zealand. Numerous conventionally powered frigates and destroyers (some nuclear capable) had visited during Labour's term of office.

Second, the 'ban' gave further impetus to concern about nuclear escalation at sea. The projected deployment of Trident submarines heralded a major escalation in the militarization of the Pacific which, according to critics, stimulated a race for first strike capability. With their long range it was unlikely that Trident submarines would travel back to Bangor, and critics feared that they would come to New Zealand for rest and recreation of crews if the US pressure to open up ports was successful. Subsequently, when the nuclear powered submarine USS Queenfish arrived in 1984 peace activists suggested that it represented a softening up, preparatory to making facilities available for Trident submarines.²⁵

Third, the suspension issue overshadowed protest against US facilities and military research in New Zealand. After a famous 'victory', orchestrated in 1968-69 by research scientists and student radicals at Canterbury University, over the proposal to site an Omega VLF transmitter in New Zealand, attention turned to the USAF Woodbourne facility near

Blenheim. This was closed in 1973. In March 1971 protestors fought a surrealistic pitched battle with police in the high country above Lake Tekapo, site of the USAF's Mount John Satellite Tracking Observatory which remained operational until 1983.²⁶ But Mount John was remote and very much a South Island issue. Nuclear ship visits engaged more attention in the urban centres of the North Island.

It was a post-Vietnam issue to stir the popular imagination. After the anti-war demonstrations of 1960s and early 1970s, many protestors 'retired' from political activism. Some like James K. Baxter took to the bush as priests and poets. But other divines, notably the staff and students at St John's Theological College, Auckland, lobbied against Rowling's proposal to reconsider nuclear powered warship visits, and announced the formation of a small boat squadron to make symbolic blockades. They were followed in 1976 by the Wellington based Coalition Against Nuclear Warships, which also promoted CND in Wellington. As the historian of the Auckland peace squadron has noted, the ship issue aroused a strong territorial sense.²⁷

Fourth, it heightened environmental concerns and drew attention to the possibility, however remote, of accidents involving radiated materials. There was concern not only about the adequacy of the US liability but about the regulations and practices for admitting nuclear visitors to urban ports. Serious questions continue to be asked about the methodology of the accident model used by governments and about risk calculations in the light of new information on reactor and weapons accidents. Such 'environmental' doubts were strongly voiced in the 1980s, during parliamentary committee hearings on the Prebble, Beetham and Lange nuclear free zone Bills.²⁸ Across the Tasman, too, accident possibilities led to Senate hearings in 1986-87 on safety procedures for nuclear powered and nuclear armed warships visiting Australian ports.

Fifth, the Labour party in opposition introduced the concept of a legislative ban as a formal alternative to executive policy. Several of those involved in the 1975 protest meeting were active in local Auckland branches of the party and promoted the issue at national level. Richard Prebble, though not one of the more ardent anti-nuclearists,

introduced a five clause Nuclear Free Zone (New Zealand) Bill in August 1976 at a time when Labour was reeling from the onslaught of Muldoon's political style. A private member's Bill on the nuclear issue seemed a promising tactic. The Bill endorsed the UN resolution for a South Pacific nuclear weapons free zone, and prohibited nuclear powered ships and nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand or its territorial sea. Prebble presented it as a choice between national survival and nuclear destruction, alleging that immediately a ship enters a port the port becomes a target. Others emphasized nationalism, suggesting that Muldoon was a lackey of foreign powers, or that visits would encourage superpower rivalry in the region.²⁹ Although Labour abandoned the legislative approach until Prebble tried again in April 1982, the legal solution had gained respectability in the party. Nevertheless the wider peace movement was to carry its distrust of Labour leaders into the 1980s. The July 1984 issue of Peacelink carried the warning: 'We must be under no illusion that election of a Labour government will solve all our woes....[given] the Rowling acquiescence in nuclear visits though they did not arrive until after the 1975 election.' After Lange's victory in 1984 the Labour party and peace groups were absolutely determined not to tolerate another executive suspension.

Sixth, it highlighted the alliance dilemma. An editorial in the Auckland Star (15 April 1975) argued that it would have to be resolved one way or another: 'On the one hand stands our advocacy of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and support for those seeking the same goal in the Indian Ocean. On the other there is the security we enjoy under the Anzus umbrella in return for obligations freely entered into.' Persuaded by the United States, the Muldoon government contended that a restrictive visit policy would be incompatible with the ANZUS treaty, and National's spokesman argued that the opposition 'must now say whether it wishes New Zealand to remain in the ANZUS treaty alliance.'³⁰ Nuclear visiting gave an impetus to views that the security relationship would need revision or abandonment, reflected in the publication of Alternatives to ANZUS (1977) by the Foundation for Peace Studies.

In conclusion, what had begun as a question for various governments of insurance liability became a question of alliance demands. In the Reagan

administration's view, of course, acceptance of nuclear weapons in ports was the test of alliance loyalty, thus crudely defining a political relationship by a particular weapons system. To suggest that, in contrast to Vietnam, the proposed all-white rugby tour of South Africa and opposition to French nuclear testing, the 'ban' reversal of 19% attracted little public interest is to miss the point. The 1974-76 period was crucial for radical causes. A government had come to power which was intolerant of any dissent and markedly unsympathetic to the South Pacific nuclear free zone idea. Nuclear visiting changed the focus of peace movements from something they could do little about (nuclear tests and a South Pacific zone) to one in which they could take direct action. Muldoon played into their hands by inviting or accepting visit requests. By mid-1982 the hitherto fragmented peace groups began to develop greater co-ordination and, with women as key organizers and publicists, to mobilize mass support. With the local authority nuclear free zone movement also gathering momentum peace politics were poised to enter another phase.

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13. Mann, p. 2; NZPD, 1(38), vol. 404, 5 August 1976 (Finlay), p. 1325; Jo Vallentine, submission 56, and Michael Lynch, submission 10, appendix C, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 'Safety regulations Relating to Nuclear Powered or Armed Warships in Australia Waters', Canberra, 1987, p. 25.

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**MAORI SELF-GOVERNMENT 1945-1981: THE NEW ZEALAND
MAORI COUNCIL AND ITS ANTECEDENTS**

In August 1981, Matiu Rata, leader of the newly created Maori political party, Mana Motuhake, announced that he had appointed one of his colleagues as spokesman on 'Pakeha affairs'. Rata was pointedly drawing attention to a rarely questioned assumption about the political order in New Zealand.

After over a century of confinement within European perceptions and institutions, a growing body of Maori opinion in the 1970s was challenging the established framework of New Zealand law and government.

There were by the beginning of the 1980s both understandable Maori disillusionment with the major political parties and emphatic voices proclaiming the need for greater autonomy, elimination of social and economic injustice, and even the recognition of Maori sovereignty. But there was also a very substantial element in the Maori world that was conscious of the significant extension that had occurred in the years since the end of the Second World War in the domain of Maori influence and authority.

Media preoccupation with protest over land and other inequities tended to obscure - for both Maori and Pakeha alike - the extent to which there had already been achieved a substantial devolution of authority and responsibility to exclusively Maori organisations.

Academic political studies have also largely ignored the role and activities of Maori organisations as well as the broader political dimension of the modern Maori experience. As Stephen Levine and Raj Vasil have pointed out, the concentration of political scientists on voting behaviour and party fortunes in the four parliamentary seats reserved for Maori representation has been accompanied by neglect of 'the much wider scope of Maori politics and ... the other institutions of government orientated towards Maori needs and interests' (1985, p.16).

Maori organisations

In addition to having full access to the national electoral system of the country, and the rights and benefits conferred by it, Maoris have two kinds of statutory organisation designed explicitly for Maori needs.

As part of the central government machinery, there are organisations created, staffed, and controlled by what Schwimmer described as 'Officers paid by the Crown' (1968/1975, p. 31). The best examples of this first category would be the Department of Maori Affairs, the Maori Land Courts, the Maori Education Foundation, and the Maori Purposes Fund Board. Although these organisations are sometimes seen to personify 'the government', they manifestly cater to the welfare of the Maori community - housing, community improvement, education, skills training, the protection and development of land, and so forth. They also act as important avenues of access for the Maori people to the government. As they had been set up specifically to administer Maori affairs, and as they had a growing policy of hiring Maoris - particularly at top managerial levels - Maoris have come increasingly to feel that these organisations 'belonged' to them.

The encouragement of community involvement in the planning and administration of Department of Maori Affairs' programs over the late 1970s and early 1980s has transformed the relationship between the Department and the Maori community. Confidence and trust between the two improved since the Tu Tangata ('stand tall' - local initiative) policy was implemented. The government is widely seen to have a friendly intent, is relatively approachable, and does not occupy some distant, other-world.

The second category of national organisation consists of those which are officered by elected and appointed Maori representatives - run by Maoris, for Maoris. The elite in these organisations are men and women with great mana (status and authority). They are often people of consequence in European society as well as in strictly Maori spheres. They may acquire considerable fame or notoriety, certainly in their own regions, and sometimes in the country as a whole. They are sought out for their views by television, radio and newspapers, and when they wish to express themselves the media will be there to give them coverage. They usually have valuable affiliations with people in power and personal relationships with key Pakeha politicians.

Maori organisations embody a mixture of bureaucratic and representative principles. Membership at each level - national, regional, or local - is decided on the basis of election and delegation. The administrative trappings are comparable with those of any European institution. The major examples of this hybrid organisation are the New Zealand Maori Council and the Maori Trust Boards which administer Maori funds for marae (community gathering place, including meeting house) activities, education, and economic development. The Maori Womens' Welfare League (MWWL) was the earliest such organisation, set up in 1951 with the aim of improving Maori health, child-care, and home-making, and to promote Maori values, arts, and crafts. The MWWL also makes contributions and policy proposals to government on all levels of Maori welfare - housing, education, employment, cultural preservation, land issues, and so on. Its large annual conferences are attended by officers of the government who take note of Maori opinion. Its views are also frequently reported in the media. The League is the exclusively female counterpart of the male dominated New Zealand Maori Council, with which it works in close association.

The New Zealand Maori Council is the official statutory organisation set up in the early 1960s specifically for the purpose of providing the Maori people with a mouthpiece to the ear of government. The Council deals with the full gamut of Maori concerns and has government funding and support. Connected with the Council is the Maori Wardens' Association. This organisation enables community appointed wardens to police Maori functions and to assist and control Maori people in those environments - such as public bars - which might otherwise get them in trouble with the police. Maori wardens act both as social workers and as buffers between Maoris and the European justice system, giving Maori communities the option of dealing with the anti-social and delinquent behaviour of their own people.

There is considerable co-operation and exchange between the various major Maori organisations. Conferences and projects are often shared. But, while the personnel in some organisations overlap with the personnel in others, the administrative jurisdiction and role-territory of each is clearly demarcated and jealously guarded.

Urbanisation and the formation of national networks

One of the most striking features of post-war New Zealand has been the geographic mobility of the rural population. The small-scale family farm became less and less viable as an economic venture. The wealthier farmers and larger holdings were improving their stock and production by the introduction of well equipped milking sheds and better farm machinery. Rural areas could no longer support such a large proportion of the population, and workers began to seek employment in the towns and cities. As relatives settled into new jobs, well-paid by rural standards, urban migration became increasingly attractive to younger Maori siblings and other family members. If a young man or woman 'knew someone' in the city they would always 'find a bed and kai (food)' until they had been able to establish themselves. This was customary Maori hospitality. However, as the historian Michael King observed, the process of urbanisation created a new environment for inter-racial tensions in New Zealand (Oliver with Williams 1981, p.287). Some stress was also placed upon migrant families as kinship obligations were expanded to accommodate the new situation.

By 1981 some twelve percent of the New Zealand population claimed to be of Maori extraction. With economic and demographic changes came changes in patterns of leadership and social organisation. The rural/urban dichotomy meant that Maori social interaction was now being conducted often over hundreds of miles. Instead of rural connections being broken and forgotten, Maoris who were active in 'Maori things' developed a stamina for travel which would have exhausted many a devoted European politician. The touchstone of Maoritanga ('the Maori way') remained in the rural areas and to a very large degree the urban Maori community developed along the lines laid down by the kawa (customs) of the tribal culture in the homelands. Traditional knowledge, marae etiquette, songs and chants, were carried by the people to the urban maraes which sprang up in the cities and towns. 'This marae' (located in the heart of Auckland city), I was told during fieldwork in 1981, 'is Waikato'; and it was right and proper that those welcoming us to the marae should make mention of the Maori Queen. 'That is an old Waikato chant'. Rather than rural connections being severed, it was apparent that the strength and identity of the urban maraes, whether dominated by a particular group, or

serving members of many tribes, were still rooted in Maori tradition. Contact with one's own tribal homeland, one's parents' homeland, or one's ancestors' homeland was maintained by regular telephone calls, letters, and visits. For large social events (hui) - such as a wedding, funeral church festival, or conference - whole delegations of urban people would travel 'home' by car or hired bus.

In addition to the new patterns of social activity arising from urbanisation, the creation and consolidation of national Maori organisations greatly increased the movement of active Maori people all across the country. Avenues for men and women, with leadership qualities and aspirations, multiplied rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. One organisation in particular, the New Zealand Maori Council, provided a ladder of opportunity for service in the national political arena. Although it was not created until 1962 its origins can be traced back to the Second World War and earlier.

Tribal executives and tribal committees

In the first decade of the twentieth century, after sixty years of subjugation and land loss, Maori opinion was strongly in favour of placing the remaining Maori land into the hands of a Maori governed organisation. The Liberals, under the influence of the outstanding Maori leaders Sir James Carroll, Sir Apirana Ngata, and the Kotahitanga (Maori Parliament) movement, passed two acts for this purpose. In 1900 Maori land councils were set up to manage Maori land at the local level and to encourage leasing instead of land sales. The second act of 1905 set up Maori councils, which Sinclair describes as a 'form of local self-government to promote Maori welfare' (1959/1980, p. 195). The formation of Maori councils succeeded in diverting the energies of the home-rule Kotahitanga movement.¹ Ngata had encouraged the movement to turn its attention to the formation of the Maori councils. But the degree of self-government Maoris actually had appeared minimal and Carroll became displeased with the growing demands of the Maori councils for the government to increase their powers. By 1906, Sinclair says, the councils were allowed to 'wither away' (ibid).

Maori councils were to re-emerge during the Second World War. Three founding members, Sir Norman Perry, [Sir] Henare Ngata² and Peter Kaua explained:

The unifying influence was Apirana Ngata. He moved around and he linked the people up loosely. He was the inspiration ... he is well known, not only in speeches, but in our songs of history ... he was the inspiration, the co-ordinator if you like. He united us loosely because there was no official body. So he sowed the seed all on his own, whether deliberately or unwittingly I don't know (Norman Perry, interview 25 October 1981).

Apirana Ngata and other leaders began to rally together the Maori people to provide human and material resources for the Second World War effort. As the majority of the Maori population still resided in the rural tribal areas these leaders travelled from community to community creating a fabric of communication and organisation between the tribal regions which had not existed there before (Henare Ngata and Peter Kaua, interview 18 September 1981).

In his own writings, Apirana Ngata observed that although Maori society had experienced 'the Pakeha and his civilisation' for over 125 years:

... the influence of the tribe still affects every aspect of Maori social life and the vast majority of the Maori population. It would be easy to get the impression that because the material and outwardly observable aspects of Maori life such as food habits and housing arrangements have changed, other more spiritual things have altered correspondingly and in proportion. Actually there is no correspondence, proportion does not apply, and psychological factors characteristically Maori exert a persistent influence and supply a racial need (in Sutherland, 1940, p. 155).

The utilisation of the existing structure of Maori organisation during the war - this 'strong thread of tribalism' - was largely the result of the keen understanding and efforts of Apirana Ngata. His disciples and supporters, a new generation of men including his son Henare Ngata, led or served in the Second World War in the Maori Battalion. As well as producing food and clothing, the Maori communities provided men.³

Maoris were allotted to different companies according to the tribal areas from which they came. 'A' company came from the general Tai Tokerau area of the North; 'B' company came from the Arawa

area - the Rotorua or Waiariki district; 'C' company was of the Tai Rawhiti tribal area of the East Coast - which was divided into three platoons, each platoon being manned by different sub-tribal groups with their own officers selected from within the hapu (sub-tribe). Henare Ngata explained that:

It was actually a conscious effort on my father's part to try and use tribalism within the structure of the military organisation like the Maori Battalion, on the basis that there was something positive in tribalism that could be used (interview 18 September 1981).

The tapping of the military spirit and organisation of Maori tribalism through the Maori Battalion proved remarkably successful. The Battalion members moved about the country visiting other tribes encouraging the recruitment of more men, liaising between the tribes themselves, and between the tribes and the army. The Maori War Effort Organisation was formed as a result of this activity. Its main function was to recruit men for the Maori Battalion and to gather locally grown and produced food, clothing, and gifts for the men during the war. The people were united in the war effort and this experience was to have a lasting influence upon future Maori social and political organisation.

The war revealed to Maori leaders, to Maori MPs, and to the Labour government, the benefits of a wider Maori organisation. It led to a significant piece of post-war legislation - the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945. This act sought to form a national Maori organisation under the Minister of Maori Affairs. The organisation, derived from the Maori War Effort Organisation, was composed of tribal committees (local or community organisations) and tribal executives (district organisations). The districts which the tribal executives represented were virtually imposed upon existing tribal structures. Tribal committees, likewise, were established at the community level by the same key leaders who sat on existing marae or pa committees. The Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act merely formalised an organisational structure which had long existed in Maori society (Henare Ngata and Peter Kaua, interview 18 September 1981).

Members of the organisations were also aided by government appointees - a 'controller' and numerous welfare officers. The duty of the

controller was to:

... advise and assist the Tribal Executives and the Tribal Committees in the discharge of their functions under this Act, and to superintend and co-ordinate the operations of such Tribal Executives and Tribal Committees (Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945: section 5).

Each tribal committee was to consist of between five and eleven elected members of the tribal area for a term of two years. In addition, a Welfare Officer was appointed as a member of the committee by the Minister of Maori Affairs. The tribal executives, which were to be founded in every tribal district⁴, consisted of (i) two representatives of each tribal committee within the executive's jurisdiction 'who shall be appointed by the Minister upon the recommendation of the tribal committees' and (ii) a Welfare Officer 'who shall be appointed as a member by the Minister' (ibid: section 8). By 1949 63 tribal executives had been formed throughout the country, embracing 381 tribal committees (King in Oliver with Williams 1981, p. 295). Maori wardens were also appointed to assist the organisation and the Maori community in keeping the peace, in administering large Maori gatherings, and in controlling unruly behaviour due to drunkenness.⁵

The responsibility of administering the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act fell heavily upon the shoulders of the new generation of Maori leaders who had gained experience through the Maori Battalion and the Maori War Effort Organisation. Maori returned servicemen were treated with greater consideration than their predecessors of the First World War. Perry explained that many of these men, particularly officers of different fighting units of the Battalion, won distinction for themselves overseas:

They came back fresh from the war effort of the Battalion ... They were an aggressive, constructive team. These were the Maori welfare officers who were proud of the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act (interview 25 October 1981).

The contribution Maoris made towards the war effort, King points out, could not but have affected race relations in New Zealand:

The Maori contribution to the war effort ... had some of the effect sought by the Maori MPs. It became more difficult for Pakeha leaders to discriminate against Maoris (in Oliver with Williams, 1981, p. 297).

On their return home many of the men completed university degrees, or trades and professional training under government rehabilitation programs. Perry felt that there was a sense of obligation in the country to repatriate these men into positions commensurate with the stature they had won overseas. Some entered the Department of Maori Affairs, others joined various welfare and social services, or other government departments. Some, like Henare Ngata, took their training (in his case in accountancy) and returned to their home district to help with the administration of Maori land incorporations. 'They accepted that Western education and administrative skills were necessary in order to function within the bureaucracy' King explained:

... they were impatient with anything less than full equality ... "we shed our blood in two World Wars". If this had done nothing else, ... it had at least purchased the right to equality (ibid, p. 296).

This generation of leaders, larger in numbers than the last, was to become deeply involved in the attempt to realise this equality. But it was an equality which rejected the assimilationist policies of the government. Over the next 40 years it was an approach which diplomatically and effectively promoted the idea that the two major cultures could develop side by side.

The improvement of educational opportunities for Maori children became an important point of focus for Maori leaders in the 1950s. It was seen not only as the training ground for effective future Maori leadership but as a necessity, if the wage-earner and his family were to prosper in the 'Pakeha world', the world of the European New Zealander. For a time Maori parents discouraged their children from learning Maori as they felt it hampered the progress of their children at school. (At this time spoken Maori was also severely discouraged by the schools themselves.) But while western education was highly valued, the Maori community still prospered, as a separate cultural and social entity. A man derived his right to leadership as much from his knowledge and practise of Maoritanga as he did from his

political and professional expertise within European society. The strength and persistence of Maori culture can be attributed to the continued use and function of the marae, which acted as the central gathering place and as the hub of social and political life within the community.

The success of these leaders on the national scene in forestalling unwanted policies and encouraging desired ones was based on an extremely delicate handling of their relationship with the government. Their diplomacy earned them the respect of a considerable number of their Pakeha colleagues. It also earned them the label of 'conservatives'. This perceived 'conservatism' was to be challenged by a new generation of urbanised, outspoken Maoris from the 1970s onwards.

The Social and Economic Advancement Act (1945) had a mixed reception. Several Maori informants pointed out that, while the original idea was good - the act being designed to '... make provision for the social and economic advancement and the promotion and maintenance of the health and general well-being of the Maori community' (section 1) - there were also problems which were both structural and cultural in nature. Maori welfare officers often experienced a conflict of loyalties between the will of their elders and the will of the Department of Maori Affairs. They became disturbed at the apparent lapse of attitudes within the department following the recruitment of Pakeha ex-military personnel into the department's bureaucracy. During the 1950s there appeared to be a shift away from the 'adventurous program' originally designed to encourage Maori autonomy toward a more paternalistic, welfare, assimilationist orientated approach to Maori affairs. One welfare officer related his first instruction from his superior before he went into the field:

"You must make sure that Maori people eat plenty of greens and that they don't hang their washing on the barbed wire fence! Because it upsets my wife every time we drive down into Wellington." That's what he told me, and I thought I was going out for a briefing on how to be a Maori welfare officer - those were the two key things. Then he went on to tell me how he was a chief of the ... tribe (25 October 1981).

The Social and Economic Advancement Act was

still a far cry from a manifesto for Maori self-government. Apart from the administration of a small allocation of funds the act barely expanded the functions of the self-regulating, self-government capacities of the traditional organisations which already existed at the community level. More significantly, almost every section of the act was 'subject to the approval of the Minister'. The administration of the executives and the committees was also designed to follow European administration and meeting procedure, decisions being taken by a majority vote, minute books to be kept, and audited annual balance sheets to be submitted. For many communities this was the first time such procedures had been introduced.

By the 1980s committee procedures had been combined with traditional marae practices (where consensus is reached by hours of debate) and used, when it suited organisations to do so, with considerable efficiency. Originally, however, the new procedures were viewed with suspicion. From her studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s the anthropologist Joan Metge found that the Maori tribal executive and committee system under the Social and Economic Advancement Act had been a resounding failure:

The Maoris of Kotare were aware that the tribal committee was a failure. They themselves blamed organisational difficulties and alleged weaknesses in the system ... They found the act difficult to understand; few had read it in full. They also complained that they were inhibited by the conventions of Pakeha committee government which the act required them to adopt ... Lack of support from the people of Kotare was a serious handicap. They mistrusted the tribal committee, in the first place, as a threat to individual autonomy, but mainly because it was imposed upon them by the government (in their view a Pakeha institution) (1964, pp. 87-8).

At the heart of the problem lay the fact that the executive and committee system did not have a national Maori body to bind its units together. Maori input stopped at the district level. At the national level the organisation came under the administration of the Minister of Maori Affairs. In a very real sense it was a 'government organisation'. Metge sadly points out that it 'did not conflict openly with the traditional form of

community government'. The structure was 'an enlightened attempt to recognise officially and standardise the procedure of the unofficial councils of elders' which already existed. It had been designed in consultation with Maori leaders (ibid). On the whole, it appeared that the Minister did not interfere with the running of the organisations. But they were gravely underfunded by the government and under-supported by the people. In some areas traditional leaders felt that their hereditary entitlement to leadership by virtue of their kaumatua (elder) or rangatira (aristocratic) status, was degraded by the new system. They refused to submit themselves to the indignities of election by community vote.

It would be misleading to suggest that the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act did not represent a step forward in the improvement of New Zealand bicultural political relations. The most outstanding feature of this effort was the establishment of greater collaboration between Maori leadership and Pakeha administration and a growing recruitment of trained Maori personnel into the bureaucratic and service areas of the government. But the fundamental impotence of the tribal executive and the tribal committee had still to be addressed.

The New Zealand Maori Council

Following J.K. Hunn's report in 1961, and with 'integration' the goal of National Government policy, the 1962 Maori Welfare Act was passed. It was enacted at a time when governmental paternalism seemed at its height. But on close scrutiny, it appeared to be a more enlightened piece of legislation than its predecessor, the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act. Although the act was still administered by the Minister of Maori Affairs, clauses 'subject to the Minister's approval' were sparingly used. The degree of decision-making power placed in the hands of each Maori association was also notably increased. In more ways than one this act was a major breakthrough for the Maori people. It gave birth to the first statutory, government supported, national Maori organisation by the introduction of the Maori-run, Maori-appointed New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC). The earlier executive/tribal committee structure established under the Social and Economic Advancement Act was expanded to include two additional upper levels. The new organisation was structured as follows:

1. The national level - The New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC or the 'Council').
2. The regional or district level - the Maori district councils ('councils').
3. The sub-district level - the Maori executive committees ('executives').
4. The local community or neighbourhood level - the Maori committees ('committees').

Officers, men or women, for the Maori committees were to be elected every three years. Thereafter each association held its own triennial conference at which delegates were selected to represent them on the wider based body. This election and appointment process moved successively from one association to the next until the national level of the NZMC was reached. The act provided for the Maori committee to consist of seven officers.⁶ Maori committees appointed two or three members to the executive committee of their district (according to the number of committees in that area). Executives appointed two or three of their number (according to the number of executives in that area) to the district council. (In some districts executive committees were not set up and delegation, therefore, was direct from Maori committees to the district council.)

The NZMC was conceived of and intended to be operated as a hierarchical power structure - a typical western model. However, informants insisted that 'in the NZMC the power was really in the hands of the people' who gave or withheld their support from their chosen leaders. Accordingly, it would be misleading to describe regional and national bodies as 'higher'. It would be more appropriate to describe their jurisdiction as 'wider' based.

This view of the organisation was not expressed in the legislation. According to the Maori Welfare Act the power to elect and appoint members and delegates to the wider bodies, the power to make submissions and remits for discussion, and the payment of levies, went in an 'upward' direction. The general thrust began at the community level and, in theory, ended in the lap of the NZMC. On the other hand, under the act, a movement in the opposite direction was prescribed in the allotment of government subsidies, in decisions on structural matters (such as the name and boundaries of the different associations, whether two associations

would be amalgamated, or a new one created), and in the issuing of directives:

Each District Maori Council shall be subject in all things to the control of the New Zealand Maori Council and shall act in accordance with all directions, general or special, given to it by the New Zealand Maori Council (Maori Welfare Act 1962, section 16).

The intention of the act, and the way in which the Maori people were to operate the structure, were rather different matters. Maori district councils - representing different tribal areas which still proudly assert their right to self-determination - were unprepared simply to submit to the dominant will of the 'higher authority' of the New Zealand Maori Council. Differences in urban and rural opinion predictably developed. Party political sentiments could also cause friction on the Council. The Council had to accommodate diverse interests, philosophies, and cultural traditions. This was done by giving prior recognition to the independence and integrity of the tribes, and the political discretion of the district councils to give their first loyalty to regional interests.

The NZMC came to function by negotiation and agreement between fundamentally autonomous political regions. A dynamic feature of Council meetings was the manner in which these interests would jostle, lobby, and solicit each other in an ongoing process of support bargaining and collaboration. Rather than a pyramid, the power structure of the organisation was better depicted as a round table, fabricated by a network of relationships of greater or lesser intensity (figure 1).

After five years of the Council's operations Metge was only moderately optimistic about the success of the new committee system. She was concerned that the area boundaries of the nine district councils seemed to be 'arbitrarily defined', and that some councils - such as Auckland and Wellington - represented over 30,000 Maoris while a small rural district might only represent 500 or so (1967/1976, p. 307). The discrepancy grew wider in the next decade.

Apart from the urban areas, however, the boundary definitions of the Maori district councils are not arbitrary. They recognise political boundaries which are both ancient in their tribal origins and recent inasmuch as tribes and sub-tribes have federated since European contact. At the edges

of these boundaries local Maori committees have stated their political preference and support the district council of their choice.




Figure 1: The Segmentary Democracy of the New Zealand Maori Council

In the 'latest of several official attempts to give Maoris a degree of self-government', Metge wrote in 1967, these official committees and councils have been co-ordinated into a nationwide system. Under their act, Maori committees had been given the power to see to the observance of law, to make by-laws, to impose small fines for petty offences, and to see to the upkeep and improvement of community facilities, health, and general welfare. Metge held that:

By and large the system has not captured the imagination or the support of the people. Although Maoris played a major part in the planning, it is widely regarded as a "Government plan" (1967/1976 pp. 207-208).

Metge was one of the few authors who devoted

more than a passing paragraph to the NZMC in the 1970s. Her comments, however, did not claim to be supported by a detailed study of the Maori council system, and were possibly still influenced by perceptions of the earlier and less successful tribal committees.

Metge's focus was mainly upon the local level. There, particularly in the early years of the NZMC, Maori committees experienced varying degrees of success in community management according to the strength of alternative local Maori organisations such as marae committees, the quality of available leadership, and the resistance of local elders. The urban rumblings of the late 1970s and 1980s were to thrust the Council into social and political conflicts of a new kind.

In the mid 1960s Metge could not have predicted how vital the NZMC was to become in Maori district politics, or the major role it would play on the national political scene in expressing Maori opinion. Indeed, for the urban elite - the articulate well educated, 'liberal' leadership which was to emerge in the 1970s on the NZMC - the interests of the Maori committees were in many ways to take a distant third place to interests of district or national concern. A view of Maori leadership today could not omit the lofty regions of national politics, inter-tribal mobilisation, and the use of the national media.

From its inauguration the NZMC played an increasingly complex role. It had to respond to growing demands for the revival of Maoritanga, for the provision of solutions to rising unemployment and urban violence, and for the retention and development of Maori land and resources. It had to deal with increasing pressures from a new generation of 'radical' youth, competing for its attention against the 'conservative' and 'traditional' sectors of the Maori world. By means of government submissions and public debate, the NZMC came to comment on most issues which affect Maoris and race relations in the country, and on other national issues besides.

At the time when elders treated the suggestion that they submit to a local election as an affront to their inherent standing within the community (Metge 1964, pp. 87-8) there was little to indicate that, two decades later, the Maori committee system would come to be viewed as a significant and thoroughly 'Maori' institution.

In 1979 any paternalistic connotation which might have been construed from the legislation's

title was removed by substituting 'community development' for the word 'welfare'. The Maori Welfare Act of 1962 (and its amendments) was thus renamed the Maori Community Development Act 1981. By late 1981 the NZMC consisted of 27 male and three female delegates representing ten district councils which, in turn, represented approximately 450 Maori committees across the country. The 'Council' met quarterly, at Parliament House in Wellington. It was unarguably the most influential Maori organisation in New Zealand.

Party politics in the New Zealand Maori Council

In the early days of the NZMC it was commonly held among Maori Labour supporters that the organisation was a device of the National Party to counter the Labour Party monopoly of the four Maori seats. Maori National Party supporters needed an alternative and authoritative means of access to government. The generation of Maori leaders after World War II included a number of National Party members who stood for election with little success. Henare Ngata, who had himself stood unsuccessfully for Parliament, explained that these men were frustrated by the fact that they did not have a channel through which their voices could be heard:

Labour people at the time contended that the Maori Council was largely a creation of National Party people, because the National Party went back to power in 1961. The NZMC was an organisation that would give voice to government of Maori concerns. And the people who were principally involved in setting up the Maori Council were of National Party persuasion - Reiwhati Vercoe, Turi Carroll, Norman Perry, myself. In 1961 there was an urge to set up an organisation to give voice to the National Party interests (interview 18 September 1981).

Henare Ngata was careful to point out that the initiative to establish the NZMC did not come officially from the National Party, but that there was a 'strong involvement' of Maori people in the NZMC who were National men. In his opening speech at the inaugural meeting of the NZMC, following his nomination as president, Sir Turi Carroll 'exhorted members to ensure that the Council did not become involved in party politics or religious differences' (Minutes 28-29 June 1962). While there was no

disagreement with these ideas, the political sympathies of the organisation's founding members were no secret. As Kawharu noted in 1977:

Roles in decision-making were also affected by party politics; indeed, it was a 'moment of truth' for party supporters. Many of the senior and most influential personalities in the reputedly non-party, non-sectarian New Zealand Maori Council were also paid-up members, office-holders, or former candidates of the ruling National Party, while the incumbents of the four Maori seats in Parliament were all Labour Party representatives (1977, p. 307).

By the 1980s the NZMC was reflecting the movement of New Zealand from a two party to a three party system with the rise of Social Credit. It also was affected by the birth of the Maori political party, the Mana Motuhake, which was making its presence felt in the Maori world in an independent campaign in the 1981 national election. As political interests diversified, the apolitical ideal became more difficult to uphold. Political commitments cut across a number of other influences - such as religious affiliations, professional backgrounds, rural or urban experience, and tribal loyalties.

One founding member pointed out that in 1981 leadership on the Council was represented by a 'lot younger and better educated' people than when the Council was established:

You get a far different type of leadership now from the type of leadership in the earlier days. I think this reflects the change in the Maori community itself. People are considerably more urbanised now than in the twenty odd years that the Council has been in existence... The number of people on the Council now who have an academic background is far more than when the Council started. And there's a far greater pressing of urban views now too than before. I don't think that the Council has quite adjusted to the change in the style of Maori life. I think it's still very largely rurally oriented. That's how it originated... The bulk of the people who get elected onto organisations such as the NZMC are still predominantly rural in their orientation. Whether they faithfully reflect

the situation in New Zealand I'm rather confused (Henare Ngata, interview 16 September 1981).

One fact of considerable significance for the NZMC was the growing dichotomy between rural and urban communities. Although Maori life revolves around urban maraes or community centres, Maori urban social organisation was at first considered to be 'weak' and its energies more easily dispersed by other influences in comparison to the 'real' community in the rural areas. An urban Maori who did not wish to become 'too Pakeha' kept an anchor in his home marae, no matter how far the cable on the anchor was extended. It was there that he hoped to be remembered in death - to be buried by his people in the place where he 'belonged'.

Strong as the links with rural roots remained, however, the existence of new formal structures in cities and towns provided a focus for the creation and expression of new identities and loyalties. Perceptions and interests in the rural and urban sector began to diverge. Nowhere was the potential for conflict more apparent than in Auckland where the Maori district council represented over 22 percent of the nation's Maori population.⁷ In spite of its size, the Auckland council - like the other nine district councils - was entitled to only 10 percent representation on the national body of the NZMC. Like national parliamentary constituencies, NZMC electorates reproduce in this organisation's representation the same imbalance between the urban and rural population which has so long been a feature of the national parliament.

In some instances, such as the 1981 tour of the South African Springbok rugby union team and the 1981 national election, the tensions and clashes of interest which disrupted the Pakeha community also produced similar political and ideological divisions in the Maori world. The NZMC was the natural forum for confrontations over issues that were of Maori concern. The majority of the remits put forward by the Auckland district council were of a different nature to those coming from the rural regions. This district council was led by two of New Zealand's most outspoken Maori academics - Dr Ranginui Walker and Dr Patrick Hohepa. These men operated in an environment of growing urban unrest, and had to contend with some of the most aggressive urban Maori pressure groups and gangs in New Zealand. Walker and Hohepa were in the vanguard of a new elite of young Labour supporting intellectuals in the 1960s

and early 1970s. During the 1970s they became increasingly visible in the media, expressing views which were not always popular. Their influence on the NZMC was difficult to ignore and some conservative members began to feel threatened by the change of tone on the Council. The conservatives feared that the Muldoon National government would withdraw its support from the NZMC and that sections of Pakeha society would be alienated by 'radical' demands. A struggle for domination over the Council between rural/conservative and urban/liberal factions seemed the inevitable consequence of a growing range of irreconcilable attitudes and ambitions.

Functions and Organisation

The principal functions of the NZMC, as defined by its act, were to promote all aspects of Maori social, economic, cultural, and spiritual welfare and to 'promote harmonious and friendly relations between members of the Maori race and other members of the community'. This would seem fundamental to an indigenous organisation which wished self-determination. What actually evolved over time was an organisation which dealt with a unique agglomeration of human needs.

In theory the NZMC is designed to offer the 'little man' access to the ear of government by a process of discussion, taking motions, and delivering remits to the next link in the communication channel. Remits moved at a Maori committee meeting would be carried by delegates to the next executive (or district council meeting if there is no executive committee), where the same process would occur. Issues of national concern were eventually carried to the Council.

On each successive level the remits and topics of discussion would be tested and compared with other proposals being brought to the meeting by delegates from the wider region. Issues were either dealt with by that body, modified, abandoned or carried forward to the next level. The urgency and complexity of the issue, the degree to which it had wider relevance, as well as the particular concerns of each succeeding body, determined whether the remit was tabled at the Council. Each level of the NZMC structure, therefore, functioned both as a collaborative and as an independent unit. Each had its own connections with outside organisations and government bodies. If it was able to settle a matter itself there was no necessity to refer it further.

A Maori committee for example, might deal with the planning of a local event, or the problem of a youth who had stolen a car or vandalised local property. If it decided to renovate the local marae it would apply for a government subsidy from the district council which allotted such funds for community improvement. Usually financial assistance was available on the basis of one dollar government subsidy for each dollar raised by the community. Realistic estimates had to be made and submitted in time for the next financial term. The community had then to wait until its 'turn' came up on the subsidy list.

Wherever possible other government programs were 'plugged into'. A Maori committee might arrange work for ten local members, under a Department of Labour employment scheme, for the building or improvement of a marae. Building materials for the project would be covered by Department of Maori Affairs subsidies, as managed by the NZMC. However, in a case with wider ramifications, when industrial effluents threatened a community's seafood resources for example, the highest level of the NZMC could be brought to bear on the issue. Each year Council members would organise or attend a range of national conferences concerning such matters as education, land development, fisheries, and Maori Affairs which had been organised by other government bodies.

Basic office and auditing expenses, conference costs, and travel expenses of delegates are shared by the Department of Maori Affairs and the communities. In 1981 the Department provided the Council with a \$50,000 grant for its general administrative expenses. Additional funds for community development were administered through the Council on their people's behalf. Grants were also sometimes made to the NZMC by the public lottery body, the 'Golden Kiwi'. In 1981, apart from the appointment of a full-time secretary to the Council (seconded from the Department of Maori Affairs), there were no salaried officers. Other expenses were met by a system of levies which were raised by each association. The district councils each paid an annual levy of 400 dollars to the NZMC raised from donations and levies received from their executive and Maori committees. Some areas, such as the Tai Rawhiti District Maori Council on the East Coast, displayed considerable economic independence because of large Maori land holdings. The maraes and the NZMC associations received generous donations of food and money from the many Maori incorporation farming blocks in this region.

Occasionally the Department of Maori Affairs found it convenient to manage a special program through the existing organisation of the NZMC. For example, in mid-1981 the Department advised the Council that 6,000 dollars was to be made available to each district council which wished to establish a Maori Language Board in its region for the promotion and learning of the Maori language on the marae (with a special aim of involving the local elders in language instruction). Cultural officers appointed by the Department were to work with Maori committees who wished to be involved in the project. Initiatives like this, based on principles of community involvement and management, were generally welcomed by Maori people and encouraged by the NZMC. Money offered by the Department was never turned down. It seemed only good politics not to offend the Department and to encourage a flow of government funds to the community.⁸

At all levels the NZMC demonstrated an impressive ability to act as an umbrella to a number of satellite organisations -such as the New Zealand Maori Wardens' Association, the Maori Sports Federation, and numerous sub-committees of its own, each with a specialised function. In addition, the Council maintained strong and influential links with otherwise independent Maori organisations such as the Maori Education Foundation, the Maori Women's Welfare League, Maori trust boards, and Maori land incorporations. Occasionally these organisations brought their own concerns to the Council for discussion. Members of different Maori organisations often worked closely together through public meetings, interacting on the marae or at conferences. A representative of the Maori Women's Welfare League regularly attended the quarterly meetings of the Council in Wellington.

It was assumed that major decisions would not be taken in isolation. Those most likely to be affected by decisions would be consulted. This was fundamental to Maori social and political philosophy. The process of debate and consultation was generally referred to as 'the Maori way', as opposed to 'the Pakeha way' where committee decisions could be made without community debate. 'Debate', however, could take literally all night or it could be more tightly structured and limited to an evening by committee procedure if necessary.

Some Maori organisations began their life as sub-committees of the NZMC and evolved an independent status with their own officers and budget. The Maori Wardens' Association, which had

its beginnings in the 1945 Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act, for instance, is the best example of this. It holds both an independent and attached status with the NZMC. Wardens are legally appointed to district Maori councils, to serve in their region, under the Maori Community Development Act 1962. The Wardens' Association, however, receives its own government funding, holds its own meetings and conferences, and makes proposals to the NZMC on a range of issues dealing with the policing of Maori communities, youth offences, and family and social problems. Individual wardens work very closely with Maori committees but the Wardens' Association can make general submissions at the district council and the Council levels.

At the end of 1980 a Maori Sports Federation was formed. This organisation needed the existing structure of the NZMC in order to establish its own network of local and regional sports committees. The NZMC agreed to assist the new body in its formative stages until it was able to function independently, finding support from existing government recreational programs or from the private sector. Like the NZMC, service on these Maori organisations is voluntary. If there be any reward, it is the sense of achievement and status which official position and community participation bestows.

Under the NZMC wing an array of specialised sub-committees remained active or dormant according to the need of the organisation. These sub-committees might act as task forces to deal with specific problems - such as the committee for drug abuse, the housing committee, or the land committee. Or they might prepare a submission for a government legislative review - such as the committee on the Maori Affairs Bill, or the Fisheries Bill sub-committee. Each district council could contribute to the work of sub-committees by making submissions to them or by having direct representation.

Maori people are great committee formers. If there is a problem, the natural response is to form a committee to deal with it. By forming committees 'things get done'. For each issue or problem there is a collective wisdom to be sought and brought to bear. Through community consultation, decisions are made over which Maori organisation, or subcommittee of a particular organisation, should handle a problem or which official channel should be pursued. Where possible, effort is coordinated rather than duplicated.

Submissions and representations of the NZMC

By the mid 1970s the NZMC had a well established procedure for preparing a submission on a new bill or an amending act. The reports of the district councils would be reviewed and compiled into a formal report. Once this report was approved by the full Council it would be submitted to the appropriate Parliamentary Select Committee. The NZMC's recommendations, of course, were not always followed. But it was generally accepted that the committee system provided an effective channel for Maori opinion to flow into legislation and, as an official Maori voice, these views commanded respect in government circles.

In 1979 a political milestone was reached when the Minister for Maori Affairs, Ben Couch, asked the NZMC to take full responsibility for the preparation of 'a draft Bill which in effect could become a new Act to take Maoridom into the 1980's' (A Discussion Paper on Future Maori Development and Legislation 1980, p. 1). This invitation was a tribute to the Council's demonstrated ability to make comprehensive and responsible submissions to Parliament.

The Maori Affairs Act, and its many amendments, had become a labyrinth. Maori leaders had suggested that the simplest way of dealing with it would be to completely rewrite the act. Maori concerns were wide and varied. Probably the most significant and difficult issue was Maori land, still complicated by multiple ownership and in many regions needing development.

The Council declared that every detail of the act needed to be examined, and all Maoris whom it affected needed to have the opportunity to express their concerns. Conferences and seminars to discuss the act were initiated across the country by the Council and by some district councils as well. The Department of Maori Affairs helped with the funding of these conferences, in collaboration with the host communities catering for the gatherings.

The 'Brown Paper', as the bill was dubbed, became a focus around which Maori leaders could mobilise their regions. The process would be slow, but the NZMC wished to be satisfied that 'everyone' had had a chance to contribute. There was, as a consequence, some grumbling in the government towards the end of 1981 that the draft Maori Affairs Bill was taking so long to prepare.⁹

NZMC submissions to government usually followed extensive discussion and redrafting. If the issue was of concern to a particular area a

district council could make an independent submission - forwarding a copy to the Council. Although the NZMC is a national body it remains unique in this respect, that the traditional custom and political autonomy of each tribal region takes precedence over the united body of the NZMC. The Council, according to Maori lore, does not have the power to enforce its decisions upon a district (irrespective of the wording of its act).

Other Maori organisations may also make independent submissions to Parliamentary Select Committees. The breadth of the NZMC's involvement in national policy questions is indicated by an examination of the subjects on which it made submissions from the time of its formation to 1981:

Land:

Antiquities Bill 1975; The Mining Bill 1981; The Reserves Bill 1976; The Rating Amendment Bill 1970; Valuation of Land (No.1) Amendment Bill 1970; Valuation of Land (No.2) Amendment Bill 1970; The Town and Country Planning Act 1973, 1977, 1980; Counties Amendment Act 1961; Public Works Amendment Bill 1976.

Fisheries:

Harbour Amendment Bill 1977; Report on the Treaty of Waitangi and Fisheries 1971; Marine Reserves Act 1971; Fisheries Amendment Bill 1977, 1981.

General Maori Affairs:

Maori Purposes Fund Board 1969; Maori Purposes Bill 1970; Maori Affairs Amendment Bill 1967, 1974; Maori Welfare Act 1962; Broadcasting Amendment Bill 1976; The Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Bill 1977; The National Advisory Committee on Maori Education 1969; Commission on the Future 1977; Institute of Race Relations 1968; The Retention of Auckland Maori Community Centre 1976; Human Rights Commission Bill 1977 (NZMC files).

In a letter dated 10 June 1971 the then Minister of Maori Affairs, Duncan MacIntyre, invited the NZMC to indicate to Cabinet those 'parts of present statutory law which in the Council's opinion are in contravention of the Treaty [of Waitangi]'.¹⁰ The resulting report drafted by the Council and

presented to the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Minister of Justice listed sections from the Maori Affairs Act 1953, the Maori Trustee Act 1953, the Public Works Act 1928, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941, the Town and Country Planning Act 1953, the Counties Amendment Act 1961, and the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967. Under each section an explanation was given as to how these infringed upon Maori rights under the Treaty, especially Article Two which confirmed and guaranteed to the Maori 'the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands, Forests [and] Fisheries (NZMC Report The Treaty of Waitangi: and Parts of the Current Statutory Law in Contravention thereof, October 1971).

Other controversial legislation to which the Council turned its attention included the Police Offences Act 1927 and amendments; the Petroleum Act 1937; the Electoral Act 1956 and amendments; the Maori and Island Affairs Department Act 1968, and the Local Government Act 1974.

Tribe, Region and National Authority

When the NZMC held its inaugural meeting in the Wellington Parliament Buildings on 28 and 29 June 1962 Maoridom was divided into eight distinct district council regions: Tai Tokerau, Auckland, Waikato-Maniapoto, Waiariki, Tai Rawhiti, Aotea, Ikaroa, and Te Waipoumanu. These regions followed the general outlines of old tribal boundaries combined with regional government boundaries in the major migrant areas.¹¹

Three delegates from each district council were present at this first meeting, each member holding equal voting rights in the organisation. Proxy delegates could be sent when officially elected delegates could not be present, to the maximum of three per district. Of the 24 founding delegates, only two still sat on the Council in 1981. These two men, then aged 69 and 63 respectively, were treated as the 'elder statesmen' of the Council. Their experience and diplomacy were often persuasive in the disagreements between 'younger' members, whose ages ranged from their mid-thirties to early sixties.


By 1980 the NZMC had redefined its boundaries to create the ninth district council of Wellington. The formation of the Wellington District Maori Council was in response to the increased urban migration to that city and surrounding urban area. In 1981 a tenth district council, Tauranga-Moana,

was formed - Tauranga also being an urban centre. In addition, it was being proposed that the densely populated South Auckland area be partitioned from the Auckland Maori District Council. Such a division, however, was seen to have serious potential consequences in the power relations between rival factions on the NZMC, and did not come into effect (Map 1).

With the exception of Wellington, the majority of the Maori population in 1980-81 clustered around the central and upper North Island - the East Coast, Bay of Plenty, central and South Auckland, and the Northland (the rural region north of Auckland). The North Island of New Zealand contained nine of the ten district councils and served 93.21 percent of the total Maori population. Te Waipounamu District Maori Council served the remaining 6.79 percent, a scattered population with small land holdings dispersed over the geographically largest district of the South Island, Stewart Island, and the Chatham Islands. It was observed that this district council was not so active in NZMC affairs. Partly because of travel costs, all of its three delegates did not always attend the Council meetings in Wellington; and absent South Island delegates were seldom replaced by proxy delegates.

For those district councils most involved in internal NZMC politics the loss of a vote in the critical, and often controversial, decision-making process is a serious matter. Any suspected affront to regional or tribal authority was met with swift opposition. Such protest would usually be supported in principle by delegates of other district councils. The NZMC, therefore, has never been able to restructure the ultimate decision-making power framework from its present circle of co-operating, but equal, units to that of one integrated, pyramidal, structure as the act envisaged.

During the course of 1981 I had several opportunities to observe the NZMC at work. Disagreement at a Council meeting between key district council delegates was normally registered by clashes between members at the boardroom table; by a divided vote recorded in the minutes, or, in a serious case, by the withdrawal of regional support for a project supported by the majority. The worst that would happen was that the executives of a district council, supported by their members at a former district meeting, would threaten to 'break away' from the NZMC. This would cause considerable public embarrassment for the Council. Indeed more than one dispute which arose at a Council meeting



Map 1: New Zealand Maori Council - District Council Areas and Population

was fought out in the newspapers, radio, and television during the term of my study. But generally such extremes were frowned upon, and avoided in an effort to protect the organisation from the catastrophes of internal disintegration or external interference.

Although the majority of Council business was conducted in a harmonious fashion, in the disputes I observed the support of other district councils was extremely important. Following the general Maori custom in marae debate, a point raised but not commented upon by any other speaker, was an opinion unsupported. The original speaker was expected, by custom, not to keep introducing the issue again and again 'like a yo-yo'. This traditional practice of non-comment avoided confrontation. It also saved the face of the individual who offered the unpopular idea. However, by 1981 traditional modes of Maori debate were being challenged by confrontationist techniques being introduced by urban elites - particularly those who were younger and university educated. A delicate balance between these two methods of debate had, therefore, to be maintained.

Council sessions could last from six to eight hours a day. Interest seldom waned. A combination of passion and fatigue could result in heated words. Occasionally a dispute got out of control. Sometimes the chairman himself came under attack. After such a breach of etiquette it was common for an elder statesman to stand and try to soothe hurt feelings in a traditional, non-personalised speech. This speech would clarify a point, offer a solution, or at least redirect the course of the discussion. A tense situation could be defused by a senior figure alluding to higher principles of political impartiality and the common good. As such comments would be directed at no person in particular, and as the ideals could not be questioned, the disputing individuals would usually withdraw from battle.

The emollient practices of respected leaders did not dissipate all tensions and hostility. Hard feelings could be harboured and taken back to the next district meetings. The events at each NZMC meeting were always related in great detail to the district membership for comment and future direction. Tribal and regional sentiments remained so strong that the Council, meeting only two and a half days four times a year, was never able to crystallise into a fully cohesive body. The NZMC was not a major political force in its own right from which executive decisions and directives issued forth. Rather, it was an association of regional

interest groups which gathered by mutual consent to deliberate and vote upon issues of mutual concern.

The Council has never been a 'pan-Maori' organisation in the sense that regional and tribal interests have become absorbed and encompassed by national concerns. The pursuit of the common good is one of its ideological foundations and can be alluded to in times of head-on regional conflict - the implication being that the placing of personal or regional interests first would mean a break-down of the organisation as a national body. Jealousies and ideological clashes between individual leaders, between different tribal regions, and between rural and urban interests spiced Council debates. But appeals to unity, even during some of the more discordant episodes of 1980-81, were usually heeded by feuding parties and used as a kind of group sanction and ultimate control of political factionalism.

The district council delegates, themselves, claimed to be instructed and directed by 'their people' about what to say at full Council meetings. In theory, they were primarily carriers of the opinion of their membership - which in turn, was a collection of local opinion. In this respect power was said to flow in a chain of command from the people to the national level of the organisation. Very occasionally a view of 'the people' was put forward by delegates which was not one they shared. In this case, while fulfilling their duty, the personal conflict which the delegates were experiencing would also be communicated to the Council.

The ebb and flow of power between the national level of the organisation and the local levels was also substantially determined by the personalities of the leaders. Articulate and persuasive individuals could easily influence the opinions of their district council members - from whom they ostensibly received their directions. In fact, this seemed to be more the norm than the exception. Minor leaders in Maoridom often looked for guidance from their national leaders and generally deferred to them - particularly if they shared their tribal and party political affiliations. A 'young' national leader, however, would be more prone to censure from community elders than an older one.

A leader who had acquired significant public stature in the Maori and Pakeha worlds, and was approaching elderhood, could be formidable. Unless such a leader fell into disgrace the community would depend heavily upon his guidance and was more likely

to support than to try to change his opinions. The only road to such a man's destruction would be if his moral character should come under question or if he should become too authoritarian - overriding the customary practices of freedom of speech and public debate among his own people. A wise leader knew that he could not lead if his people refused to follow. He had always to appear to be giving their views his first consideration, to 'listen to his elders', or at least to reveal to them his dilemmas and to explain the reasons for his eventual decisions.

Clever politicians, therefore, usually won the sympathies of their supporters, despite ominous predictions about their downfall by their opponents. Experienced mediation was so highly prized that people with this gift were not discarded because of small idiosyncracies or misdemeanours. Who else would defend the interests of the community in high places? The protection and patronage of important leaders were frequently sought by both individuals and whole Maori communities, particularly when a problem required negotiation with Pakeha authorities. They, in turn, are defended by their people in political contests with outsiders. In modern political contexts, status is derived from leaders' skills of brokerage, and their power to arouse public sympathy for Maori issues, as well as from their skills in Maoritanga.

Leaders, for their part, are encouraged to bear the burden of leadership - and all the demands on their time and energies that this involves - in return for the loyalty, respect, and deference offered to them by their supporters.

In any voluntary organisation, particularly one that operates over a wide geographical area, decision-making structures have to provide an efficient and effective means of discovering and implementing consensus views. Representative structures in which decision-making bodies are composed of delegates from several areas inevitably have a hierarchical form. Where there are strong traditions of regional autonomy and local initiative, it cannot be expected that a centralised concentration of power will be allowed to occur. Nevertheless, without delegation of some authority to those who are appointed to represent the whole organisation, those who look to their representatives for leadership in a national context are doomed to disappointment.

There was nothing unusual about the dilemmas faced by active members of the New Zealand Maori

Council and its several participating levels during its first two decades. What was distinctive is the balance that was maintained between trust in elected leaders and the responsiveness of leaders to those whom they serve. Maoritanga, blended with principles of representative democracy, produced a unique institutional compromise that has continued to evolve.

From a radical perspective, the NZMC can be seen as a creation of the Paheka, an organisation whose role in the political structure helped to legitimate a system that should have been rejected rather than reformed. As Donna Awatere wrote:

Maori "leadership" is largely irrelevant to the new directions mainly because mana, status and "leadership" is derived from white models ... When these people assert their leadership they assert at the same time, white values and the colonial culture (1984, p. 94).

But although the New Zealand Maori Council may resemble a conventional hierarchical political organisation, it is in fact based on a different philosophy of representation. A hybrid of both European and Maori traditional forms, it acquired, over its first twenty years, specialised skills in brokerage and negotiation with the wider system. Its structure, however, stayed true to tribal principles of segmented authority. The Council provided a forum within which a variety of conflicting impulses in the Maori world could be articulated and tested. It contributed to the growth of a pan-Maori consciousness and habits of consultation and co-operation that laid solid foundations for future autonomy.¹².

END NOTES

Kayleen M. Hazlehurst 1949 -

A New Zealander herself the author, Kayleen Hazlehurst, trained in socio-cultural and political anthropology in Canada between 1973-1980 and returned to New Zealand to undertake her doctoral research in 1981. Since 1982 she has lived in Australia where she worked as a consultant and research officer with the National Aboriginal Conference and the Aboriginal Development Commission before joining the research staff of the Australian Institute of Criminology in Canberra. Her most recent publications include Migrants, Ethnicity and Crime in Australian Society; Ivory Scales: Black Australia and the Law; Justice Programs for Aboriginal and Other Indigenous Communities (ed.); Aboriginal Criminal Justice: A Bibliographical Guide, and a forthcoming book on the rise of Mana Motuhake, New Zealand's first Maori political party.

1. While the Kotahitanga movement was no longer an overt political force, the flame of its beliefs in Maori self-government was kept alive and shrouded with secrecy, by elders and devotees, until the movement's revival in the 1970s and 1980s.
2. Henare Ngata, son of Sir Apirana Ngata, received an OBE in 1967 and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Victoria, Wellington, in 1979. In December 1981 he was knighted for his services to the Maori people.
3. More than 2,000 Maoris served overseas in the First World War and 'a total of 5,300 Maoris were accepted for overseas service' in the Second World War (Hancock, New Zealand at War, 1945, p. 10).
4. Since the 1850s New Zealand had been divided for the purpose of administering Maori affairs into districts, broadly based upon existing tribal boundaries.
5. Today Maori wardens, who still work with the New Zealand Maori Council, have an organisation of their own and provide

extensive social work as well as policing services to their people.

6. This number was increased in 1963 by the Maori Welfare Amendment Act.
7. The Auckland urban area contained 63,560 'NZ Maori' (of half or more Maori blood) or 86,350 persons of 'Maori descent' (persons of Maori descent irrespective of degree) out of a total of 279,252 'NZ Maori' or 384,970 persons of 'Maori descent' in New Zealand (NZ Census 1981).
8. Because the Department was staffed by a significant number of Maori personnel, particularly at the highest levels, the relationship between the Maori people and the government was notably less alienated than that which I saw between the Department of Indian Affairs and Canadian indigenous people between 1973-1980. The Maori community and its leadership were considerably more involved with Department funded programs than the Indian community was in Canada at that time.
9. In February 1983 the NZMC submitted to the government Te Wahanga Tuatahi, a set of proposals most of which were accepted in principle by the government. These broad recommendations were turned into legislation and introduced to Parliament in December 1983 as the Maori Affairs Bill. Further work has been undertaken on the Bill since that time. The act is expected to come into force in 1988.
10. The controversial Treaty of Waitangi was signed on 6 February 1840 between Maori chiefs of New Zealand and Captain William Hobson on behalf of the British Crown. Under this treaty the Maori chiefs ceded 'all rights and powers of the sovereignty' which they possessed 'over their respective territories'. In return the Queen of England confirmed and guaranteed to the chiefs and tribes of New Zealand 'all rights and privileges' as British subjects and 'the full, exclusive, and undisputed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties, which they might collectively or individually possess'.

11. The area of the Auckland District Maori Council, from Rodney County in the north, to Pukekohe in the south, and including Great Barrier Island in the east, is known for statistical purposes as the 'Central Auckland Area'. The District Council of the second largest city, Wellington, is similarly defined by regional government boundaries (Map 1).
12. This description of the NZMC's structure and operations is based on a study of its records up to 1981 and observations at many meetings during 1981. In subsequent research I have confirmed and amplified my original findings. But this essay does not attempt to detail developments since 1981.

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GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE: EARLY DAYS OF
ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY IN NEW ZEALAND
<1>

The current level of concern over the appropriate role of government in the economy prompts enquiry into how such things were handled in the past. This investigation centres upon matters which, whilst they are primarily of historical interest, do retain some relevance to the present debate. The aims of the investigation are twofold: to consider the specific case of the early development of the electricity industry, a topic which has received scant attention in New Zealand and to place the findings within the general debate concerning the underlying motives of governments for intervening in the economy, or for regulating economic activity.

In the political and social features of late nineteenth and early twentieth century New Zealand are to be found the origins of the distinctive characteristics of the method used to initiate the generation and distribution of electricity, to operate the system and to regulate its operation. The role expected of government forms a central core to these basic features and it is this issue which is addressed first.

Government and the Economy

New Zealand has been said to owe more to pragmatic responses to particular problems than to any form of commitment to a general philosophy or consistent ideological viewpoint. Since the earliest days of European colonisation, there has been a mixture of planned, unplanned, regulated and unregulated enterprises all operating simultaneously. Some areas of economic activity have experienced direct ownership by the state, whilst others have been left totally in private hands.

Despite attempts at the turn of the century, exemplified by the work of Pember Reeves <2>, to describe New Zealand as a social laboratory, the apparently radical measures taken by the government

at this time were far from sufficient to constitute anything approaching a clear commitment to a socialist programme. Even Metin's much cited description of the system as socialism sans doctrine seems inappropriate. The general view appears to be that the ideas put into practice in the late nineteenth century were the product of practical expediency rather than of commitment to principle.<3> Direct involvement by government was intended to set a competitive yardstick to serve as a control over the activities of the private sector.<4> The strength of feeling in favour of the municipal trading movement which existed in Britain in the eighteen eighties and which was particularly strong in the electricity distribution field as it developed in that country, <5> was probably reflected in the depth of feeling in New Zealand which was clearly in favour of the state playing a dominant role. Hutchison's suggestion that New Zealand was further along the path to socialism than the rest of the world <6> may be true in that there was a greater degree of state involvement in New Zealand than elsewhere, but it is generally accepted that there was little or no commitment to achieving a fully socialist state. One contemporary view was that state trading was principally aimed at reducing the cost of living and preventing the growth of oppressive monopolies.<7> In effect it was concerned with the distribution of wealth and power as well as with the distribution of real income.

In the recent past successive governments have tended to concentrate upon regulation rather than upon extending state ownership as a way of exerting competitive control over private enterprise. Where state ownership has traditionally been strong it has remained constrained, usually by being prevented from expanding in the same way as similar undertakings of a private nature. In the specific case of retail activities of local power boards, the selling of electrical appliances has been permitted, although not without criticism at times, but for them to contemplate expansion into more general retailing activities would be viewed as going beyond their prescribed role. In general terms such bodies have been established as a control mechanism in certain closely defined areas and they have been expected to confine their operations in consequence. Such an attitude is not calculated to produce a rapid expansion of state ownership and control.

Professor G.R.Hawke has recently described three broad roles that any New Zealand government might be expected to have played in nineteenth and early twentieth century economic life. These are: 1. to exercise its power to secure public order and to borrow against tax revenue; 2. to accord preference to the activities of settlers over those of foreigners, and 3. to affect the relative interests of different groups within settler society.<8> State ownership for ideological reasons is seen as being of far lesser importance. Socialism, doctrinaire or otherwise, is accorded only a minor role.

The specific manner in which these roles have been played by successive New Zealand governments has been traced back by several authors to various reasons or arguments. The first role is principally of importance to the electricity case only in so far as it affected the general structure of the system within which the industry operated. The second and third roles have a direct bearing upon the way in which the industry's development was permitted to take place. It is only in terms of the little-used, but nonetheless important, statutory rating powers of the local distribution boards <9> that the first role makes a direct appearance. In terms of the second role, that of giving preference to New Zealand interests rather than those of foreigners, there is some clear evidence that this was an important element in determining how and why policy was formulated. The desire to push domestic rather than foreign interests has its limits as can be seen by considering the third role expected to be played by government. A strong fear of private monopoly emerges relatively quickly. Whilst foreign monopoly is seen in the worst of all possible light, a domestically based one appears to have been seen as only marginally preferable. The potential private, monopolistic control of any natural resource, basically water power in the case of electricity, was felt to be undesirable by many of the Members of Parliament who participated in the various debates on the issue.

The question of capacity to undertake large projects has been raised as a reason for the unusual degree of direct state involvement in the economy. The argument runs that the capital requirements needed to undertake major civil engineering projects such as building rail links were so heavy that no private group within New Zealand could possibly hope to undertake them

successfully:

no body of colonists rather than the whole community as represented by the government had the ability to buy the materials and expertise needed. Private railways would have introduced a new and probably foreign element.<10>

Mascarenhas extends the scope of this argument to other sectors of the economy:

In other words, the nature of the colony and the dependence of the settlers on the government placed the state in a position in which it had to use its authority to establish the basic infrastructure for development. There was no private enterprise which could carry out these functions.<11>

Given that there was antipathy to allowing foreign interests to control such undertakings, the state became the only body that could do so. The use of this type of approach raises some questions: were private, domestic groups incapable of raising sufficient funding for such undertakings, or were they merely reluctant to do so because the returns to them were likely to be limited? Was there a situation of market failure, with the likelihood that profitable projects might not be undertaken, or did the government merely wish to restrict such opportunities to itself? It has also been suggested that all the state was doing was to provide an infrastructure on which to enable the profitable expansion of private enterprise.<12> What will become clear is that in the case of electricity the argument that private groups were incapable of undertaking the projects is not a convincing one. There were private groups which were more than willing to become involved from an early date both in its generation and its distribution. It would appear that in this instance the over-riding motive was one of ensuring physical control over the natural resource, rather than fear of foreign domination.

With the rail network firmly in the government domain, it was but a short step from there to considering coal, a major input into the industry. Here too the fear of the combination of monopoly control and foreign ownership played their part. Moves by the state to take over coal mines were made at the turn of the century, not always with

great success.<13> Hawke has suggested that such moves, while they may not have been entirely unconnected with electoral considerations,<14> were mainly based upon opposition to possible monopoly pricing. It has also been said that coal mines were brought into public ownership because of the dangers inherent in their control by a shipping ring composed partly of foreign-owned forms.<15>

The moves to acquire direct ownership of some coal sources occurred at about the same time as government was active on the electricity front. The connections between the two are considerable in their extent. Not only was coal a potential power source for electricity generation, but the concern government showed towards it mirrored that shown towards the use of potential sources of water power. The possibility of private operations to generate power in the mid-eighteen nineties had prompted the introduction of the Electric Motive Power Bill, which passed into the Statute Book in 1896. This act effectively prevented untrammelled private use of all sources of water power for electricity generation purposes, with the exception only of cases where rights had already been granted to private undertakings.

Under the terms of the 1903 Water Power Act, government clearly reserved to itself the control of all such sources of power not already granted, with the Governor having power to acquire as public works, the undertakings of those concerns using rights already granted. Companies were permitted to generate electricity for their own use, but not for sale to the public.<16> The debates on the measure reflected a general feeling that control should be kept within the hands of government, either central or local.<17> Little attempt appears to have been made to continue with the sort of regulatory alternatives which had been tried in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The latter model was in fact described by one speaker as leading to the building up of trusts and monopolies and the evils which he attributed to them.<18>

The water rights issue could have been a factor in determining a difference in attitude, but was unlikely to have been a dominant one. Water rights in New Zealand were not subject to as much dispute and conflict as in Australia or other countries where water was in short supply. Some problems were foreseen for chaff mills, flour mills, paper and freezing works and others reliant

upon water as direct source or through its capacity to generate electricity.<19> Major difficulties do not appear to have eventuated in these areas, although in a more liberal climate regarding the sale of electricity surplus to specific plant requirements more private activity would have been anticipated. Serious sources of conflict over water rights appear to have been confined to problems between various local authorities. These disputes involved questions concerning who was generally to exercise overall control in such matters, boroughs or counties for example,<20> and more restricted disputes, such as that between the Selwyn County Council and the Christchurch City Council. In this case one party wished to control water for irrigation purposes and the other to encourage electricity generation.<21> A suitable placement should have saved acrimonious debate on the issue.

The New Zealand choice of direct, physical control affected the speed, nature and direction of the industry's development. Monopoly may have been desirable from the point of view of reaping economies of scale. Foreign monopoly may have been undesirable from a political point of view, but it is far from clear that other forms of control could not have accomplished the target of regulating the exercise of power by a domestic group.

A clear commitment to socialism does not appear to have been the aim of government intervention in the economy as a whole. Was it the real purpose underlying the almost single-minded pursuit of direct ownership and control characteristic of the approach taken by members of the legislature towards the electricity industry in its infancy? Whatever the answer, what is clear is that by 1925, when the basic structure had been fully developed for both generation and supply, central public control of the former and local public control of the latter were firmly entrenched.

Government and the Electricity Industry

The impact of the electricity industry's development upon the economy has been extensively studied and reported on for many countries. It would be tempting but somewhat simplistic to assume that New Zealand could, by virtue of its colonial origins, provide a further case of the British type, or be similar in character to the United States because of similarities in attitudes towards

new aspects of their economic infrastructure. Neither of these examples provides a totally satisfactory model for studying the origins and aims of the policy of regulation and control developed by governments in New Zealand. This is not to suggest that no similarities in experience exist. On the technological front there were many, not least as the result of the international character of the industry from the time of its very inception.

Siemens's development of the dynamo formed the basis of the electrical industry as it evolved in the late nineteenth century. By the late eighteenth seventies the dynamo was in common use, generating electricity for both power and lighting purposes at costs of production sufficiently low as to make the operation commercially viable.<22> During the next decade commercial operations spread rapidly in both the United States and Europe, with the particular form taken by the industry varying from country to country partly because of the way in which governments chose to control it and partly because as Hannah put it: 'Each country had to adapt the technology to suit its own requirements.'<>23>

The United States was seen as fertile ground for the extensive use of electricity because of its enormous hydro-electric potential, its rapid rate of economic growth and the relatively high cost of labour. New Zealand demonstrated some of the same characteristics, especially the first. The Niagara Falls development was said to have at least partially inspired the plan for the initial moves to utilise the Huka Falls in the eighteenth nineties.<24>

In contrast to America, however, New Zealand appeared at this stage to offer only a restricted demand for electricity beyond that for lighting purposes. Industrial development was somewhat lacking, although refrigeration opened up the possibility of a potential major market emerging in the future. The booming use of electric traction for urban tramways in the United States in the eighteenth nineties saw the development there of firms which retailed electricity produced from spare capacity. They developed into general utility companies which came to play a fundamental role in the industry.<25> The comparative lack of dense urban development and the dominant role of municipal enterprise in electric tramways in New Zealand <26> meant that similar developments did not occur in that country.

The period post-1907 saw a concentration in America upon home appliance use, although this was combined with an accompanying expansion of manufacturing demand.<27> In contrast total consumption in New Zealand at this time was very limited, as may be seen from Table 1. Changes in the components of the demand for electricity are a little difficult to determine, in that the available figures do not satisfactorily reveal trends in different sectors of the market. It was the nineteen twenties before a separate domestic tariff was introduced by the retail boards. The major expansion in domestic sales which then occurred was linked to domestic water heating requirements and led to the situation where domestic prices per unit fell generally below those charged to industrial and commercial customers.<28>

Table 1.
Sales of Electricity by Sector 1910-1925
(Millions of Kilowatt Hours)

Source: (Bloomfield, New Zealand p.208)

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1910	09.3	0.8	-	-	10
1915	25.2	1.5	-	-	07
1920	76	3	11	2	92
1925	204	5	33	12	254

[1: Year; 2: Domestic, industrial and commercial;
3: streetlighting; 4: transport; 5: other; 6:
rounded total]

For whatever reason they occurred, such differences in the pattern of demand were instrumental in affecting the manner in which the industry developed. In Britain the industrial structure was different to that of either New Zealand or the United States, exhibiting a much greater reliance upon the traditional cotton and coal industries rather than the lighter engineering sector, which electrified more rapidly. This slowed the rate of expansion of industrial demand relative to the American experience, while the demand for a lighting source in Britain was an area in which gas remained a major competitor right through to 1914.<29> Gas competed in New Zealand too. The Auckland Gas Company went to the extent of publishing its own analysis, undertaken by James

Lowe, its Chief Engineer and Manager, of the comparative costs of using gas rather than electricity from hydro sources in 1918. The costings used were said to be designed to place gas in a favourable light rather than being intended to give a true picture of the situation.<30> The government's Chief Electrical Engineer, E. Parry, commented upon the report and came to the somewhat even-handed conclusion that each fuel had its own particular market to which it was best suited. He saw electricity as being best for lighting and for power for the electro-chemical industry, whereas gas came into its own for space heating, cooking, forge and furnace work.<31> Gas production certainly expanded despite the growth of competition from electricity. From something in excess of half a million cubic feet in 1895-96, total output climbed rapidly to over two and three quarter million cubic feet by 1915-16, before the rate of increase slowed down.<32>

Electricity appears to have been used by the government to act as a competitive form of price control on gas, with moves such as the introduction of Hire Purchase schemes for electrical appliances aimed at boosting the demand and thereby helping to build up the load factors.<33> The usual problem with gas from the consumer's point of view was its relatively high production costs and retail price. By 1889, when all the principal towns were served by gasworks and most were under public rather than private ownership, the relative costs of converting coal to light appeared to favour electricity. A comparison revealed in the records of the 1889-90 New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition concluded that a ton of coking coal, costing £1, converted to sufficient gas to produce 32,000 candle-power hours of light. By comparison one ton of low grade coal at eight shillings could be used to generate sufficient electricity to provide 37,000 candle-power hours.<34> Production costs were not entirely reflected by this simple comparison but it would appear that in terms of basic input costs electricity had a marked advantage over its rival.

The early measures that were adopted to control electricity show some distinct similarities as between Britain and New Zealand at the same point in time. At the turn of the century, government in New Zealand engaged in very little heart-searching on the topic of how to regulate a natural monopoly. Competition was felt to be ineffective in this regard. In Britain water and

gas had shown a consistent tendency to over-investment when left open to all comers. The lure of a new activity seemed to outweigh the sound commercial judgement of the backers of such schemes. Early promoters of electricity schemes also appeared to be susceptible to bouts of over-optimism with respect to the returns that they anticipated.

In Britain as early as 1847-48, the tide turned away from favouring a policy of open access towards regulation of utilities, particularly by means of setting maximum prices. This change was said to have resulted from the examination of gas proposals carried out by surveying officers appointed by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, the body responsible for control of such utilities at that time.<35> A system of franchises granted to private operators with the imposition of strict conditions upon their methods of operation became the usual regulatory device. A similar system started to evolve in New Zealand, but by the time of its major electricity development some fifty years later, the whole climate had changed.

The New Zealand government attitude to the energy sector by the late nineteenth century appears to have been one of close control, if not direct ownership. Experiences with private gas companies seem to have provoked a strong response to proposals for electricity generation and supply. The level of prices charged and service provided were of major importance. In common with the railways and the Post Office, the basic aim was to break even rather than to generate large profits, as long as the public were being well served.<36>

At the distribution level the concept of municipal trading appeared to be strongly favoured in New Zealand, no less than in England. It was not surprising therefore that municipal and, from 1918, local elected board control, became dominant from the earliest days. The Electric Telegraph Commissioner was entrusted with overseeing the infant at first, under the powers contained in the Electric Telegraph Act of 1865. Perhaps a somewhat less incongruous choice than had been that of the Commissioner of Woods and Forests to oversee gas reticulation in Britain in the eighteen forties, but it was not until 1884 that a separate Electric Lines Act appeared. It was the control over the stringing of the wires for distribution that was initially felt to be the cause of most pressing concern to the authorities. Even after 1884 the

Telegraph Commissioner still had to approve the placing of lines for electric lighting, so as to avoid interference with operations of the Telegraph. Actual cases of such interference were said to have resulted in Dunedin in the eighteen nineties from lack of care in the positioning of the tramway lines.<37> Private generation and use was already severely restricted by this time, usually confined to one single building of works.<38>

The response to the major initiative by an early pioneer in the use of electricity, Josiah Clifton Firth, in 1896 was not therefore entirely unexpected, although the extent to which the legislature went to ensure the direct control of water power for energy production may have surprised some of those involved. Firth, a Yorkshire-born industrialist, was then currently involved in the production of pumice insulation for freezing chambers. This gave him the industrial base from which he hoped to branch out into the supply of electricity to the Thames Goldfields. He had previously utilised electric lighting in the ill-fated 'eight hour' roller mills project in Auckland <39> and one of his sons, Edward, had received some training in the subject.<40>

The Premier, R.J. Seddon, in speaking to the second reading of the Electric Motive Power Bill, maintained that only upon the goldfields could a syndicate apply for permission to generate power from a natural waterfall as was now proposed.<41> As for the Huka Falls in particular and the Waikato River in general, the example of the Niagara Falls development was said to be a warning. Monopoly there had been detrimental to the interests of the people and in consequence, rights to the use of such sources of power should remain firmly in the hands of the state.<42> The government felt impelled to respond to the fear of private domestic monopoly power, clearly tainted in this instance with the hint of overseas connections, for the supply of part of the £500,000 capital and the suggested association with Professor Forbes, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Andersonian University of Glasgow. He was the author of several works on electric motive force and his practical experience had included involvement with the Niagara development. A measure was introduced which gave the government time to think about their longer term view and which gave clear powers for the central control of the resource while the

thinking was done. The principal aim was to provide power to operate the batteries on the Thames goldfields.<43> The debate on the 1896 Electrical Motive Power Bill had demonstrated that a feasible plan for private generation was possible and that the strength for legislative feeling was against such private development.

Similar anti-monopoly sentiments to those expressed in the 1896 debate were to be noted in speeches three years earlier in the Gore Electric Light Bill<44> and were still being expressed in similar tones by 1903 with respect to the Taieri River.<45> In a more general vein, the attitude of many MPs was reflected in the statement by the member for Lyttelton, G. Laurenson, during a debate on the Hawera County Electric Lighting Bill, when he said:

The only desire was that no monopoly should be allowed in anything that related to water, electrical power or gas.<46>

By monopoly was meant private monopoly; public control was considered sufficient protection against the possibility of gouging or other practices against the consumer's best interests.

Special provisions were included in the 1896 Act relating to the mining sector. These reflected the way in which mining interests were consistently dealt with separately in relation to their use of natural resources: thus timber use was also governed differently in mining areas as well as water rights. By 1900 all the larger mines on the Thames goldfield were lit by electricity. Mine safety encouraged such use and it was ironic and not unimportant that 1896 saw not only the foundation of clear, direct control over water power sources, but also the worst disaster in New Zealand's mining industry with the Brunner mine explosion.

Mention was made in the 1896 debate and at other times <47>, of a possible link between electricity and the railways. Thoughts of the future need to supply electricity to the railways prompted J.E.Jenkinson to maintain that this would justify strong governmental control.<48> This line of reasoning ties in closely with that used later when the move was made by government to acquire ownership of the coalmines. It would appear with respect to water power that the overall intention at this time was to conserve as many options as

possible. Regulation rather than ownership was not ruled out, but Firth's proposal was.

It is clearly apparent that the argument that the state had to undertake the general infrastructural development, because no other domestic group had the capital or inclination to do so, is called into question. Since Firth was prevented from going ahead with his plan, it is now impossible to show that he would indeed have undertaken the venture. The counterfactual is an intriguing but untestable proposition. It would appear that the antipathy to private control of such a resource was strong by 1896 and that it grew even stronger as New Zealand moved into the twentieth century. By the nineteen thirties Lee was able to write:

In New Zealand no Government, Liberal, Conservative or Labour could hand water-power over to private enterprise and live.<49>

The antagonism towards private development schemes was heightened by the 1898 moves to require local authorities to obtain a special act of parliament before assigning any water rights to private individuals or firms. The pressure was on the local authority to develop the resource itself rather than to assign it.<50> This would appear to mean that direct control was already the preferred option as far as central government was concerned. The fear of monopoly was strong and any private company would clearly need a separate act before it could hope to generate power for sale to the public. Such acts were few in number and subjected promoters to detailed control by the relevant local authority. The details of the terms of such control bore a strong resemblance to those contained in the British legislation of the time. The ultimate sanction was the power of the local authority to buy out the franchise holder at strictly controlled prices.

Development was slow into the twentieth century. Coal prices were rising at this time and the future source of power was increasingly seen as coming from watercourses and falls. The Hancock report of 1904 suggested that the renewable character of water power gave it the long-term edge over coal.<51> Long distance transmission was by this time a viable proposition, which extended the area over which primary power could be gathered. By 1903 it was felt that allowing local authorities to

control private development was plainly not going to produce a satisfactory outcome.

The 1903 Water Power Act therefore explicitly prevented private generation for general sale and limited the role of private operators in the supply of the publicly generated power. This strongly restrictive approach remained in force through to 1908, when it was eased in principle under the terms of the Public Works Amendment Act, but this still left the state as the dominant force in generation. The various powers allotted to the governor-general and other authorities were simplified in 1917 when a further statute, the State Supply of Electric Energy Act, essentially vested all powers in the Minister to control the generation, sale and supply of electrical energy by the state.<52> Municipal, or local elected board ownership and control of the bulk of the supply networks became an established fact by 1918 when the Electric Power Boards Act brought the latter into being, so as to combine several areas into one control network. By the time of the 1925 Act these boards covered some 61 per cent of the area of New Zealand and about half the population. Virtually all of the rest of the population lived in the main centres, under municipal control.<53>

By 1925 the groundwork was clearly laid. Noonan has suggested that the period 1903 to 1920 was a critical period in terms of decisions concerning ownership, control and use of hydro-power.<54> It is clear, however, that the train of thought that came through from the eighteen eighties was one which led in the direction of direct intervention by government, both local and central. 1903 was but the culmination of this process.

The factors which distinguish the period of the early twentieth century were that technological development ensured that efficient generation and supply was beyond the scope of individual local bodies and that hydro-power would replace thermal sources as the principal means of generation. The problems encountered in the nineteen twenties by the British Electricity Commissioners in trying to co-ordinate the various suppliers and their different systems <55> were generally avoided in New Zealand by concentrating generation under the central control of the government and as a result of the later start of major development. There were some problems associated with the supply system, but here too the later timing of the major

developments meant that advantage could be taken of the fact that the region was by then the natural area appropriate for the supply network.

Pickering suggests that development by the state was beneficial, not least in respect of the way in which it spread the availability of power.

Private companies could never have achieved such an extensive distribution of electricity to isolated areas.<56>

The Parry report of 1918 talked enthusiastically of how, in the interests of national economy, hydro-power could and should be made available to every householder, to industry, for railway electrification and for a whole host of other purposes.<57> This approach led to less than three per cent of the population being outside the supply area by the late nineteen forties. It was first attained by some disguised subsidisation of reticulation into rural areas by the urban centres and thereafter by a direct subsidy programme. Whether this was desirable, or if so would have been better achieved by a clear subsidy in the first place is arguable. What is not arguable is that the policy with respect to electricity supply was similar in tone to that adopted for the operation of the Post Office and rail transport. Administrative and financial policy was effectively set by the 1917 State Supply of Electric Energy Act and 1918 Electric Power Boards Act. The tenor of both is reflected as similar to that revealed in the consideration of the proposal to extend supply into the Christchurch hinterland which took place in 1915:

Purely economic considerations could not be disregarded but the Welfare of the Community took first place. If the sale of electricity paid the working expenses of the plant then the Government would be satisfied.<58>

One of the consequences of this emphasis on extensive distribution was that costs for the supply network soon came to take up a larger part of the total than they did in either the United States or Great Britain.<59> The emphasis was upon services rather than profit and upon direct ownership to prevent private monopoly, either foreign or domestic. Lee in fact saw the struggle of electricity as being principally against

coal.<60> In this respect he probably too readily overlooked gas, but essentially he was correct. That coal was also under the direct ownership and control of the government is therefore of no little importance.

Demand for coal as an input for electricity generation grew strongly at the beginning of the twentieth century and demand was sustained through until 1932 <61> by which time hydro sources accounted for nearly eighty percent of all electricity generated. They had assumed this dominant role by the early nineteen twenties.<62> Some conflicts must inevitably have developed for government in deciding how fast to develop electricity in competition with coal and how fast to develop hydro resources at the expense of using coal from state mines. Development of hydro-power was certainly slow despite its cost advantage. Even by the First World War thermal generation still formed the principal source of electrical power. Efficiency criteria appear to have been of lesser importance to government than was control, although any lack of efficiency does not appear to have resulted in over-pricing to the consumer.

One of the aims of government which was common both to New Zealand and to Britain <63> was that of extending the benefits of cheap electricity as far as possible. In consequence it was usual for demand to be described as constantly outstripping supply. This led to the adoption of a supply augmentation approach associated with physical planning in preference to any great reliance upon price as an allocative measure. With the high degree of government ownership that existed in the energy sector, the attitude to pricing of end-products and of intermediate goods was of considerable importance to the consumer. Consistency of policy was one requirement, since consumers faced some considerable costs in switching their demand from one fuel to another. The purchase of equipment to use specific fuels meant that there was an element of sunk costs in their decisions. Flexibility of choice, even in an open market environment, was at times more apparent than real. After 1925 the consistency in policy was there and it was firmly based upon government ownership and control. Twenty years later the state remained virtually totally in command with something less than five per cent of total generation coming from private sources, with a few freezing works, cement plants and woollen mills being involved.<64> Generally private

generation was uncompetitive with state production, partly because of the economies of scale involved and partly because of the pricing policies adopted by the state.

General Conclusions

In the various debates concerning the role played by government in the New Zealand economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the case of electricity has been relatively neglected. Mascarenhas lumped it in with the infrastructure developments of the pre-eighteen nineties, along with posts and telecommunications, and the railway system.<65> This is placing electricity too early, for its historical setting in this respect is in the eighteen nineties not the eighties. Where it does have links with the other two sectors is in the way in which the government set prices for them all. The underlying philosophy was one which placed the expansion of service above that of profit-making for all three of them.

A more important outcome of the neglect of electricity is to overlook the consistent way in which most of the energy sector was treated by government. Gas was essentially being placed in municipal hands, coal came into state ownership at the turn of the century and electricity was firmly seen as warranting the same treatment by the early twentieth century. In terms of the final two of Hawke's three categories: the fear of foreign ownership prompted concern and strong action, particularly in coal, and the fear of monopoly, foreign or domestic meant that, in the case of electricity, the state felt impelled to take similar action. The view of how to control natural resources for the energy sector appears remarkably consistent, with a clear willingness to take such means of production into public ownership. Finally, it is not the case that government stepped in only because private enterprise was constrained through a lack of capital. The motivation for direct control was far stronger.

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REVIEWS

Lauris Edmond (ed), **WOMEN IN WARTIME; NEW ZEALAND WOMEN TELL THEIR STORY**, Government Printing Office (Wellington), 1986

'The early war was very much a British war, a BBC war; David Niven and a nightingale singing in Berkeley Square'. Thus, a woman who was a Wellington schoolgirl in 1939. Though this witness goes on to emphasise that the arrival of US troops in New Zealand (from June 1942) provided a very different perspective, making 'the war real for us in a way that the black and white films of the day, and the patriotic messages had not', a leitmotiv of Lauris Edmond's anthology of anonymous short memoirs is the total identification with Britain felt by many (was it most?) New Zealanders.

Another then-schoolgirl, from Papatoetoe, recalls 'the feeling aroused by a soloist singing "Land of Hope and Glory" at a patriotic concert'. A third (Hawera) remembers filing into the Assembly Hall to the strains of music over the loudspeaker system, 'always a patriotic marching song, "Sussex by the Sea", "There'll Always Be An England"'. Later, she helped run the local Boy Scout Club den. 'I had a group of boys between nine and eleven - they spent a lot of time talking about the air raids over London, their attitude one of excitement and glamour.' This was a milieu in which some fifth-form schoolboys asked the teacher for a lesson on Rupert Brooke's The Soldier, an overlocking machinist had her work cut out supplying a 'never ending line' of orders for Union Jacks, and a young soldier heading for Egypt with New Zealand's 'First Echelon' wrote in his girl friend's autograph book 'England expects that every man this day will do his duty'.

As New Zealanders remember it, food rationing was introduced because 'Britain needed all the food we could send'. A merchant seaman's wife, then living in Wellington recalls (and I find this almost incredible) that 'fruit always seemed in short supply. I became so used to going without fruit that even years after the war ... I seldom bought it until I had re-educated myself to its luxury taste'. Ample statistics prove that New Zealanders sacrificed themselves for the Empire to the very limit of their capacity - the highest proportion of war casualties of any Commonwealth

country, the highest productivity of agricultural labour per head of any combatant nation. Yet Edmond's witnesses combine to produce the image of a quiet provincial society, faithfully, wistfully mimicking the heroic metropolis as far as it could. An umbilical cord joined two corners of planet Earth. When a secretary took over the additional duties of office mail clerk after the young men joined the forces, she found that 'Mail work increased. A large portion of our correspondence was with the UK, and because enemy action might stop the mails from getting through, we always had to do three mailing copies of each letter. These I sent off at six-weekly intervals. The British firms did the same thing when they wrote to us'. Barely a note of Kiwi nationalism sounds in this book. One learns from the useful chronology at the end, not from the main body of text, that 'God Defend New Zealand' was made the national hymn in May 1940.

BBC News ensured that New Zealanders knew promptly what they had to do to keep in step with the Motherland. The New Zealand 'Home Guard' was created three months after its British model and dutifully conformed the 'Dad's Army' image. 'My husband was ... given a gun that was used in the Maori Wars, and he had one bullet!' 'We used to watch in great amusement whenever they marched down the main road on their way to take up their position near the Pencarrow Lighthouse'. In mid-1940, so dangerous for Britain, Lord Haw Haw broadcast the 'true story' from Germany to New Zealanders as well. After Pearl Harbour there was real cause to fear Japanese invasion. 'The Northland coast was considered a threatened zone, and all the Home Guard was called up. Overnight, the women, many quite inexperienced, had to manage the farm Frequently, the talk was what to do if the Japanese came'. A woman in Hawera's Home Guard Intelligence Corps recalls being summoned to stand by one night, for hours; later, she learnt that a Japanese submarine had been sighted off the coast. A serviceman's wife living in Plimmerton relates: 'We were issued with instructions to keep a little case packed with necessities, and at a given signal were to head for the hills. I had visions (and still do at times) of myself, a baby on one arm, clutching a three-year old with my free hand, forcing my very pregnant form through the bush and up into the hills. I don't know who was going to carry the case of necessities'.

Just as in Britain, the demonic Squander Bug

featured in anti-waste propaganda. Just as in Britain, black and grey markets developed. A South Island woman who kept bees became 'very popular', adding 'I remember being approached by one of the bank managers to see if I would sell him a four-gallon tin of honey'. Sadly, Italy's entry into the war provoked the same reaction in Eastbourne, near Wellington, as it did in British towns large and small. 'One young man, not long out from Italy, had a barber's shop in the village, and one night a group of local men smashed it to pieces'. But (clearly to the chagrin of some) New Zealand could not replicate the psychological and social tensions caused by evacuation and bombing in Britain. A young mother read of 'the courage of Londoners in the Blitz' and developed 'a sneaking fear' that in like circumstances she might 'go to pieces and be useless'. One morning a huge explosion woke her. Believing that an air raid was in progress, she calmly roused and dressed the children and packed a basket with food for twenty-four hours before proceeding, as arranged, to a neighbour's basement shelter. It later transpired that a bomber had crashed taking off from a nearby base. But she was proud of herself. 'I had not panicked. I had done the right things. I had passed my test of fire'.

At home, then, there was war in the mind only, while oceans away New Zealand servicemen, and servicewomen, experienced real horrors and triumphs. The great tests for young mothers were, in fact, loneliness, 'coping', and still more, holding family life together afterwards, when a strange man had returned after years abroad to meet strange children of whom he was jealous and who were jealous of him, over Mummy. 'Both men and women had changed', muses one witness, 'We women were not now so submissive'. But their warriors, 'and New Zealand as a whole', wanted a return 'to the kitchen and to maternity'. Another displays her acceptance of the prescribed role. 'Having made all the decisions in the bringing up of the children while the men were away, it wasn't easy for us to adjust to father's firm hand - which actually was badly needed, and finally gratefully accepted'. A third, a teacher who confesses to being something of a 'feminist', sets Father in a different light, with a surprising yet entirely plausible allegation which may have some application to British post-war experience also. Standards of honesty among children, she says, dropped after the men returned. 'After experiencing four or five years in

situations where property wasn't private (belonging either to the government or to the enemy) and souveniring common, the men brought their attitudes home with them. They returned as heroes to their children, and the loss of honesty was quickly communicated'.

Edmond, as she explains in her Foreword, resisted the idea of selectively emphasising feminist viewpoints. She wanted to represent women as they were at the time, 'on the other side of the modern upsurge in women's social realignment', when 'women not only endured with few complaints such injustices as getting lower pay for doing a man's job while he was away, and then losing it when he returned', but 'actually felt honoured by their inclusion in the national drama'. She admires their unconscious 'generosity of spirit'. She was a young woman herself during World War II. In 1984, she suggested to the Government Printing Office a project of collecting memoirs by women of both World Wars. Advertisements trawled in this rich catch. Edmond took what was freely offered and did not solicit material on specific aspects (though thirteen interviews are included, and here there are some traces of 'leading' questions.) So the project was not exhaustive, nor even particularly systematic. However, as Edmond claims, the range of response is wide enough to provide a sense of the whole society - at least, for 1939-45. The few First World War memories scattered throughout the book provide only a sketchy basis for comparison. They evoke a markedly rawer society, dominated by distance, with little motor transport and no radio, and point up how much livelier conditions became over the succeeding quarter-century.

Even on re-reading, I have not detected the key to the book's arrangement in three sections, but Edmond is a distinguished poet, and she has contrived a sequence of utterances which keeps one turning the pages avidly. The result is substantial, captivating, and moving.

She suggests that her chosen narratives form 'a collection of short stories in which all the tales are true'. Some do indeed have haunting literary quality. As historical evidence - this goes for all such material - they have the virtue of vivid suggestiveness, and the limitation that memory selects, distorts, and is sometimes plain wrong. One former alumnus of Wellington East Girls College implies that soon after war started in 1939 the headmistress delighted pupils by saying that,

because of shortage of woollen goods, they could wear white socks instead of long black stockings. But a contemporary at the same school recalls carrying on 'the time honoured practice of disguising the holes in our stockings by using our fountain pens to colour the flesh underneath them with blue-black ink'. The two accounts may be somehow compatible - I have no way of checking this. However, I am quite certain that the Luftwaffe's 'Baedaker' raid on Bath, England, apparently remembered by a New Zealander who was then a social worker in Bristol, occurred in 1942, not 1943 and was a reprisal for British bombing of Lubeck, not of Dresden.

But Edmond, who herself points in her Foreword to other contradictions and errors, was wise to eschew pedantic corrections and annotations. Memories are historical 'facts' in their own right. What this book gives us is the significance of wartime experience as registered by women in late-middle and old age. Edmond urges, justly enough that 'we no longer believe - if historians ever did - that the truth of human activity is to be found in a single "accurate" chronicle'. A 'truth' which seems to emerge through these pages is that the experiences of New Zealand women at war were extremely diverse, yet contained common factors explicable by geography, by history, and most of all by gender.

Almost all, because they are women, had their expectations in life disrupted more sharply than men (who are socialised to be warriors) by the exceptionally complete mobilisation of a country with a population of only 1,600,000. Change was registered more swiftly and starkly than in large and lavishly differentiated British society. (A statistical jump from one to ten, put it this way, is much more dramatic than three jumps from one thousand to ten thousand.) A witness who can remember 1914-18, when women took over men's farm work and handled baggage and mail off the steamers as porters, was nevertheless impressed by her sex's efforts in World War II. 'The women sprang into action to support their men. Who could forget the girls on the overcrowded trams, coping with overhead lines, keeping the friendly drunks in order, and battling through the mass to collect the fares before the next stop!' She herself acquired the office job of a young man gone to the wars - at half his pay. But as a middle-aged divorcee she was grateful for the new direction her life took. 'The

war gave me opportunities that I could not have obtained as a married woman'.

Younger women chalked up many 'firsts'. One group could claim to be 'the only girls in the world driving 10-wheeler trucks for the US Navy'. The Women's Herd Testers Reserve completely replaced men, and even achieved equal pay. The very first woman Government Herd Tester to be appointed in the Antipodes, recalling her jolting tours around the countryside in a horse-drawn buggy, still writes with warm delight about the kindnesses she received from farming people. Less spectacularly, but for the individuals concerned, no less momentously, banks which would never before have employed women now engaged them, and the Auckland daily newspapers 'were forced to take on females. Opening journalism to women was a big thing that the war did for us'. In the Land Army city girls learnt how to ride horses, killed and sheared sheep. One recruit observes that 'The health of some girls was affected and some had to live under poor conditions, but that was not my experience. Being a land girl completely changed my life'.

That remark, of course, points to diversity. Depending on age, temperament, background, luck, the experience of bringing up children single-handed, or that of being 'manpowered' into unexpected work, might be felt as positive or negative. The same went for other aspects of the war. When US troops arrived in force, they dominated some areas completely (though an Invercargill woman 'never saw an American serviceman during the war' and doubts 'if any came south of Christchurch', and a Maori mother of eighteen encountered Yanks only on a rare holiday in Auckland.) A sailor's wife recalls with disgust the physical and moral squalor they brought to Wellington, where 'they urinated in shop doorways, anywhere; they fornicated in shop doorways, alleys, and lanes. When daylight came, Willis Street and Manners Street, probably because they were dingy and dark, looked like the streets of a slum. There were condoms thrown everywhere, soiled knickers, puddles of urine and stranded faeces, fag ends and paper rubbish, and pieces of food. Wellington's rat population doubled'. Chacun a son gout. The clever girls of Victoria College in the same city delighted in the Yankee invasion - 'Chesterfields and Camels we had by the carton' - and gave an 'exultant "view halloo" when "the curse" - except

it was mostly seen as a blessing - made its monthly appearance'. But a young woman whose father was Liaison Officer between New Zealand and American forces in Whangarei nobly resisted American charm. 'I longed to find someone to love, and there was not one New Zealand soldier among the thousands that I met that filled the bill'. She turned down an offer of marriage from an American doctor and eventually wedded a demobbed New Zealand Lieutenant.

For one serviceman's wife in Dunedin the war entailed constant fearful suspense - 'We lived for the sound of the postie's whistle'. Yet a Christchurch woman who actually lost her husband and trained as a beauty therapist to support their two children found this a 'marvellous job'. She adds 'Despite everything, we were in great heart during those war years'. After news came that her fiancé was killed, a Gisborne woman stood in the hall of her parents' home and screamed, 'and a part of me is screaming still and always will be'. Serving in the WAAC in Italy, she barely fought off three Arab auxiliaries who tried to rape her, and saw appalling death and devastation. Then she lost a second, British, fiancé. She considers herself a 'war casualty'. Yet she enjoyed her spots of leave in Venice, In England, as 'sheer magic'. Another witness writes of the war years as 'exhilarating we did' - though she had a painful time as a war bride in the USA, where she encountered fierce anti-"Limey" prejudice, before she brought her American sailor husband back to New Zealand. A Belmont child had found life 'incredibly dull' before war broke out. But now 'it began to be exciting'. Grown ups who hardly exchanged a word before 'were always talking together these days whenever they saw each other They even waved their arms about in great circles or patted each other affectionately, even though they weren't special friends'.

British testimony of similar kinds displays the same contradictions. But an intelligible pattern emerges, common to both countries. The war did not decisively 'liberate' women, or even make many of them 'liberation' minded. After strains and deprivations, the general reflex when peace returned was to try to re-establish pre-war habits, including that of masculine domination. But this did not mean that women's encounter with 'history' had had no positive effect. Many had discovered new capacities or had experienced however bitterly, an

independence. Much 'war effort' suited traditional roles - by the end of 1941, Edmond's chronology tells us, New Zealand women had knitted 98,000 mittens, 95,000 scarves, 94,000 balaclavas, etc. etc. But the first ten women police had begun training. In 1944 the Presbyterian Church voted to support admittance of women as elders. In 1946, the first two women would be appointed to the Legislative Council. From our vantage point in the late eighties we may assume, and I think rightly, that long term trends in Western society were bound to promote, however patchily and inadequately, chances of greater independence and status for women. But during the war, women were conscious of something remarkable happening in their own lives. The trend was dramatised unforgettably.

The last, deeply thoughtful, contribution to this book (is it by Lauris Edmond herself?) makes the crucial but usually forgotten point that 'War was the process by which the abnormal became the normal'. Men brought up to shun murder were now praised for killing. Women nurtured in housewifely skills were 'manpowered' into heavy jobs, responsible jobs, exciting jobs. Our witness continues: 'I think it is true to say there was hardly a moment when I didn't feel mentally involved with the process of being at war, and still constantly aware of trying to reconcile the ordinary with the extraordinary.' Her husband remains at home, her doings were those of an 'ordinary' housewife. But 'total war', that novel phenomenon of our century, permeated lives, like hers, in New Zealand many thousands of miles from Europe's bombed cities, many hundreds from the Allied-Japanese front. Dominating consciousness then, it still overweens in the stories which people tell themselves and others about their own lives, helping to focus, as blurred peace-time continuities cannot, sense of what it has meant to be lover, mother, member of society, woman. Edmond's story-tellers are not betraying the liberationists of younger generations. They offer a usable version of past experience on their own terms, the terms of the people who laboured and laughed and suffered. They rarely solicit pity, and deserve much better than condescension. They were 'England's still, colonial', but feeling and thinking their way into a Pacific, as well as a pacific, future. It must be in great part a credit to their values, as passed on to or shared with society, that the Government Printing Office of

their nation should publish a book so subversive of masculine heroic concepts. It could not happen, alas, in Thatcher's Britain.

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Keith Sinclair (ed.), TASMAN RELATIONS: NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA, 1788-1988 (Auckland University Press, 1987, NZ \$45.00)

Media coverage in Britain of the bicentennial celebrations no doubt reinforced as many myths and prejudices about Australia as it demolished. Nevertheless, any serious attention given to the South Pacific is always to be welcomed, even if John Pilger was the only commentator to compare Australia's recent history with that of New Zealand. Pilger, ever the dissenter, suggested that his compatriots' self-esteem and global reputation might be significantly enhanced if their government emulated its ANZAC partner's reassertion of national sovereignty and regional self-determination. Such a sentiment, fuelled by unambivalent antipathy towards all ANZUS shibboleths, finds scant expression in Tasman Relations, if only because its examination of postwar foreign policy (with the emphasis more on Canberra than Wellington) has long since been overtaken by events. The eminence and distinction of Tasman Relations' sixteen contributors reflects the volume's establishment credentials as the New Zealand academic community's bicentennial contribution. Yet this genuinely eclectic collection of essays on 'trans-Tasman currents of thought and influence, of migration, of trade, and of cooperation' is by no means the dull and unexciting tome its semi-official origins would suggest.

With the exception of Holland's Hans Mol, who offers a surprisingly upbeat conclusion to his short survey of both nations' present spiritual condition, the authors are made up of three Australians and a dozen New Zealanders. The fact that four of the latter actually work in Australia ensures that what is after all a Kiwi project can still lay claim to a balanced perspective on trans-

Tasman relations. The major omission is a contribution from Maori or Aborigine students of race relations in Australasia. Astonishingly, Sir Keith Sinclair acknowledges this weakness in his introduction, but goes on to suggest that 'meaningful' comparative studies are of limited value. Thus, although Judith Binney offers an illuminative account of Maori contact with New South Wales prior to the permanent arrival of the Pakeha, relations between the two communities henceforth become a very secondary consideration. The same applies to the Aborigines, while the impact of recent Polynesian migration into the North Island attracts only marginal concern.

Sir Keith is equally frank about the absence of sport, perhaps because it has yet to acquire the same intellectual cachet on New Zealand campuses that it now enjoys among a growing number of British sociologists and social historians. Cricket does make an appearance in John Salmond's very personal - and in consequence, especially attractive - 'A New Zealander in Australia'. Peter McPhee's six years in Wellington earlier this decade qualified him to offer 'An Australian View of New Zealand'. Distanced by geography, if not yet by time, he advances a more dispassionate and rigorous appraisal of his briefly adopted society than does Professor Salmond. McPhee is not afraid, in his very academic and detached way, to state a few home truths, contradicting my earlier suggestion that successive contributors too easily ignore current racial problems in south Auckland and elsewhere.

Space prevents any detailed listing of all the essays, suffice it to say that this book constitutes far more than a rather arbitrary gathering of pertinent research findings. Contributions such as the demographic survey 'The Peopling of Australasia, 1788-1988', by one of the continent's most eminent postwar social scientists, W.D. Borrie, make Tasman Relations an extremely useful work of reference. Although not readily accessible in the United Kingdom, copies can be acquired via Oxford University Press. University libraries would undoubtedly benefit from making contact with their OUP rep.

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Patricia Grimshaw, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE IN NEW ZEALAND (Auckland University Press/Oxford University Press, paperback edition, 1987)

Though long neglected, the history of the women's suffrage movement has emerged over the last twenty years. This achievement is due to the work of many individuals researching the history of the movement in their own countries. Gradually the pieces are being put together in an attempt to create the full picture and popular misconceptions about suffragists as 'howling viragoes' are slowly being eroded. It is generally conceded that the movements were not separate but were part of a worldwide phenomenon, and indeed there was a wide network of contact and awareness between the women in the different countries. The suffrage movement was a reflection of expanding democratisation in a number of countries during the late nineteenth century. While certain common characteristics linked the suffragists to each other, the movement in each country had its own individualistic traits which reflected the politics, society and ambience of that country. The movement grew out of particular circumstance and was promoted by a particular group or groups in society. This is nowhere more true than in a country which was the first to enfranchise all its women, New Zealand.

A study of the movement in New Zealand is not only important for historians of that country but for all women's historians. As the first country to enfranchise women, the movement in New Zealand served to inspire women agitating for the franchise in countries as far flung as Ireland, the United States and South Africa. Suffragists abroad repeatedly referred to the situation in New Zealand to back up their arguments and pointed out that the calamities predicted by the anti-suffragists had not happened in New Zealand.

Therefore the new paperback edition of Patricia Grimshaw's book Women's Suffrage in New Zealand, first published in 1972, makes a welcome reappearance fifteen years later in a time which is more favourable to women's history than when it first appeared. Anyone at all interested in the women's suffrage movement (or indeed in any aspect of modern women's history) in any country should have this text as a reference book.

New Zealand was the first country to grant women the suffrage in 1893 though they did not have

the right to sit in parliament until 26 years later in 1919. The New Zealand suffrage movement is not unique in the fact that it was associated with the temperance movement, however this connection was far stronger than in any other country. The suffrage movement grew out of and was fostered by the Women's Christian Temperance Union (an import from the USA) which was pro-suffrage not for the cause itself but for what it was likely to achieve in curbing New Zealand's drink problem. The paradox that drunken males had the vote and sober women did not was constantly alluded to by both temperance campaigners and women suffragists. The WCTU, like other groups who supported the suffrage cause, believed that the admittance of women into the legislative procedure would improve the moral tone of politics and society in general. Likewise, as in other countries, the anti-suffragists were often backed by the breweries, for example Guinness supported the anti-suffragists in Dublin, Ireland.

The WCTU nurtured the suffrage cause and served as an apprenticeship body for a number of women who spearheaded the suffrage movement. In the WCTU they 'learned the art of organisation, administration, and leadership which could be turned to use in later years in their own cause'. Despite this patronage, in her final chapter Grimshaw is anxious to point out that there were other women besides those in the temperance movement who were interested in campaigning for the suffrage.

The movement for the enfranchisement of women in New Zealand appeared to have had a wider social appeal than in other countries and had the support of working class women and their unions. This support is more evident in New Zealand than elsewhere because of a less rigid class system. Maori women were included in the demand for the vote. However, this should not be seen as a reflection of the altruism of the European women who were indignant that male Maoris had the vote while they remained unenfranchised. This is one of the few allusions to native New Zealanders in the book. Surely their involvement or non-involvement deserves more attention than a few brief references?

Grimshaw recounts in detail parliamentary debates over the subject. However she never gets to grips with the question that the reader is continually asking. Why New Zealand? What was so unique about New Zealand that it was the first (apart from a few American States) to grant women

the franchise? Had it something to do with its status as a colony? (After all, Australia was the next country to follow, giving women the suffrage in 1902.) Were the colonial women of New Zealand a harder tougher breed? Was it felt in a relatively new country that all had a right to have a part in its government? Before enfranchisement women were comparatively much better off than women elsewhere with regard to jobs, admittance to higher education and participation in local government. Indeed Grimshaw points to a pro-suffragist member of Parliament as late as 1893 using women's favoured position in New Zealand as bait to attract English immigrants.

What is very welcome about this book on women's suffrage is that it goes past the point where many studies on the suffrage movement stop - the moment of enfranchisement. Grimshaw has three further chapters on the period after women gained the vote. She looks at their participation in the first election (held only six weeks after their enfranchisement), examines their turnout and asks whether the predictions of their opponents were fulfilled. She also, with a certain wryness, discusses how anti-suffragist politicians coped in their first election. In their desire to be elected they had to swallow publicly their doubts and now that women had the vote they had to be canvassed like the rest of the electorate.

In her Afterword to the 1987 edition Grimshaw recounts that as an undergraduate the only women's issue she encountered in four years was an essay topic on the British suffragists and it was not until later she realised that there was a significant movement in her own country. This reviewer had the same experience with regard to the Irish suffrage movement and the question, therefore, is prompted: how representative is women's history? Caution must be exercised that it will not just become another history of elites. This is why books like Women's Suffrage in New Zealand must be welcomed in that they will contribute to building the overall picture of the women's suffrage movement worldwide and will challenge the view that it originated and remained within the confines of Britain and the United States.

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Richard S. Hill, POLICING THE COLONIAL FRONTIER: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COERCIVE SOCIAL AND RACIAL CONTROL IN NEW ZEALAND, 1766-1867 (Vol. 1 of The History of Policing in New Zealand, V.R. Ward, Government Printer, Wellington, 1986), parts 1 and 2, xxi + 1142 pp.

The study of force in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand has suddenly come of age. James Belich's robust and original discussion of the Maori Wars has been accompanied by Richard Hill's vast examination of the colony's emergent police force. Both books, though sharply divergent in so many ways, reveal some of the dilemmas facing a New Zealand historian. The mastery of local detail - to convince resolutely minute scholars at home - is matched by a need to consider the larger imperial or British context. Belich very ably succeeded in persuading the more general imperial historian of the value of his firmly and freshly argued case-study. Hill demonstrates how British policing traditions, models and experiments - and Australian policing experience and personnel - influenced policy and practice in early New Zealand. But he fails to sustain this comparative dimension. Very occasional references to practices elsewhere do not provide enough to interest imperial historians. Still: this is a critical rather than celebratory official history and provides a great deal of material on mid-nineteenth century New Zealand.

The obvious problem is that this material is presented in an extraordinarily self-indulgent and (suitably for its subject) fragmented, even ill-disciplined, manner. The book starts on an adventurous note, commenting on such matters as hegemony and social control. Traces of such theorizing occasionally bob up in the capaciously descriptive text. Thus, we are told on p. 607, 'The problem of what should be for the Otago police their precise situational location on the coercive continuum was compounded by the escalating internal crisis of constabulary morale.' But, by the end of the story, on p. 943, the author signs off in a perfunctory postscript, without having reached any tightly constructed conclusion to illuminate the theories referred to or to justify the weight of preceding detail. The decision to describe policing developments in every single province to 1867 means that many underlying themes are simply submerged. One feels an instinctive sympathy for various

provincial councillors who held that the halving of police resources might improve efficiency; a far shorter book might have proved more useful and, it has to be said, readable.

Since the book is overwhelmingly long, it might prove helpful here to summarise and comment on its key arguments and contribution.

Organisation takes up much space. Initially a system of beat police supervised by police magistrates obtained. Under the influence of Governor Sir George Grey, however, the more centralised and militarised Armed Police Force held sway in 1846-53. The switch went through on a financial up-swing and in the midst of a crisis in Maori relations, so that resources were plentifully - if temporarily - available in the mid-1840s. Both systems partly reflected other 'colonial' models, the first that of the Australian settlements and the second that of Ireland; Grey had personal experience of both earlier in his career. By the mid-1840s the Police Magistracy system smacked too much in New Zealand of penal colony conditions, seemed too costly, and struch many observers as unnecessary to the requirements of policing whites - a task deemed more suitable for special constables drawn from among the settlers. The Armed Police Force separated the Regular Magistracy from managerial control of the police and also provided - it was hoped - more disciplined and better educated members. It held out the prospect (extremely important to Governor Grey) of recruiting Maoris as privates, at a time of increasing inter-racial tension, to engage in a civilising mission among their own people. Such anticipated benefits mostly failed to accrue, especially as Maori troubles receded. Personnel did not improve in quality. By the early 1850s Maori constables did not act as 'civilising' agents. In 1852 the Constitution Act devolved much power upon the provinces, and so, from 1853 to 1877 the provincial authorities (originally six of them) controlled their own forces. Jurisdictional problems recurred - within the provinces between politicians/magistrates and the senior officers, and sometimes between provincial and central governments. But the period to which Hill devotes half his account remained one of extremely fragmented and particularist organisation.

While such organisational changes reflected political and administrative developments, they also illustrated the impact of different policing

theories, notably the London Metropolitan beat system imported via Sydney and the Irish Constabulary system deployed to contain a restive and rural population. Whether one should go further into theorising than to say that the former suited urban conditions and the latter fitted the needs of a troublesome countryside is more doubtful. Increased manpower and the introduction of stronger military elements into police equipment and organisation reflected simple pressures from the opening of goldfields and the eruption of Maori discontent. The political authorities quickly cut back manpower when revenues sank or disorder diminished.

Demand for policing arose from growing towns, distinctive settlements by whalers and gold-diggers, and the Maori presence. Urban centres typically absorbed most police manpower. Fresh immigrants, peripatetic Maoris, debauched or deserting soldiers and sailors, transitory gold-diggers all required attention. For example: in Otago during 1853-54, half the prisoners gaoled were visiting seamen; of the 1,460 prisoners entering Auckland's Mount Eden Gaol during 1865 over one-fifth were servicemen, their numbers swollen by the large military and naval build-up for the Maori Wars during 1863 - 64. Drunkenness and related disorder mainly disturbed urban peace. Rural demands for formal policing were less strong and Hill partly ascribes this to the self-satisfaction with which landowners looked after the countryside. Rural magistrates tended to regard such police privates as were assigned as little other than servants. More obtrusive problems arose from the presence of whalers' camps and, more spectacularly, goldfields. The latter would start with miners' own self-policing rules and regulations but, once they attained significant size, required more formal supervision. Periods of police expansion, and of rising crime, coincided with gold rushes; most dramatically illustrated perhaps when convictions in New Zealand rose from 2,903 in 1860 to 11,357 in 1864, to stabilise at about that level for another decade (p.632).

The largest threat came from the Maori presence. One emphasises 'presence' rather than simply 'Maoris', because often enough the disturbance of order resulted from pakeha land hunger rather than Maori aggression. But interactions between Maoris and police were not straightforward. Under the Armed Police Force,

Maori recruitment was fostered, only to die out by the 1860s, a product in large part of racist exclusivity. Early hopes that continual professional contact between very poor pakehas (the only sort prepared to join the police) and typically higher caste Maoris would improve or civilise the latter soon became discredited. But Maori policemen contributed to the runanga system of creeping magistracies pushed into Maori territories; Maori collaborators were thus employed to uphold Britain's proclaimed sovereignty over all New Zealand's inhabitants. More generally, settler authorities often respected differences between Maori and British laws, so that Maoris accused of law-breaking were frequently returned to their tribes for punishment. But the worst clashes between Maoris and settlers involved imperial forces rather than local police. Indeed in the much disturbed Taranaki Province during the 1860s, police functions were confined to the town of New Plymouth, with soldiers taking care of the rest.

If, then, the police were responsible mostly for the towns and goldfields, how did their role affect their composition? One is impressed more by continuity than by change in police personnel, despite all the alteration in organisation charts. Perhaps the magistracy improved in quality upon the first batch of police magistrates. They certainly needed to. Among them, one was dismissed for alleged sexual molestation of two young boys; another was killed by Maoris in an operation exceeding the legal bounds of pakeha expansion; and a third was forced to resign after being physically assailed by one of his own constables with whose wife he had slept (pp. 160, 166, 170, 191-4). If things cooled down subsequently, however, the difficulty remained of attracting men of sufficiently lofty social position (and presumably sober ways) to such posts. For the privates or constables, much stayed unchanged. Turn-over continued very high. This partly reflected the stipulation that the poor should police the poor, with the corollary that pay was set determinedly low, sometimes miserably so. Recruitment from the Australian colonies, the London Metropolitan Police, and the Irish Constabulary failed to rectify this defect. Drunkenness was endemic, accentuated by the double requirement that the police should lead impossibly abstemious lives and that they should enforce the licensing system. Individuals found themselves unpopular if they

failed the first or fulfilled the second. Rewards, special expenses for travel, and rapid promotion existed as inducements. But if the towns exposed policemen to drink - and often subsequent dismissal - then goldfields attracted even unskilled constables to depart for richer pickings. The very periods of heaviest demand for policing were thus the occasions for even higher turn-over.

As has been stressed, the civil police rarely participated directly in expansion into Maori tribal lands. But - and this is one of Hill's useful contributions - runanga systems offered ways of signing up co-operative chiefs, of members of their families, and of securing inexpensive Maori constables and informers to operate within the tribal lands. If these methods did not always yield loyalty, they certainly extended influence and sustained British claims to sovereignty over all New Zealand's inhabitants. Various organisational experiments probably did not affect the basic system, though it grew in scale and significance in these decades.

Having suggested some broad themes that emerge from hundreds of pages of detail, one should add that Hill disappoints in not tackling more analytical questions. Given the smallness of the police forces, it might have been possible to present more systematic data on numbers, costs, recruitment, turn-over, and pay for the whole colony. Such an approach would have obviated the need for much repetitive description. Early on we are told a good deal of social control and 'the British state', but these vague concepts receive no sustained analysis and drift elusively away from sight by the end. One wonders if the police forces so poorly kept together imposed the first or manifested the obtrusive presence of the latter. The reality of state power was confused. One tension of which we might have learned more was that created by the imperial forces when they were posted to New Zealand; their behaviour among, and reception by, the settlers was not always that expected. The reality of state power was often pathetic - a drunken, isolated, ill-educated constable struggling desperately to make financial ends meet, and supervised by authorities capable of such helpful acts as the provision of the Works of Hesiod, Callimachus and Theognis for a remote police headquarters library (pp. 654-55). The reality of state power was, finally, highly varied over time according to the undulations of the trade

cycle (and thus government revenues and expenditures) and by location and province. Indeed, an advantage of Hill's province-by-province approach is to show such differences in organisation and activity.

No doubt we are meant to learn a political lesson from the existence of such flawed instruments by which mid-Victorian colonial authorities sought to guarantee order, and even morality, in their settler societies. But, in many respects, one comes away impressed more by the feebleness and pettiness of state control than by the vigour, obtrusiveness, and deplorable character of these small, often unstable, policing institutions.

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Judith Binney and M.P.K.Sorrenson (eds), ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR KEITH SINCLAIR (New Zealand Journal of History, vol. 21, no. 1, April 1987). 193 pp + photograph.

I think I have met Keith Sinclair (Sir Keith as he has been since 1985) on two or maybe three occasions, in passing at conferences. He would probably be surprised to learn that I owe to him not just my interest in New Zealand history, but much of my instinctive belief that history itself is something which can be both analytical and atmospheric, something which explains and accounts on the one hand, but conjures and re-creates on the other.

My acquaintance, of course, began with the Pelican History of New Zealand (as I still think of it, although that is not in fact its precise title), bought for three-and-sixpence sometime in the early nineteen-sixties. I am pretty sure that I was still at school when I bought the paperback, so there must have been some prior affinity which made me lash out so much of my suburban pocket-money. It

was the era of cheering for Peter Snell and Murray Halberg if there were no English athletes in a televised race, and of wondering what ever became of the boy who had been the spin-bowling genius of the primary school cricket team after he had emigrated to those distant islands, another England, people said, where the people were much nicer than the rough Australians.

Not only did I buy Sinclair, but I read him. I cannot say that I marked and learned, but I may have inwardly digested, for I recall gaining unexpected brownie points in a second-year undergraduate tutorial on Roosevelt's New Deal by airily remarking that of course, many of his relief measures had been independently adopted in New Zealand, but with little effect. But in a wider sense, I think I can claim to have inwardly digested one Sinclair message - that New Zealand, that distant England through the looking glass, was a Pacific country. I remembered his description of 'Beach', the raucous frontier port of Kororareka, which came alive again when I visited the Bay of Islands - how many historians manage to stimulate tourism? I noted the significance of the point that it was the Californian Monterey pine (rather, say, English oak tree) which is among the commonest trees in New Zealand.

Above all, I was haunted by two images, obviously personal recollections of the 1930s and early 1940s. One caught the desperate idealism of the 1935 election, a small boy's memory of an Auckland radio station, 'The Friendly Road', run by the Reverend C.G. Scrimgeour ('Uncle Scrim'). 'Of its theme song', wrote Sinclair, 'the author can recall little except its reference to the President in the White House; its exhortation, "Brother, do your share"; and its comforting assurance: "There's a new day in view".' (There certainly was for 'Uncle Scrim', whose support for Labour landed him the post of Controller of Commercial Broadcasting with a goodly salary.) The other brought alive the threatened isolation of New Zealanders in the aftermath of the sinking of the Prince of Wales, as ill-equipped Territorials waited for a Japanese invasion which they knew they could not repel. 'But it was not the Japanese who invaded New Zealand. One day in 1942 the coastal forces saw a grey ship slipping down the Hauraki Gulf, then two, then ten. The United States Marines had arrived, a century after the New England whalers had sailed away.' The poet and the historian unite in those lines, the

grey ship slipping through a circle of time.

Much later, it dawned on me that these were Auckland images, part of the world-view of a fourth-generation New Zealander from the North Island's largest urban centre. He understood the Maori Wars (as they were still called when his first major book was published in 1957), partly because the Sinclairs, victims of the Highland Clearances, knew both what it was like to lose and to covet land. He was, I felt, less at ease with Walter Nash, finding it hard to penetrate the mind of an Edwardian, petit-bourgeois British migrant. Yet Nash undoubtedly tells us something about the ethos of Wellington and the bungaloid world of the Hutt Valley, and is at least as revealing of the New Zealand radical tradition as Semple the orator, Lee the larrikin or Reeves the exile.

Once, I even managed to catch Sinclair in error. In his essay on the 'Scarecrow Ministry', in the Willis Airey Festschrift, Studies of a Small Democracy, he argued that the prolonged domination of politics by the 'governing families' during the 1870s and 1880s was partly to be explained by the fact that a large proportion of the population was illiterate: in 1878, 23.7 percent could neither read nor write, and a further 6.7 percent could only read. It was an item of evidence which struck me as being very much part of a Sinclair view of New Zealand, for by implication it made all the more remarkable the pioneering legislation of the 1890s. Yet I was uneasy with the statistic, since New Zealand struck me much more as a serious, self-improving Victorian society. So I turned to the 1878 census, and there indeed was a table showing that 23.7 percent of the population of New Zealand that year was illiterate. Two pages further on, a more detailed table explained that 98.47 percent of New Zealanders under the age of five were illiterate, and in 1878 an awful lot of New Zealanders were under the age of five. In the 30-34 age group, almost 93 percent (if we are to believe the census) could both read and write. (It should be added that in his 1980 reissue of the Pelican History, which has something of the flavour of the elegiac gloom of another poet's second thoughts - Tennyson's Locksley Hall Sixty Years After - Sir Keith Sinclair not only that modern New Zealanders are among the best educated people in the world, but that their country's short history - some would add, and small population - make them unusually

ready to turn outward and avoid insularity.)

There is a certain furtive delight in contesting even the sweepings of an admired scholar, but when I was asked to give a lecture to the Arts Faculty at the University of Otago, I attributed the error, with much heavy irony appreciated by a Dunedin audience, merely to an unnamed professor at a certain North Island university. The truth is that I have put not a few howlers of my own into print and the difference between Sir Keith Sinclair and me is that noone is likely to take the trouble to point mine out. Perhaps there is some affinity between Sinclair as historian and A.J.P.Taylor, in that even though they might sometimes be wrong (Taylor more often than Sinclair), both stimulate their readers to ask - why? Yet the comparison is unfair. Hundreds of years of Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns give a head-start to any scholar who wishes to pirouette in the realms of paradox. A century of sheep farmers and earnest perfectionists offers less promising material. But the real difference lies in viewpoint and intent: it is hard to write as if of a real world from the banks of Cherwell, because it is itself a place of fantasy. From the shores of the Hauraki Gulf, New Zealand is something both real and worthwhile.

More than two decades ago, Keith Sinclair founded the New Zealand Journal of History. Now, following his retirement both from the editorship and from the Auckland department, his successors have honoured him with a special issue, with articles about him and about the themes which have most interested him. The opening personal sketch is magnificent, hovering uncapturable between detachment and involvement like a grey ship in the Hauraki Gulf: happy the land that can claim both Keith Sinclair and Bill Oliver, and happier still to have confirmed that for all their perceived intellectual differences they refuse to be 'deadly enemies and not good drinking coppers.'

The editorial introduction neatly categorises the various essays, tagging each to phases of the Sinclair odyssey. Judith Binney discusses Maori oral traditions, Claudia Orange the Maori War Effort Organization and Keith Sorrenson the role of the Waitangi Tribunal since 1975. These essays - especially in the controlled outrage of Claudia Orange - collectively honour Keith Sinclair in their recognition that in New Zealand, the past has both a moral and a practical relationship to the

present.

Russell Stone's essay on Auckland business cliques is a reminder that the man so often associated with the Left and those who begged to deride the rich and powerful was also the co-historian of the Bank of New South Wales in his own country. The balanced currency of the Festschrift is maintained by five essays on aspects of New Zealand political history. Raewyn Dalziel challenges the idea of the 'Continuous Ministry', the background to the 'Scarecrow Ministry' and the fractured triumph of Pember Reeves. David Hamer discusses one of New Zealand's less saleable political experiments, the Second Ballot - a device which, in modern France, leads governments even to break solemn obligations to keep their own criminals in luxurious confinement. Jeanine Graham casts oblique doubt on the reforming triumphs of the Liberals by discussing legislative responses to the problem of child labour. Erik Olssen re-examines the origins of the Labour party, in an essay which pushes the crucial formative period back into the latter days of the Liberal ascendancy. Michael Bassett begins his 'search' for Sir Joseph Ward by wondering why so few private papers survive for such a long-serving minister: his paper was originally delivered before he joined the cabinet himself. To complete the collection, Judith Bassett describes the 1901 royal tour of New Zealand, when the Duke of York toured King Dick's Dominion, and Mary Boyd discusses New Zealand's own venture into imperial rule in Western Samoa.

In 1950, the young Keith Sinclair provocatively called for a 'generation of pedants' to unravel the minutiae of New Zealand history. Now, in a prefatory poem, his friend Kendrick Smithyman pictures Sinclair 'answering ... questions not yet proposed.' This commemorative volume marks the success of a career which has spurred a whole generation of scholars to define and tackle questions about their country's past. Keith Sinclair could never inspire anyone to pedantry.

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At the very beginning I must confess my ignorance of the Canadian short story. I know very little of the Canadian writing New discusses and in effect I shall only be reviewing half his book. Comparative studies of this kind and I suspect that most readers will come at Dreams of Speech and Violence from either a Canadian or a New Zealand angle.

New's starting point is the unusual dominance of the short story in Canadian and New Zealand writing. Compared with Britain, America or Australia this is obviously true, although there are other literatures, Russian and Spanish for example, in which the short story has also been central. In his opening pages New connects this dominance of the short story form with the subordinate position of Canada and New Zealand to Britain, and to their large neighbours America and Australia. He also suggests this is why it has been read as a literary failure. The ubiquitous short story has commonly been seen as an inferior substitute for the great novels which remain unwritten. Lurking behind this is the fear that Canadian and New Zealand culture is not yet sufficiently mature to produce great novels. The short story is then read as a symptom of retarded cultural growth.

New's book tackles these fears and prejudices. He argues that there is nothing inferior about the short story as a form, and that Canadian and New Zealand examples of its practice show great subtlety and sophistication. A distinguishing feature of short fiction in both cultures is that writers tell their stories indirectly and obliquely. In Canadian short stories this indirect form characteristically involves serial effects of cumulative arrangement, shifting motif and reiterated rhetorical structure. The New Zealand short story more characteristically involves internal rather than serial fragmentation, with framed silence, oral gesture and the masks of memoir and memory among its distinguishing features. Common to the best short stories in both cultures is a commitment to open and broken forms, and an interrogation of conventional theories of

the short story with their expectations of wholeness and unity. These terms - indirect form, open form, serial fragmentation (Canada) and internal fragmentation (New Zealand) - constitute the critical armoury with which New attacks his subject.

Interesting as this approach is, it raises a number of problems. There is, I think, a great deal more to be teased out in the relation between regarding one's own culture as derivative or inferior, and producing short stories rather than fat novels. A.S. Byatt has argued that the short story can cross frontiers more easily than the social nuances and density of the long novel. If there is uncertainty about one's audience - is it at home? overseas? where is 'home'? - then the international form of the short story is likely to interest writers. The case of Mansfield is obviously relevant here, and Sargeson too was more quickly acknowledged overseas than if he had begun writing as a novelist.

A further problem is that there is nothing culturally specific about either of the main features New sees as characteristic of Canadian and New Zealand short stories. A self-conscious concern with form and language is a distinguishing feature of the short story per se. As Malcolm Bradbury argues in his introduction to the recent Penguin Book of Modern Short Stories, the constraints of length in many ways bring the short story closer to poetry than the novel. In any good short story the experience has to be somehow implicit in the form. New makes too much of this both as a critical discovery and as something specific to Canadian and New Zealand short stories. Furthermore, his own commitment to fragmentation means that New Zealand stories which do not seem to conform to this type are too summarily dismissed. The critical preference for fragmentation and open-endedness over unity and closure is by now widespread and familiar, and, by and large, it is one that I share. However, the terms 'open' and 'closed' need more critical scrutiny than New is often prepared to give them. Just how closed are many apparently whole, unified and well-turned stories? Is Sargeson's 'The Man and His Wife' open or closed? Is Joyce's 'The Dead' open or closed? Both are precisely crafted, patterned and coherent stories. Neither uses conspicuously open or broken forms, yet both open out into areas of experience which remain unspoken, even mysterious. Unlike realist

fiction, with its settling of accounts and judging of issues, any good short story, whatever its mode, is likely to suggest openness and indefinability. This seems to me a paradoxical consequence of its brevity, or something inherent in the form rather than characteristic of the Canadian or New Zealand short story.

New discovers the origins of the Canadian and New Zealand short story in the short documentary sketch. He contrasts this with other societies in which the short story has grown out of the folk-tale, romance or exemplum. In the earliest Canadian or New Zealand examples of the form there is a distinctive concern with documentary rather than narrative. These early 'open photographs' evolved from an essentially static form to that of shifting impression as the observing mind of the author redefined the documentary language of observation. In some of the early twentieth-century stories of Alfred A. Grace a new aesthetic impulse is discernible in the handling of the sketch, but it is of course Mansfield who is the key figure in the emergence of the form in New Zealand. In her earliest stories feeling and impressionism turn the sketch inwards into psychological drama, without relinquishing that sharp eye for detail, now used to document feeling, which had characterized early examples of the developing form. Mansfield's mood sketches develop into the open-form short stories of her maturity, with fragmented moments of sketch used to give shape and nuance to her art. 'At the Bay' becomes the ideal type of the open-ended story, contrasted favourably with the neat closures of 'The Garden Party' and 'Bliss'. New quotes from a letter Mansfield wrote to Richard Murry: 'I used to fancy one knew all but some mysterious core (or one could). But now I believe just the opposite. The unknown is far, far greater than the known. The known is only a mere shadow.' This sense, I think, is characteristic of all Mansfield's best stories, and not just those which can be described as open-ended rather than end-closed. Closure rarely achieves its end, as most serious writers since at least the time of George Eliot have realized. New sees Mansfield's skill with fragmentation rather than revelatory phrase as her particular gift to the short story. The point is well made, but the opposition of 'revelatory phrase' and 'fragmentation' is too simple. However her stories end, they voiced for her culture something beyond

its existing literary and social norms.

The next peak in the landscape of the New Zealand short story is, of course, Sargeson. New also, however, attempts to sketch in some of the foothills, and his pages on the literary context of the first forty years or so of this century, drawn from research in magazines and periodicals, is interesting. His social and historical generalizations are less satisfactory, and sometimes hair-raising. 'By the 1930s the National Image which had won fairly standard acceptance involved British homogeneity and the orderliness of fair play.' Tell that to the unemployed demonstrators attacked by mounted police in Wellington in 1932. And again: 'New Zealand political and economic life ran generally parallel to that in Australia, and the smaller society was not unaffected by the larger one.' This vacuous generalization says absolutely nothing, and indeed the Australian connection remains under-developed throughout the book.

In dealing with Sargeson, New has interesting things to say about the limiting realist assumptions which determined his reception and influence. Against this, New sees Sargeson as having freed local discourse from the self-imposed closure characteristic of writing between Mansfield and Sargeson: 'both writers [i.e. Mansfield and Sargeson] framed silence so that it became articulate, Mansfield by using it to assert that women's experience could not be described by current structures and Sargeson to say that men's experience was curtailed by those same structures.' Sargeson's legacy, in particular his demonstration of the suppleness and flexibility of language in New Zealand, enabled the short story to become, in the hands of Duggan, a medium of introspection and open play.

It is at this point in the book that New's arguments come to seem forced and limiting. The authentic short story tradition in New Zealand becomes a kind of relay with Sargeson receiving the baton from Mansfield and then passing it on to Duggan. Although New's range of reference to other New Zealand short story writers is impressive, too often it becomes a mere listing of names. There is no matching sense of a good many writers doing a number of different things at the same time. Instead, all but one or two writers at any particular moment seem to be doing the wrong things, and at times there has not even been a

single redeeming exception; for example 'in the thirty-year period that began about the time of World War 2, New Zealand short fiction went into the doldrums.' It was becalmed through Sargeson's misunderstood legacy of realism, and the consequent failure to perceive him as a stylist and innovator. Again the blame lies with closed forms and the biggest culprit is Shadbolt, dismissed in sprightly but not altogether fair passages. Shadbolt and his contemporaries - Hilliard, Ballantyne, Wilson et al - ran back the wrong way down the track Sargeson had travelled.

The early stories of Frame were a breeze of hope in this prolonged period of doldrum. Their interpretation of the visionary and the everyday, enigmatic metaphor and vernacular utterance, and their reading of the world as lying in the shapes and layers of language, were a new version of Sargeson's linguistic independence. However they promised only to disappoint. Their avoidance of summary is reversed in the later stories which are mainly 'end-closed and mechanical'. At this point, New's use of his critical armoury becomes a bit end-closed and mechanical itself.

It was therefore Duggan rather than Frame who made possible the experimentation with open and non-linear prose which new thinks has characterized New Zealand short story writing since the early 1970s. This is partly a consequence of Duggan's control over the nuances of fragmentation, his acceptance or discovery of the invalidity of resolution offering what New terms 'paradigms of indeterminacy'. It was also because Duggan's reaction against Sargeson's laconic plain style permitted a new linguistic freedom of artifice and elaboration. Underlying this, and all too briefly sketched in, was the breakdown of homogeneity, order and calm in New Zealand society. Realism's false illusion of pacific unity, its reflection of order, was forced by social change in the 1970s to give way to open, dissonant non-realist forms able to express social rupture. This is exemplified in the work of Maori writers like Patricia Grace and Witi Ihimaera, and Vincent O'Sullivan (the major baton carrier since Duggan). Even when writers of the last decade or so continue to use techniques of documentary illusion, they simultaneously remind us that it is illusion. There are no flies on the contemporary New Zealand short story writer. The lessons of Mansfield, Sargeson, Frame and Duggan have been learnt. The well-formed, unified, end-

closed short story is almost a thing of the past. Of course I simplify New's argument at this point, but I do so in order to draw out the simplifying nature of his own survey and argument. The oppositions he uses, and the formal modes he privileges are just not sufficiently flexible or sophisticated to cover the range of writing he examines. There is, in fact, a serious unresolved tension in this book between being a survey, covering the sweep and range of this most active of New Zealand literary forms, and a thesis, determined to separate the open and fragmentary from the closed and organic.

The final part of the New Zealand sections is a rather brief discussion of four short stories, designed - I take it - to exemplify the general approach the book has followed. Although there are good things in these short essays, particularly in the discussion of 'At the Bay' and Duggan's 'Along Rideout Road That Summer', they are oddly isolated from the main body of New's text. Each of them is short enough to have been integrated with the main text. 'For example' is heard too infrequently earlier in the book, and when it comes in these concluding essays there is a certain irony in watching a critic who strongly espouses open form remorselessly pinning everything down. Voicing the ineffable would be an appropriate title for this section.

Given this, and New's clear preference for one kind of short story over another, the tolerance and pluralism of his Epilogue reads a little strangely. 'To discern a fixed pattern in what they have done would ... falsify their accomplishment, and to conclude ... by suggesting numbered categories of national practice would be an arbitrary critical gesture and an unsatisfactory attempt to make the little anarchies of a fluid art serve the rule of measurement instead.' This states, too clearly for comfort, New's own procedures. There is much of interest and value in this study but it is far less permissive than its Preface and Epilogue would have us believe.

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R.C.J. Stone **THE FATHER AND HIS GIFT: JOHN LOGAN CAMPBELL'S LATER YEARS.** 24.5 x 15 cm, 309 pp, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1987, hbk, ISBN 1 86940 016 X.

As a foreign tourist walking in Auckland's Cornwall Park and observing the magnificent views from the top of Maungakiekie (One Tree Hill), I had paid little attention to the origin of the Park, or the obelisk on top of the hill. I had walked past the bronze statue at the north-west entrance to the Park and had not considered the origin of Campbell Road running along the Park's boundary. Having read R.C.J. Stone's fascinating account of the later years of John Logan Campbell, my next visit to Cornwall Park, and indeed to Auckland itself, will be made with renewed interest. I will have numerous fresh insights, gained from Stone's book and its predecessor, Young Logan Campbell, which shed much light on the foundation and 19th century development of Auckland. Not only will I know the story of Campbell's gift of Cornwall Park to the city, but much of the flavour of the economic trials and tribulations of the growing city will accompany me.

Although this is ostensibly the story of the last 55 years of the life of a remarkable entrepreneur, it is also the story of the emergence of Auckland from its position as an important element in a rather uncertain pioneer economy to a more prosperous, populous and substantial city in a country whose future seemed far more secure. The family and entrepreneurial details of Campbell's life are themselves of interest and worthy of study, but it is the insights to the general view of both Auckland and New Zealand that provide the greatest fascination. For much of his life, Campbell, and doubtless many other 19th century colonists, does not seem to have regarded New Zealand as his home. Indeed, despite deriving his major income from an Auckland-based business, Brown & Campbell, he preferred to travel in Europe for long periods (for example, between 1856-9 and 1862-71), having failed to reconcile "the European and colonial worlds between which he had been uneasily suspended." He seems to have looked upon New Zealand as a place from which to acquire wealth but not to live in or in which his children should be brought up.

That Auckland should have become his home for the last 41 years of his life seems to have been largely the result of personal family misfortune and

economic necessity. It is ironic therefore that he should have been hailed as 'The Father of Auckland' and have become mayor of the city. A statue of Campbell was erected in his lifetime, he was knighted, and he became a much revered figure - all this for a man who often seemed to be a reluctant citizen. However, what Stone portrays so vividly is a city and society gradually coming of age. That transformation from rough-edged pioneering settlement was somehow reflected in the continuing presence of one of its 'founding fathers', Campbell, who had made sufficient money from trading in the city to give land for the community and, on his death, make substantial charitable legacies (including money to found a Chair of Agriculture at Auckland University). Therefore this book represents a story within a story.

It is evident that The Father and his Gift represents the product of many years of research. The voluminous archive left by Campbell has been searched diligently to produce an extremely detailed account of his life. Similar reconstructions can be dry and dull; the success of this book is that the detail of the archive has been put to excellent use. Critical insights to Campbell the man are presented as well as the graphic portrayal of the background to the growth of Auckland in the second half of the 19th century. There are various 'sub-plots' that can be followed in what amounts to a multi-faceted story: Campbell the business man, the family man, patron of the arts, public figure, the European traveller, the colonist. Whilst the wealth of the surviving records has permitted such detailed reconstruction, this account is one which can be read with enjoyment. The avenues explored are many and varied; and this is a 'good read' as well as being a scholarly piece of work. Both this and its predecessor, Young Logan Campbell, give a valuable picture of the man and the society, and contribute greatly to the understanding of the early growth of Auckland and the country itself in the 19th century.

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
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
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
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